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

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IN

THE CHINA WAR

INCIDENTS

IN

THE CHINA WAR

OF 1860

COMPILED FROM THE PRIVATE JOURNALS OF

GENERAL SIR HOPE GRANT

G.C.B.

COMMANDER OF THE ENGLISH EXPEDITION



BY

HENRY KNOLLYS

CAPTAIN ROYAL ARTILLERY

AUTHOR OF 'FROM SEDAN TO SAARBRUCK,' AND EDITOR OF 'INCIDENTS IN THE SEPOY WAR'

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This Volume is Inscribed

TO

MAJOR-GENERAL F. C. A. STEPHENSON, C.B.,

LATE COMMANDING SCOTS FUSILIER GUARDS,

AND WHO SERVED IN THE CHINA CAMPAIGN

OF 1860

AS DEPUTY ADJUTANT-GENERAL TO

THE BRITISH FORCES.

PREFACE.

JUDGING by opinions expressed both by the Press and by private individuals, there is reason to believe that the narrative of Sir Hope Grant's military services in 'Incidents in the Sepoy War' has been read with some little interest. Sir Hope Grant has therefore once more been persuaded to intrust to me his private journals and his correspondence relating to the China War of 1860, and has allowed me to publish such portions as appeared to me to merit special attention.

It is necessary to explain that, in accordance with the General's directions, I have abstained from narrating certain facts, and from inserting certain correspondence, closely affecting public individuals still living; and this reservation has particularly applied to the share taken in the campaign by our French allies. Even with this drawback, however, it has appeared to me desirable to make further public the little-known

incidents of the war, and the little-realised successes then achieved by our troops, ere an additional lapse of years shall have entailed on the subject the proverbial indifference belonging to the feats of a bygone age.

This book has no pretensions to being a complete history of the Expedition. As in the case of 'Incidents in the Sepoy War,' the present diary was no after-thought composition. Day after day the events of the preceding twenty-four hours were committed to paper while fresh in the writer's memory.

HENRY KNOLLYS,
CAPTAIN ROYAL ARTILLERY.

17 EATON SQUARE, LONDON,
February, 1875.

POSTSCRIPT.

During the interval between the delivery of the manuscript of this volume to Messrs Blackwood and its publication, Sir Hope Grant died—March 7, 1875. During the month of February, however, he went over with me, carefully, the

proof-sheets; and as he was then in the same possession of his mental faculties as though he were in perfect health, it may with certainty be asserted that this book contains precisely the same matter the General would have desired had he lived to witness its publication.

HENRY KNOLLYS,
CAPTAIN ROYAL ARTILLERY.

17 EATON SQUARE, LONDON,
March 15, 1875.

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
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Taku
P E C H I L I
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Gulf
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SEA
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Scale of Miles
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100
150
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J. Barbed

INCIDENTS

IN THE

CHINA WAR OF 1860.

CHAPTER I.

JOURNAL.

SIR HOPE GRANT APPOINTED TO COMMAND CHINA EXPEDITION — SIR WILLIAM MANSFIELD DECLINES POST OF SECOND IN COMMAND—ARRIVAL AT HONG-KONG—ACQUISITION OF KOWLOON—EXPEDIENT FOR QUIETING CANTON —PROCEEDS TO SHANGHAI—WAR DECLARED—CONSULTATION WITH FRENCH CONCERNING PLAN OF OPERATIONS—SEIZURE OF CHUSAN—INTERVIEW WITH MANDARINS—HOW TO ALLOT QUARTERS—THE FRENCH AND THE FLAG-STAFF—RETURN TO HONG-KONG—COMPOSITION OF THE ENGLISH EXPEDITION—DELAY ON THE PART OF THE FRENCH—THEIR WANT OF TRANSPORT—ENGLISH TROOPS SAIL FOR GULF OF PECHILI—THE NEW ARMSTRONG GUNS — REMARKS BY THE EDITOR — LETTERS AND RETURNS.

In consequence of the severe reverses we had met with in the attack on the Peiho Forts in 1859, the English Government determined to

send out an expedition to China to demand redress, and to secure the provisions of the treaties made by the Earl of Elgin[1] and Baron Gros[2] respectively on 26th and 27th June 1858. The French likewise resolved to despatch a force to act in conjunction with ourselves.

Her Majesty, on the recommendation of his Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge, was pleased to nominate me to the command of the British troops, with the rank of Lieutenant-General—a mark of favour which I appreciated the more, because I had sought for it neither directly nor indirectly. Indeed, I heard from home that, in the first instance, Sir Charles Wood,[3] Secretary of State for India, had offered great opposition to my appointment, and had requested that Sir William Mansfield,[4] whom he considered much superior to myself, might be selected instead. But the Duke urged my fitness for the command, and at the same time pointed out the injustice of passing over a senior and competent officer who, his Royal Highness was

[1] Afterwards Governor-General of India; died 1863.

[2] Since dead.

[3] Now Viscount Halifax.

[4] Now General Lord Sandhurst, G.C.B., commanding the forces in Ireland.

good enough to say, had always done his duty.

I received private letters from the Duke, and from Mr Sidney Herbert,[1] Secretary of State for War, notifying to me my appointment, and explaining that Sir William Mansfield would be nominated my second in command, in consequence of his being a first-rate diplomatist and French scholar. Mansfield and myself had always been the best of friends, and I felt sure that we should continue to work together harmoniously; but it was hardly to be expected that he would consent to act as my junior, for he was considerably senior to me as a local Major-General, though below me in army rank. Accordingly, in course of time, he wrote to tell me that he had declined the appointment, provided the Government approved of his refusal. I replied that I thought the view he had taken of the matter a mistaken one; but, of course, he adhered to his opinion, which was subsequently fully endorsed by the home authorities. On 26th February 1860, I sailed on board the screw-steamer Fiery Cross from Calcutta for Hong-Kong, where we arrived on 13th March. Admiral

[1] Afterwards Lord Herbert; died 1862.

Hope,[1] who was there in command of the fleet, carried his flag on board the Chesapeake, and I at once proceeded to make his acquaintance. He was a tall noble-looking man, with a prepossessing and most gentlemanlike appearance, and we were not long in becoming excellent friends. From him I learnt that Lieutenant-General Cousin de Montauban,[2] the French military commander-in-chief, had gone to Shanghai, but that their senior naval officer, Admiral Page, was living on shore at Hong-Kong. I was most hospitably welcomed at Government House by the governor, Sir Hercules Robinson,[3] whose residence was beautifully furnished in English fashion, and well warmed with blazing coal-fires. Although we were in the same latitude as in Calcutta, the climate was entirely different—in Hong-Kong the weather in March was bitterly cold.

On the opposite coast, and within three-quarters of a mile of Victoria, was the promontory of Kowloon, a spot of which I was most anxious to gain im-

[1] Now Admiral Sir James Hope, G.C.B.

[2] Now Count Palikao. After the fall of the Ollivier Ministry in July 1870, he was head of the Government, until the battle of Sedan, September 1, 1870, overthrew the French Empire.

[3] Now Sir Hercules Robinson, K.C.M.G., Governor and Commander-in-Chief of New South Wales.

mediate possession—firstly, because its occupation was absolutely essential for the defence of Hong-Kong harbour and the town of Victoria; secondly, because it was an open healthy spot, admirably suited for a camping-ground on the arrival of our troops; thirdly, because at the conclusion of the war it would be a salubrious site for the erection of barracks, required for the Hong-Kong garrison; and lastly, because if we did not take it, the French probably would. This tract was about two miles in length and two miles in breadth, and was particularly healthy, owing to its being exposed to the south-west monsoon. There were, however, difficulties in the way. Mr Bruce,[1] our plenipotentiary, had sent an ultimatum to the Chinese Government, allowing them a month to reply, and war had not as yet been actually declared; so the forcible seizure of the promontory would not have been quite legal. Meanwhile, Mr Bruce directed Sir Hercules Robinson to apply to the governor of the two large provinces of Kwang-tung and Kwang-si, for a lease of a portion of the ground, about two square miles in extent. The mandarin governor was at that

[1] The Hon. Sir Frederick Bruce, G.C.B., British Minister in the United States, died 1867.

time resident in Canton; and Sir Hercules Robinson charged our consul at that town, Mr Parkes,[1] a clear-headed and able young man, with all his wits about him, to take steps for the attainment of our object. This, to my surprise and satisfaction, he accomplished most successfully. The mandarin agreed to give us a lease of Kowloon, together with "Stone-Cutter's Island," in perpetuity, on our engaging to pay a yearly rent of £160. Of course we instantly closed with these terms, and the lease was signed by both parties. On 18th March, the promontory was occupied by a detachment of the 44th Regiment. The 8th April was the day fixed on for the reply to our ultimatum; and I decided that if war were declared I would at once despatch a force of 2000 men, comprising 67th and 99th. Regiments, Rotton's battery of artillery, and a company of Engineers, &c., to take possession of Chusan, which would serve as a base of operations. Admiral Hope agreed to aid me with 600 marines; and Admiral Page, with the permission of General de Montauban, likewise promised to send 500 marines and sailors. The French regulations

[1] Now Sir Harry Parkes, K.C.B., Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Japan.

differ from our own with regard to command when the sea and land forces co-operate. The military officer, if he happens to be the senior, is empowered to employ the navy as he thinks fit, and *vice versâ*.

I was anxious to start at once for Shanghai, that I might proceed without delay to Chusan, should the answer to our ultimatum prove unfavourable; and Admiral Hope placed at my disposal a nice little steamer of about 800 tons called the Granada. Before setting off, I paid a visit to the town of Canton, where were stationed the 3d Buffs, the 67th Queen's, and the 65th and 70th native infantry regiments, under Major-General Sir Charles Straubenzee,[1] who had commanded the troops in China previous to my arrival, but who was now about to return to England—a very gentlemanlike active officer, and young for his rank.

Canton had been in a very disturbed state for some time; and on one occasion a gingal had been fired by some Chinese in concealment upon a party of fourteen military police as they were going their rounds, killing seven of their

[1] Now Lieut.-General Sir Charles Straubenzee, K.C.B., Governor and Commander-in-Chief of Malta.

number; whereupon the General, in reprisal, demolished the whole street in which the outrage had taken place, and thus effectually put a stop to a repetition of such occurrences. Canton was now very fairly quiet; and Lady Straubenzee, Mrs Straubenzee, wife of the aide-de-camp, and my wife, were carried in sedan chairs through the crowded streets and by-lanes without meeting with any incivility. On 31st March 1860, we set sail from Hong-Kong for Shanghai, where we arrived on 6th April; and I at once went to call on General de Montauban and Mr Bruce. The latter was our plenipotentiary in China; but his brother, Lord Elgin, was shortly expected to take over the management of affairs during the war.

I had formerly known Frederick Bruce well. In disposition he was a fine, upright, honourable fellow, and in appearance tall and strong made, with a remarkably good expression of countenance. I was sorry to find that the chief diplomatic power was to be taken out of his hands; but Lord Elgin had more experience, and had been in China before. General de Montauban was a fine, handsome, soldier-like-looking man, apparently under sixty years of age, with a pleasant expres-

sion, and in general appearance quite the "beau sabreur."

On 8th April, the official reply to our ultimatum arrived from Pekin, and was "cheeky" in the extreme, refusing point-blank all our demands. No doubt one reason for this was that our conditions were too moderate, and led the Chinese Government to think that we were frightened. Their answer was, however, quite what we expected, and war was at once declared.[1] [The following are the concluding words of the Chinese official reply: "The despatch written on this occasion is in much of its language too insubordinate and extravagant for the Council to discuss its propositions more than superficially. For the future the British Minister must not be so wanting in decorum. . . . It will behove (him) not to adhere obstinately to his own opinion, as so doing he will give cause to much trouble hereafter."]

On 14th April, Mr Bruce, Monsieur Bourboulon,[2] the French plenipotentiary — afterwards succeeded by Baron Gros—General de Montauban, Admiral Page, who had arrived from Shanghai, Admiral Jones,[3] second in command to Admiral

[1] See despatch at end of chapter.

[2] Since dead.

[3] Now Admiral Sir Lewis Jones, G.C.B.

Hope, and myself, assembled to arrange about the preliminaries of the war, and to decide on a few points bearing on the blockade of the Gulf of Pechili, and the immediate occupation of Chusan. We all agreed that it would be inexpedient to blockade the gulf—the war was not being waged against the poor inhabitants; we had not thought it necessary to seize their junks; and indeed, had we done so, our interests would probably have suffered more than those of the Chinese Government. We were likewise unanimous, with the exception of General de Montauban, in favour of immediately seizing Chusan. The French general, however, objected so strongly, that our conference lasted three hours ere we could reconcile our differences of opinion.

On 18th April, we set sail with the troops I have before mentioned[1] for Chusan, and the next day anchored at King-tang, at the mouth of the river Ningpo, the appointed rendezvous of our little force. On 20th, all our vessels got under way, some towed by steamers, and the rest sailing vessels, and on 21st we entered the beautiful harbour of Chusan. The batteries had all been

[1] See page 6. The numbers were 2000 English, and about 200 French marines.

dismantled since the last war in 1841, and no opposition was offered to us. A summons was at once sent to the chief mandarin to surrender to us quietly the town of Ting-hai[1] and the island; and it was also explained that all we required in addition was that the Chinese military forces should deliver up to us their arms and guns, which would be kept in safety and returned to them at the conclusion of the war. Mr Parkes, a very fearless man, was appointed our interpreter, and was sent into the town with the summons, and with instructions to endeavour to persuade the chief mandarins to come on board ship. Accordingly, in about a couple of hours he returned to the Granada, accompanied by the two chief men, a military and a civil representative. I notified their arrival to Admiral Page, and he at once joined our conference. The poor mandarins were humble and submissive, chiefly owing, I believe, to the kind manner with which they had been formerly treated when our people held possession of their island. But I was much vexed with the French admiral, whose manner to the Chinese was harsh and overbearing. They soon came to terms, and agreed to all our demands; and after

[1] The population of which was 400,000.

disposing of a good number of glasses of cherry brandy, they took their departure.

The next difficulty was in housing our troops. The French, after all, only brought with them about 200 marines, and Admiral Page had selected a joss-house at the north gate, near the French Roman Catholic mission, which had for a long time been established there. I supposed, therefore, that they were all comfortably located; and I forthwith allotted the other available buildings in the town to my own troops, of which I had over a thousand to every hundred of the French. I then went with Admiral Jones to Admiral Page's ship, and laid before him my proposed detail. He looked askance at the paper for some time, and I perceived that an explosion was gurgling up. "What is this I see?" he broke out at last; "nine, ten, eleven, twelve places for your men, and I have not one! I will not stand this. No, no; this must not be;" and he got up and stamped about the room as if I had grossly insulted him. I laughed, let his excitement calm down, and then asked him what he wanted. I told him I was most anxious to meet his wishes; but that in consequence of the number of troops I had with me it was necessary for me to avail myself of all the accommodation

which he did not himself require, and that notwithstanding all my efforts, I had still been compelled to leave the 67th Regiment on board ship. "Only write down," I wound up by saying, "what you require." He flew to pen, ink, and paper, put his hand to his head, and began to consider. At length, after some deliberation, he wrote down that he required a building for the officer commanding the French marines, and a small hospital. Of course I instantly acceded to his demand. We also agreed that the joss-house on the hill, a building invested with a sort of official dignity, should be occupied by a force of twenty men from the English and French troops. And here another difficulty arose. Under such circumstances, custom prescribes that the national ensigns shall be hoisted. The French got hold of a good long pole and fixed their flag to it. Our men, after considerable difficulty and search, laid their hands on a stout beam which was considerably loftier, and from the top of which our standard floated in the breeze as if looking down contemptuously on its ally. I have no doubt that herein our seamen were actuated by some little malicious feeling; but the commotion created amongst our allies did not tend to promote the good feeling which I was so

anxious to establish. At last the French soothed their feelings by hoisting their banner on a still higher beam, and the rivalry of the poles ceased.

All these small troubles having been at last smoothed over, on 23d April I set sail[1] and returned to Hong-Kong, where there was a great deal of work awaiting me. Admiral Hope was an excellent officer and a first-rate colleague, and we got on together admirably. Nearly all our force was now concentrated on the newly-acquired promontory of Kowloon. Its composition was as follows:[2]—

Queen's Regiments.

Infantry, six battalions.
King's Dragoon Guards.
Military Train.
Royal Artillery—5 field-batteries and 2 siege-batteries; the whole under the command of Brigadier Crofton, R.A.[3]

[1] A small garrison was left behind to hold Chusan.

[2] For detailed return see p. 29. In addition, there were the 87th Regiment, the 13th Punjaub Infantry, some marines, &c., stationed at various garrisons.

[3] Major-General Crofton died 1863.

Royal Engineers—3 companies, under Colonel Mann, R.E.[1]

Native Troops.

Sikhs—Loodianah Regiment.
4 regiments of Punjaub infantry.
Madras Sappers.
A company of Goolundaz.[2]
2 Bombay native infantry regiments.
21st Madras Native Infantry Regiment.
2 Irregular Sikh cavalry regiments.

The total strength was 13,116 men, of whom about 1000 were cavalry.

The two irregular cavalry regiments were really magnificent. They were composed of fine handsome men—Sikhs—becomingly dressed, well mounted, and commanded by two excellent officers—Major Fane,[3] and Major Probyn,[4] both of whom I had known well in India during the Mutiny. The

[1] Now Colonel Mann, C.B., commanding Royal Engineers at Malta.

[2] Native Sappers.

[3] Now Lieut.-Colonel Fane, C.B., Commandant of the 19th Bengal Cavalry (late Fane's Horse). An irregular cavalry officer of great repute during the Indian Mutiny.

[4] Now Major-General Probyn, V.C., C.B. The services of this

King's Dragoon Guards was also one of the finest regiments in the service; and, altogether, I had reason to be proud of my little cavalry force. It was commanded by Brigadier Pattle,[1] of the King's Dragoon Guards.

My staff consisted of Colonel Stephenson,[2] Scots Fusilier Guards, Deputy Adjutant-General. I consider myself most fortunate in this appointment, as not only was he in every respect a first-rate staff officer, but he possessed a peculiarly conciliatory manner, which smoothed over many difficulties, and specially qualified him for the post of an adjutant-general.

Major Hon. C. Dormer,[3] Assistant Adjutant-General.

distinguished cavalry officer are almost historical, especially in the annals of Indian military operations, where, during the Mutiny, his exploits mark him as the beau-ideal of a leader of irregular horse. (*Vide* 'Incidents of the Sepoy War.') After the China campaign, he held various appointments, his last post being Commandant of the Central Indian Horse, and Political Agent in West Malwa. On returning to England, he was gazetted in 1872 Equerry to His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales.

[1] Now Major-General Pattle, C.B.

[2] Now Major-General F. C. A. Stephenson, C.B., to whom this volume is dedicated.

[3] Now Lieut.-Colonel Dormer, Assistant Adjutant-General, Dover.

Major Taylor,[1] Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General.

Colonel Kenneth Mackenzie,[2] Deputy Quartermaster-General. This skilful and valuable officer performed his onerous duties with a judgment and ability which merited my warmest approbation.

Colonel Ross,[3] Assistant Quartermaster-General.

Lieut.-Colonel Wolseley,[4] Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General—a very excellent officer.

Dr Muir,[5] principal medical officer. A great deal of responsibility devolved on him, and he performed his duties with great zeal and ability.

Major Reboul[6] was appointed French Com-

[1] Now Colonel H. D. Taylor, Madras Staff Corps, Inspector-General of Police, Central Provinces, India.

[2] Colonel Mackenzie, C.B., late Assistant Quartermaster-General, Horse Guards, died from the results of an accident met with while fording a river, in the performance of his duties during the Dartmoor manœuvres of 1873.

[3] Since dead.

[4] Now Major-General Sir Garnet Wolseley, K.C.B., K.C.M.G. Inspector-General of Auxiliary Forces.

[5] Now Sir William Muir, K.C.B., Director-General of the Medical Department.

[6] Major Reboul was afterwards appointed to the Chasseurs of the Guards, and was taken prisoner at the battle of Sedan, Sep-

missioner with the English headquarters. He was a very agreeable gentlemanlike officer, and spoke English like an Englishman.

Lieutenant Biddulph,[1] Royal Artillery, was my military secretary. He carried on the duties of this responsible position with zeal and ability, and I entertained a high opinion of him. Captain Hon. A. Anson,[2] Captain F. Grant,[3] Major Sarel,[4] and Captain Farquharson,[5] were my aides-de-camp. They were all excellent staff officers, and were frequently intrusted with important duties, which they invariably carried out to my satisfaction.

Colonel Mann was the commanding officer of the Royal Engineers. He carried out his duties most ably.

The two Generals of Divisions were Major-General Sir John Michel[6] and Major-General Sir

tember 1st, 1870. In consequence of the personal application of Sir Hope Grant to the Prussian authorities, the rigours of his confinement were much modified.

[1] Now Colonel Biddulph, Assistant Adjutant-General for the Auxiliary Forces.

[2] Now Lieut.-Colonel Anson, V.C., C.B., retired.

[3] Now Lieut.-Colonel Grant, retired.

[4] Now Colonel Sarel, C.B., Assistant Adjutant-General, Dover.

[5] Now Major Farquharson, 60th Rifles.

[6] Now Lieut.-General Sir John Michel, G.C.B.

Robert Napier[1]—both excellent officers. Captains Green[2] and Allgood[3] were Deputy Assistants Adjutant-General and Quartermaster-General to Sir John Michel. Major Dillon[4] and Lieutenant Lumsden[5] filled the same positions on Sir Robert Napier's staff.

The Brigadiers were Sutton,[6] Jephson,[7] Staveley,[8] and Reeves.[9]

About the middle of May the French troops began to arrive at Shanghai;[10] but they had not yet made any arrangements to procure horses for their guns, and had organised little or no com-

[1] Now General Lord Napier of Magdala, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., Commander-in-Chief in India.

[2] Afterwards succeeded by Captain Stuart, 1st Royals.

[3] Now Major-General Allgood, retired, Chief of the Constabulary in Northumberland.

[4] Now Colonel Martin Dillon, C.B., C.S.I., Military Secretary to the Commander-in-Chief in India.

[5] Now Major-General Lumsden, C.B., C.S.I., A.D.C. to the Queen, and Quartermaster-General of the Bengal Army.

[6] Since dead.

[7] Now Major-General Jephson, C.B., retired.

[8] Now Lieut.-General Sir Charles Staveley, K.C.B., Commander-in-Chief at Bombay.

[9] Since dead.

[10] Some of the French troops lay at anchor at Hong-Kong for a short time on their way to Shanghai. See return at the end of this chapter.

missariat.[1] Upon hearing this, I offered General de Montauban to let him have 170 ponies, which we had collected at Shanghai, and were in excellent condition, provided he paid their cost. He was much pleased with my offer; but after consulting with his staff, he declined it, considering the price of the ponies excessive. This little piece of economy was more expensive in the end, and did not further the main object in view—viz., to bring the war quickly to an end. The ideas of the French on this subject evidently differed from ours, for his officers stated that they did not expect to be able to get to work this year. I understood, however, that instructions had been received from the Emperor to delay as little as possible, and they then set to work with vigour. In course of time they obtained a number of ponies from Japan, and began breaking them into harness.

By 1st June the whole of the British force had sailed for the Gulf of Pechili. Unfortunately, the Assistance, a fine steam-transport, commanded by Captain Balfour, R.N.,[2] struck upon a rock going into "Deep Bay" and went down. No one

[1] See remarks at the end of this chapter. [2] Since dead.

was drowned, and nothing was lost except some provisions. The French sustained a severe loss in two large transports. One, the Isère, laden with harness for their gun-horses, and 400 tons of gunpowder, struck upon a rock entering Amoy, and sank; and the other, the Queen of Clippers,[1] containing stores of various kinds, and especially a quantity of warm clothing for their soldiers, took fire off Macao and was burnt. Our troops had scarcely sailed when a severe north-east gale set in so strongly that thirty of our vessels were obliged to put back into Hong-Kong, where they remained until the 8th June, when the wind shifted to the south-west, and the expedition started afresh. Admiral Hope sailed on the 9th June; but I remained behind to meet Lord Elgin, who was daily expected.

Thus far everything had gone wonderfully well with us. The men were in excellent health; and our cavalry and artillery horses were assembled in capital condition. We had purchased and collected, from various places, numbers of ponies and mules; and had also organised a coolie corps.

[1] An English transport hired by the French, and designated by them *Reine des Clippères.*

I must also mention that two batteries[1] of the newly-invented Armstrong guns had arrived from England; and, to judge from some experiments made with them at Kowloon, we had every reason to consider them a great improvement upon the old smooth-bore 9-pounder.

[Sir Hope Grant, in his journal, here gives a minute description of these weapons, which at that time had been recently introduced into our service. Great importance was then attached to the fact that they were loaded at the breech; and, as will be seen in the sequel, they fully came up to the expectations formed of them. Of late years, however, breech-loaders have, in the British Royal Artillery, been discarded in favour of muzzle-loaders, contrary to the conclusions arrived at by the great majority of European States.—H. KNOLLYS.]

At last I determined to wait no longer for Lord Elgin, and I once more embarked on board the Granada. My wife remained behind me in the Commander-in-Chief's residence, over which had been established a guard of native soldiers—but for these the Chinese care little. On one occasion, one of these sentries was pacing

[1] Viz., Lieut.-Colonel Barry's and Major Milward's.

up and down in front of Government House, when a Chinaman crept up behind, tripped up the sentry by means of a long stick with a crook at the end of it, wrested the musket out of his hands and bolted.

Remarks by the Editor.—In all military operations beyond Europe, the provision of transport has invariably been a gigantic difficulty, and the present instance proved no exception. Native horses, mules, and ponies were with much difficulty and expense collected from India, Manilla, and Japan. In one instance the fittings of a ship conveying ponies from Japan gave way, and 70 out of 270 died. It was in a great measure owing to the scarcity of draught animals experienced by the French that the armies were unable to take the field until so late a date that, as will be subsequently seen, Pekin was captured but just before the severe winter set in. But for the strenuous efforts which were made to hasten the preparations, there is reason to suppose that the operations of the expedition would have been prolonged into another year. Our embarrassments were increased by the ignorance of all foreigners as to the resources of the country—thus requiring an accumulation of every sort of sup-

plies. Our English practice of protecting the inhabitants, and of paying for whatever we consumed, once more met with its reward. When we landed in Ta-lien-wan Bay,[1] proclamations in the Chinese language were distributed throughout the adjacent villages, assuring the inhabitants that we intended to pay them liberally for their supplies; and that if any of them received ill-treatment at the hands of the English, the injured parties would obtain redress by representing their cases to certain indicated civil officers who understood Chinese. At first all the inhabitants fled; but after a few days, realising the fact that our reign was a reign of order, honesty, and justice, they gradually returned, bringing with them every description of provisions into our camp. These were bought up by the commissariat at a fair rate, and a plenty prevailed which more or less attended the English army throughout the campaign. So great was our solicitude on this point, that in one of the semi-official, semi-private documents with which I have been furnished I find the following entry: "June 30th, compensation ordered for the crops destroyed by the camps." Now, had we pursued an opposite

[1] *Vide* chapter 2.

course—had we acted on the somewhat brutal theory of making war support war—full surely would our economy have proved false and unjust, and full surely should we have rued the evil consequences.—H. K.

DESPATCH from Mr F. BRUCE to Sir HOPE GRANT.

"SHANGHAI, 16*th April* 1860.

"SIR,—You are aware that the Imperial Commissioner Ho has communicated to me a document emanating from the Great Council of State at Pekin, and purporting to be a reply to the ultimatum sent by me.

"Not one of the demands made is accepted; and the language in which the document is couched convinces me that the course most likely to conduce to a speedy and satisfactory termination of existing differences, is to treat the reply as altogether unsatisfactory, and to call upon her Majesty's military and naval authorities to prosecute with vigour and despatch the military preparations for an advance on the north. It is possible that when the Pekin Government becomes more alive to their magnitude than it is at present, more moderate counsels may prevail; but I am

led to conclude, from the most reliable sources of information, that such will not be the case, unless the hostile party now dominant feel that they are unable to resist on land the force brought against them; and I fear, after the unsuccessful attempt at the Peiho last year, that they will not be convinced of that fact by anything short of actual defeat.

"I will keep you informed of any fresh overtures of the Imperial Government which may seem deserving of consideration, as I know that you, as well as myself, would willingly see the question terminated with as little effusion of blood, and as little disturbance of peaceful relations with the industrious classes of China, as possible. The latter consideration is of the highest importance with reference to our future position in this country.

"Monsieur de Bourboulon has taken a similar view of the reply received by him from the Chinese Government to the French ultimatum, and has informed me that he will to-day call upon the French military and naval authorities to act.—I have the honour, &c.,

"FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE."

DESPATCH from Viscount CANNING,[1] Viceroy of India.

"UMBALLA, 9*th May* 1860.

"DEAR SIR HOPE GRANT,—I was very glad to get your letter of the 27th March, which reached me as I was leaving Simla a few days ago. It is a great relief to find that, notwithstanding the outcries from home, and the early presence on the scene of General de Montauban, we are not behindhand. It is an excellent thing that the material force should, at starting, be mainly at your back and not at his. I hear a good account of General de Montauban as a sensible, conciliatory man; but nobody in England seems to know much of him as a soldier.

"The despatch which I was obliged to send you last month respecting the (supposed) undue excess of our force will, I hope, give you no trouble. The truth is that, as therein shown, we exceed the prescribed 10,000 by very little, when garrisons are deducted; and that little can, if you think right, be sent back to us, either to Singapore, or Calcutta, or whatever Indian port may best suit the remanded men. It was not until many weeks after our Indian force had been warned for ser-

[1] Earl Canning, K.G.; died 1862.

vice, and much of it despatched, that I heard of any agreement with the French Government that it should not exceed 10,000; and up to that time the cry had been, 'send all you can.'

"Probably Lord Elgin's arrival with a French colleague, and fresh from Paris, will do away with all risk of a misunderstanding of our exaggerated strength, either in France or on the spot. I should like much to know whether you have as yet had any questionings or heard of any remarks upon it from the French staff. Bruce has done well in securing the Kowloon peninsula. If the readiness of the Governor-General to treat for it may be taken as an indication of a disposition to peace on the part of his superiors, it will be still better; but I suppose Pekin did not know what Canton was doing when the bargain was made.

"The only part of your letter which makes me a little uneasy, is what you say of the French not contemplating to begin work until the middle of August. I am glad that they should not be ready before ourselves; but this surely will be very inconveniently late. The northern coast is, I believe, untenable by troops or ships after the beginning of November—that is, for active operations.

"Good-bye, my dear Sir Hope Grant. I hope

you will continue to let me know how you get on; and, believe me, very faithfully yours,

"CANNING.

"Lieut.-General Sir HOPE GRANT,
K.C.B., Hong-Kong."

SUMMARY of EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, as embarked at Hong-Kong up to 7th June 1860.

Regiments and Corps.	Strength. Officers.	Men.	Horses.
Barry's[1] Armstrong battery,	7	220	195
Milward's[2] " "	7	220	145
Desborough's[3] battery, .	8	197	135
Moubray's[4] " .	6	224	150
Govan's[5] " .	9	242	150
Rotton's[6] " .	6	142	...
Guns of position, . .	9	280	...
Madras mountain-train, .	10	219	67
1st King's Dragoon Guards,	8	126	146
Fane's Horse, . . .	14	352	372
Probyn's Horse, . .	18	454	466
Fisher's company (No. 10) Royal Engineers, . .	2	94	...
Half of No. 8 company, 7 Royal Engineers, . .	2	46	...

[1] Now Colonel Barry, C.B.

[2] Colonel Milward, C.B., A.D.C. to the Queen, and Superintendent Royal Laboratory, Woolwich; died Dec. 2, 1874.

[3] Now Colonel Desborough, C.B.

[4] Commanded by Captain Stirling throughout the campaign.

[5] Now Lieutenant-Colonel Govan.

[6] Now Colonel Rotton.

Regiments and Corps.	Strength. Officers.	Men.	Horses.
Graham's company, No. 23, Royal Engineers, . .	4	90	...
Madras Sappers, . .	8	236	...
2d battalion 1st Regiment,	29	541	...
1st " 2d "	27	625	...
1st " 3d "	27	816	...
31st Regiment, . . .	30	973	...
44th " . . .	25	942	...
2d battalion 60th Rifles, .	29	773	...
67th Regiment, . . .	29	752	...
99th " . . .	30	899	...
Regiment of Loodianah, .	10	633	...
8th Punjaub Infantry, .	20	783	...
15th " " .	15	929	...
19th " " .	14	661	...
Military train, . . .	21	250	...
Chinese Coolie Corps, .	15	297	...
Total, . . .	439	13,116	1826

Besides troops stationed at various garrisons.

RETURN of FRENCH FORCES in CHINA.

See p. 19.

EXPEDITIONNAIRE DE CHINE.

Etat Major-Général.
Situation Sommaire de l'armée Française en Chine.

Général Commandant en chef les forces de terre et de mer—COUSIN DE MONTAUBAN.

Chef d'Etat Major-Général—Lt.-Colonel SCHMITZ.
Commandant de l'artillerie—Colonel de BENTZMAN.
Commandant du Génie—Lt.-Colonel LIVET.
Chef des services administratifs—Sous Intendant BUBUT.
Prévôt—Capitaine TANISSAT.
Payeur Général—M. LAFFAGE.

Troupes.

Commandant la 1ère Brigade et commandant en second de l'Expédition—Général de Brigade JAMIN.

2ème bataillon de Chasseurs à pied, environ	850
101ème Régiment de ligne, . . .	1550
1 compagnie du 1er Régiment du génie,	142
1 " 3ème " "	140

Commandant la 2ème Brigade—Général de Brigade COLLINEAU.

102ème Régiment de ligne, . . .	1600
Régiment d'Infanterie de marine, . .	1500
Total approximatif pour l'Infanterie,	5782

(y compris 2 compagnies du génie qui figurent dans la première brigade pour le combat.)

Artillerie.

Une compagnie de pontonniers.
4 batteries à six pièces chacune.
Une section de fuséens.
" " d'ouvriers.
" " d'armuriers.

Total approximatif, ...	1200

Génie.

2 compagnies qui figurent dans la première brigade.

1 section d'ouvriers, environ . . . 320

Gendarmerie.

1 Détachement, ... 30

Services Administratifs.

Service du train, et autres, environ . . 300

SHANGHAI,
Le 15 *Avril* 1860.

Le Chef d'Etat Major-Général,
J. S. SCHMITZ.

CHAPTER II.

SAILS FOR SHANGHAI—CONFERENCE WITH THE FRENCH—SIR HOPE GRANT'S AND GENERAL DE MONTAUBAN'S RESPECTIVE PLANS OF ATTACK—DELAY ON PART OF FRENCH—DEPLORABLE CONDITION OF CHINA—GENERAL IGNATIEFF—VISITS WEI-HEI-WEI AND CHE-FOO—THE NEW FRENCH GUN—DISEMBARKATION OF BRITISH TROOPS AT TA-LIEN-WAN—ARRIVAL OF LORD ELGIN—SIR HOPE AGAIN URGES ON GENERAL DE MONTAUBAN THE NECESSITY FOR QUICKLY BEGINNING ACTIVE OPERATIONS—SPLENDID CONDITION OF OUR TROOPS—INSPECTION BY FRENCH—GENERAL DE MONTAUBAN ABANDONS HIS ORIGINAL PLAN, AND RESOLVES TO ACT WITH US IN ATTACK ON PEH-TANG—EMBARKATION OF TROOPS FOR PEH-TANG—STRENGTH OF FORCE.

ON 11th June I sailed from Hong-Kong for Shanghai. After we had proceeded about 500 miles on our journey, we came upon the last division of our ships at anchor behind a little island called Lam-yit. They had been detained there by a wind blowing so strongly from the north-east that the towing steamers could make no way against it. We had reason to suppose, however, that the monsoon would soon change to another

quarter. We therefore sailed on, and reached Shanghai on the 16th June; and I immediately went on shore, and arranged with Mr Bruce for a conference with General de Montauban the following day, that we might concert plans for our further proceedings. Colonel St George Foley,[1] the English Commissioner with the French, Major Réboul, and Monsieur Bourboulon, were likewise present at the conference. General de Montauban laid before us his plan of attacking the Taku defences. He proposed to land at a spot 25 miles south of the large fort which had done so much damage to our fleets the previous year, and then to march up along the coast through a wretched semi-barren country, taking with him his light guns only. For provisions and water he would rely upon his ships. This scheme appeared to me very hazardous. The difficulties of landing would be great; heavy winds might very probably arise, and prevent communication with his ships for days; and, above all, it was most unlikely that the large fort, which was armed with about sixty very heavy guns, could be compelled to yield to the fire of light field-pieces only.

[1] Now Major-General Foley, C.B., Lieutenant-Governor of Guernsey.

Before attending the conference I had consulted with Admiral Hope, and we both came to the conclusion that our most judicious course would be to proceed up the river Peh-tang, eight miles north of the Peiho, capture the town of Peh-tang, and there establish a base for future operations. The Taku forts were four in number, two small upper, and two large lower works—a large and a small fort being on each side of the river.[1] In front of the lower forts, near the mouth of the Peiho, were fixed two very strong chain-barriers, impassable for ships under fire; and on each side of the river was a salt-marsh. The plan which I proposed to the French general was first to attack Peh-tang, the defences of which were, so far as we could ascertain, of a less formidable description. Here, too, there was, it is true, a fort on each side of the river, but there were no barriers thrown across; and by landing near the town of Peh-tang we could attack in rear the Taku forts, which would thus probably fall after a short resistance.

General de Montauban remained wedded to his opinions, and proposed that we should each of us carry out our own scheme independently, as far as possible. To this I readily agreed. I

[1] See plan.

had an amply sufficient force for my purpose, and we should thus avoid many causes for disagreement. My satisfaction was marred by the French general's statement that he could not be ready to begin operations until the 15th July. This delay was serious, as by that date the rainy season would in all probability have set in, and would have so inundated the country as to render it almost impassable for troops. We were prepared to open operations on 1st July, but the French very naturally insisted on a simultaneous start; and as I had received strict injunctions from home to act in unison with our allies, I had no alternative but to wait patiently.

The long-haired rebels[1] who had risen against the Chinese Government were now becoming very formidable. They had taken Foo-Chow, the great emporium for silk, and had treated the inhabitants with great brutality, murdering women and children wholesale, and committing great destruction of property. They next began to make their appearance in the neighbourhood of Shanghai, where the panic amongst the native population was excessive, and the trade was stopped in consequence. Ho, the governor of

[1] The insurgents were distinguished by the length of their hair.

the province, applied to us to protect the town; and we therefore took possession of the gates, and I brought up the Loodianah Regiment from Hong-Kong. The garrison then consisted of 1030 men, which, with 600 French marines and a party of their sailors, was sufficient to insure tolerable safety for the place. China was indeed in a deplorable condition, with rebellion and misgovernment within, and a war with two great European nations from without. About this time General Ignatieff,[1] the Russian ambassador, arrived at Shanghai from Pekin. He spoke English very well, and appeared to me a straightforward, gentlemanlike man. The Emperor of China, a young man, 32 years of age, I was informed, had worn out his intellects and brought on paralysis, which deprived him of the use of his legs, by debauchery.[2] The government was in the hands of a party of civilians, who were determined to wage war to the last extremity. They overruled their famous general Sang-ko-lin-sin and the military mandarins, who were inclined for peace.

[The intestine strife which was then raging in

[1] Now Russian Ambassador at Constantinople.

[2] He died in 1862, and was succeeded by his son, who died while this work was in the press, aged 25.

China materially complicated the difficulties of the expedition, so far at least as the English were concerned, and powerfully influenced the ultimate result. On the one hand, the Imperial Government were unable to resist us with their whole force, owing to the necessity imposed on them for employing a large portion of their army in attempting to suppress the rebellion. But for this diversion, it is probable that by the mere force of numbers they would have succeeded at all events in rendering our subsequent march to Pekin a more perilous and a more protracted undertaking. On the other hand, the last thing to be desired was the overthrow of the ruling dynasty, or the flight of the Emperor from Pekin, whereby there would be no responsible Government with which we could negotiate, or from which we could take guarantees for the fulfilment of a treaty. A certain consequence of the above contingencies would be a complete state of anarchy and the cessation of our trade. Even so early as June, the rebel forces, fully appreciating the difficulties entailed upon the Imperial Government by our threatened descent upon the shores of Pechili, began to throng around Canton; and one large Taeping[1] army was reported to be within sixty

[1] Chinese rebels.

miles of the city, spreading universal terror and paralysing commerce. It therefore became the business of the English military and diplomatic authorities intrusted with the conduct of the war so to hit off the happy medium, that the Pekin Government might be rendered so weak as to be unable to offer to us further resistance, but so strong as to be capable of suppressing the formidable rebellion. Hence our wise anomaly of smiting them in the north at Taku, and serving them in the south at Canton. These complications little affected the French, as their commercial interests were small, and their longing for laurel-leaves in the shape of victory over the Imperial hosts of China great.—H. KNOLLYS.]

On 22d June I sailed from Shanghai for Wei-hei-wei, a town situated on the promontory of Shan-tung, at the commencement of the Gulf of Pechili, as I wished to ascertain whether it would be a suitable spot for the formation of a depot. On the way we touched at Woosung, about ten miles north of Shanghai. Here I made the acquaintance of Admiral Charner, who had been sent out from France in the Renommée to supersede Admiral Page. He was an elderly gentlemanlike person, had been a long time in the service, and I at once

saw we should get on well together, as he did me the justice to believe that I was most anxious to promote good feeling and cordiality between the nations. Altogether I welcomed the change very gladly, for his predecessor was a person with whom it was difficult to harmonise.

We continued our voyage, and after two days and a half reached Wei-hei-wei, where we at once landed and walked up to the gates of the town, which was small, containing about 2000 inhabitants, and, like all Chinese cities, walled in. The people were civil. We entered the gate unmolested, and after a short search discovered the residence of the chief mandarin. By means of an interpreter, I told him that I proposed establishing a force in Wei-hei-wei; and that if he would bring in supplies he should be well paid for them, and every consideration and kindness shown to the inhabitants. The mandarin, a humble fellow, declared that he would do his best, but that the resources of the town were very slender. Upon further investigation, I found that there was deficiency of good fresh water and of anchorage, and I therefore abandoned my intention of forming a depot at this place.

We next sailed for Che-foo, 35 miles higher up

the coast,[1] where the French had established large magazines under the supervision of General Baron Jamin, a most civil obliging officer, and particularly popular with his men. He showed me over his lines, formed round a conical hill, where his soldiers had pitched their *tentes d'abri*, which looked fairly comfortable on a fine day. He also directed my attention to the new French rifled guns[2] of the same description as those which had been used with so much effect in the late war with Austria. They were so light, that four Japanese ponies could easily draw them, and their range was considerable; but they had not the carefully adjusted sights which made our Armstrongs so formidable, and their fire was not particularly accurate. I told Baron Jamin that General de Montauban had stated he hoped to be ready to take the field by the 15th July; but he laughed at the notion, and declared it to be utterly out of the question. The number of ponies required for the artillery and other purposes was, he said, 620. As yet they had only 114, and these were still unbroken to harness.

[1] And opposite the English rendezvous of Ta-lien-wan.

[2] Commonly called the Napoleon gun—a converted muzzle-loading bronze gun with studded projectiles, rifled.

The English forces had been collected at Talien-wan, a magnificent bay to the west of a promontory in the large province of Manchooria, in the Gulf of Pechili, and opposite Che-foo. I now betook myself to this spot, and arrived there on the 26th June, where I found that our whole army, with the exception of 120 of the King's Dragoon Guards, had arrived in 73 vessels. This splendid fleet rode at anchor in the bay. The French force had not yet made its appearance; so, without any further delay, I landed all my troops and encamped them on three sides of the bay—the cavalry and artillery on the east, near the entrance, at a place called by us Odin's Bay, after the name of a vessel commanded by Captain Lord John Hay.[1] On the north was the 2d Division under Sir Robert Napier at Hand Bay; and on the west the 1st Division, Sir John Michel's, at Victoria Bay: the baggage animals were stationed near Sir John Michel's position. The men were in excellent health, and the horses in first-rate condition; and though they had travelled so far over a troubled sea, there had been scarcely a casualty amongst them. At first

[1] Now Captain Lord John Hay, C.B.

we apprehended a deficiency of fresh water, but in course of time we discovered one or two small streams flowing into Odin's Bay and Bustard's Creek; reservoirs were formed, and we were thus enabled both to supply the troops and to keep the ships well stored. The inhabitants were Tartars; and though at first surprised and frightened at our large ships of war and red-coats, soon became friendly, and brought us in abundance of supplies.

About this time I received an official letter from General de Montauban, in which, to my great satisfaction, he stated that his force would be ready to begin operations by the 25th July at the latest.[1]

[1] The following despatch serves to point out one of the difficulties attendant on carrying out military operations in conjunction with an allied power :—

"HEADQUARTERS, TA-LIEN-WAN,
9th July 1860.

"MY LORD,—I have the honour to inform your Excellency that the British land forces at this place amount to about 12,000 men.

"By a despatch from Lord Canning, I learn that the Home Government had arranged that the British expeditionary force should not exceed 10,000 men, and his Lordship requested me to act in accordance with this arrangement. To effect this reduction, it will be necessary for me to leave 2000 men at Ta-lien-wan.

On the 9th July, Lord Elgin arrived in the Feroze, and I immediately went on board to pay my respects. My eldest brother was married to his sister, Lady Lucy Bruce, and in former days I had known him well. Twenty years at least had intervened since we had last met, and we were, of course, both much changed; his hair had become perfectly white, and mine was well sprinkled with grey. We renewed our old acquaintance, and he told me how he and

As the aim of the expedition is a speedy success with as small loss as possible, it seems unwise thus to throw away the services of these men—the expense of bringing them to China having been already incurred; whilst the stronger the force, the fewer in all probability will be the casualties in action.

"From what I can gather, I understand that the French effective force will not greatly exceed 6700 men, including the garrison of Che-foo.

"Having informed Mr Herbert that the wishes of H.M. Government as expressed to Lord Canning will be attended to, and that the surplus force would be left at Ta-lien-wan, I venture to request that your Excellency will, if you think fit, obtain the concurrence of H.I.M.'s Plenipotentiary to the English force exceeding the limit of 10,000 laid down, in which case I would propose to leave only 600 men to guard the depot at Ta-lien-wan.—I have the honour, &c.

"J. HOPE GRANT, Lt.-Gen.,
Commander of the Forces.

"His Excellency the Earl of Elgin and Kincardine,
K.T., K.C.B., &c., &c., &c."

The authority requested was granted.

Baron Gros, the new French ambassador, had been wrecked in the harbour of Galle. Just as his ship, the Malabar, was preparing to sail, a severe squall suddenly came on and bumped her fifteen times on a rock, which knocked a hole in her bottom. Her steam was up, and they managed to run her ashore ere she sank; but nearly all the property of the passengers was lost. After Lord Elgin had made me acquainted with his views bearing on the politics of the war, I determined to start at once for Che-foo, in order that we might fix on a day for both armies to begin their move. I arrived there the next day, and proceeded to confer with the French general and admiral. Admiral Hope had been obliged to remain at Ta-lien-wan, in consequence of an injury he had sustained on the shin-bone.

I impressed upon General de Montauban the expediency of getting to work at once, and I showed him his own letter to me, binding himself to be ready by the 25th July. He seemed to have forgotten the existence of such a document, and declared his present inability to fix a day; but added that by the 20th July he would, at all events, let me know the exact date when he would be prepared to start. I dined with him that

evening, and then returned to Ta-lien-wan. On 13th July, General de Montauban and Admiral Charner came to pay an official visit to Lord Elgin and myself, and I took the two French officers to Odin's Bay to inspect the portion of our troops stationed there. On disembarkation we found the King's Dragoon Guards, and Probyn's and Fane's Horse, with a field-battery on each flank, drawn up to receive us. A salute was fired in honour of our guests, and we proceeded along the line. Though the force of cavalry and artillery was small, the sight in such a distant land was undoubtedly one to be proud of showing to the representatives of a great foreign power. It must be remembered that this force had been conveyed a distance of 5000 miles from India; that they had been embarked and disembarked several times during the process; and that, though frequently unprovided with proper landing-places, scarcely a casualty had occurred. Each English soldier was a splendid fellow, and looked as though he were a thoroughbred gentleman—powerful and strong enough to contend with any men the world could produce. The Sikhs, too, with their beautiful turbans wound gracefully over their ears and drooping down the

backs of their heads, were almost equally splendid, and looked as if they intended to vie in acts of daring with the British. I need scarcely add that the Royal Artillery was, as usual, in the most beautiful order. And then the horses were turned out in a manner which did credit to both branches of the service. They had been taken from the stud-depots of India; and having recently had plenty of rest and good food, they looked handsome, imposing, and full of breeding.

The French general walked down the line with me, and frequently expressed his admiration of our troops. Such a sight, he said, would not have been extraordinary in Hyde Park or in the Tuileries, but he could never have expected to witness it in China. In the evening, Lord Elgin, General de Montauban, and Admiral Charner, dined with me; but I am sorry to say that I cannot report so favourably of my dinner as of my parade.

Very plentiful supplies, in the shape of bullocks, sheep, goats, and vegetables, were daily brought in to us at Odin's Bay, so I determined to establish here a depot for supplying the rest of our army, and to leave a small force to protect it.

Lord Elgin had gone over to Che-foo to see

Baron Gros; and he wrote me word that the French had discovered the impracticability of landing a force south of the Taku forts. On hearing this, I at once went to Che-foo to see General de Montauban, who told me that he had sent a ship to reconnoitre the coast where he had proposed disembarking; but the report was so unfavourable that he had relinquished his original intention. He now wished to ask me whether I had any objection to his men landing at the place I had selected—viz., Peh-tang. I told him that he was at perfect liberty to do so, as it was my sincere wish to keep up a good understanding between the two nations. He then said that he should be quite ready to start by the 26th July. We afterwards rode out together into the country, which appeared fertile, well wooded, and cultivated. Here, too, the people were bringing in supplies freely, and also numbers of capital mules. Baron Gros allowed me to purchase two of these animals for my private use, which, from my experience during the Indian Mutiny would, I knew, prove most serviceable. During my last campaign in India, many a good breakfast had my old mule carried for me on the line of march.

On returning to Ta-lien-wan, we set to work in

earnest preparing for the real business of fighting. We had no difficulty in embarking the infantry, but the cavalry and artillery proved a more onerous affair. Thanks to Admiral Hope's judicious arrangements, and to the care and energy displayed by all the officers concerned in the operation, the whole of the horses were got on board safely, with the exception of one officer's charger, which broke its leg, and had to be destroyed. Our force amounted, in round numbers, to about 11,000 men; that of the French to 6700.

SUMMARY of EXPEDITIONARY FORCES, as arrived at Ta-lien-wan Bay up to 9th July 1860.

Regiments and Corps.	Strength. Officers.	Men.	Horses.
1st King's Dragoon Guards,	8	190	185
Probyn's Horse, . .	17	446	433
Fane's Horse, . . .	15	347	327
Royal Artillery, . . .	50	1515	747
Madras mountain-train, .	7	168	39
Royal Engineers, . .	11	224	...
Madras Sappers and Miners,	8	245	...
Military train, . . .	28	260	...
2d battalion 1st Royals, .	28	539	...
1st " 2d Queen's, .	28	617	...
1st " 3d Buffs, .	27	823	...
31st Regiment, . . .	30	970	...

Regiments and Corps.	Strength. Officers.	Men.	Horses.
44th Regiment, . . .	25	940	...
60th " (2d battalion),	30	772	...
67th " . . .	32	818	...
99th " . . .	22	584	...
8th Punjaub Infantry, .	15	763	...
15th " " . .	15	943	...
19th " " . .	19	463	...
Chinese Coolie Corps, .	14	264	...
Total, ...	419[1]	10,491	1731

(Signed) FREDK. STEPHENSON,
D.A.G.

[1] Of this number about 70 were native officers belonging to the regiments from India.—H. K.


PEH-TANG HO
Swampy
PEH-TANG
Joss Poles
Hard Ground
Marsh
Water
Route of 2nd Division 12th August
Advance of 2nd Division & French Force on 14th Aug
Enemy's Works
Hard Ground
Enemy's attacked on 2nd Div.
Gardens
Enemy's Works
Sin-ho
Swampy Ground
Gardens
Gardens
Cultivation
Camp of French on 13th
Hard Ground
Attack on 14th
P E I H O
TANG-KU
Reeds
Gardens
Chinese Battery
French Outposts on 18th Aug
Reeds
Attack on 21st
Northern Fort
Fort
Si-ku
TAKU
Southern Fort
SKETCH
of the
OPERATIONS
between the 1st & 21st August 1860.
Scale - Half Inch to One Mile
Miles

CHAPTER III.

DISEMBARKATION NEAR PEH-TANG—ADVANCE THROUGH THE MUD—SURRENDER OF THE TOWN—THE HIDDEN SHELLS—TALES OF VIOLENCE—DREAD OF FIRE—RECONNAISSANCE AND SEARCH FOR WATER—SIR HOPE GRANT RESOLVES TO CONTINUE MARCH, AND GENERAL DE MONTAUBAN AT LENGTH ACQUIESCES—MEASURES FOR ATTACKING THE SIN-HO FORTS—FRESH STRUGGLES THROUGH THE MUD—GALLANT ATTACK OF TARTAR CAVALRY AGAINST STIRLING'S GUNS—REPULSED BY PROBYN'S HORSE—CAPTURE OF THE SIN-HO FORTS—FRENCH ADVANCE AGAINST TANG-KU, BUT ARE FORCED TO RETIRE—PRISONERS CAPTURED BY THE TARTARS—ATTACK AND CAPTURE BY THE ALLIES OF TANG-KU ON 14TH AUGUST—INCIDENTS IN THE ENGAGEMENT—DESPATCH FROM LORD ELGIN.

ON 26th July 1860, our fleet got under way. It consisted of 73 vessels, some of which were sailing ships, and the others steamers, drawn up in two lines. The French fleet, composed of 40 transports and men-of-war, formed the third line. On 27th and 28th July we anchored within 20 miles of the Taku forts, which loomed large in the

distance; and on 30th we approached to within 10 miles of Peh-tang. We had intended to cross the bar the following day, and to anchor within 2000 yards of the forts; but owing to the storminess of the weather, we deferred our further advance until 1st August. The depth of water over the bar proved to be only 13 feet, and at low tide only 3 feet, in consequence of which large vessels could not cross; and the admiral determined to ship the troops in men-of-war boats, towed by gunboats. This was effected with admirable precision, and we anchored on 1st August just out of fire of the batteries. It had been originally settled to land on the left bank of the Peh-tang river; but on further examination the muddy state of the beach deterred us, and the troops disembarked on the right or south bank.[1] Even here the ground appeared to be little better than slush; and General de Montauban, just as he had set foot on shore, suddenly found the river rising, and the water surrounding him. There were close at hand two or three high mounds of earth, apparently serving as a guide for navigation, and on one of these the French general placed himself; but even here he was in a few minutes surrounded by

[1] About a mile and a half east of Peh-tang.

a sea of water extending for miles. The two forts on the river-banks looked very imposing. They were constructed of mud and straw, with a high cavalier[1] in the centre of each. That on the right bank was armed, so far as we could see, with 13 guns; the one on the left bank with 11 guns. No notice was taken of our approach beyond that of a few "Braves"[2] looking at us from the parapets.

A total of 2000 troops, in equal numbers of French and English, were forthwith landed; and as we had the prospect of wading through at least two miles of mud, I took off my boots and stockings, tucked up my trousers, and pushed forward at the head of my men towards a raised causeway, which led apparently from the gate of Peh-tang to the Taku forts.[3] On our way we came across a deep water-course, concealed by the high tide, and many were our cooling tumbles therein. The French Chief of the Staff had landed on his pony, and both came to terrible grief in this briny bath.

Some Tartar cavalry were seen moving along the road, but on our approach they retired in the

[1] A raised terreplein with parapet.

[2] The term adopted for themselves by the Chinese army.

[3] See plan.

direction of the Taku forts. At last all our wading difficulties were got over; our men reached the causeway, which was found sound and dry, and were ordered to bivouac on it for the night. I arranged with Admiral Hope and the French that at daybreak we should make a simultaneous attack on Peh-tang from the road. At the same hour the gunboats were to steam up past the forts and support us with their fire.[1] During the night the admiral sent up one of his small boats to find out whether any barriers impeded the passage of the river; and having ascertained that all was clear, we felt confident of being able to establish ourselves in the town without much difficulty.

When we laid down for the night in the open on the road, we had no apprehensions of being attacked during the darkness, as there was nothing but water and swamp on our flanks, which, moreover, were guarded by a few pickets. At midnight, to my surprise, firing commenced in the centre of our line, and it was reported that some Tartar cavalry had ridden close up to us. However, it soon ceased, and next morning a Tartar

[1] Preparations were also made for landing the remainder of the troops the next day.

pony, fully accoutred, was found within a stone's-throw shot dead by a rifle-bullet. Not far from Peh-tang was a bridge, which was occupied by one of our pickets; and as everything appeared perfectly quiet, I sent a flag of truce with an interpreter to demand the surrender of the town. A respectable-looking old man came up and said that no opposition would be offered to our entrance, and that no Chinese soldiers were in the place; but he warned us that inside the fort were concealed some large shells filled with gunpowder, which would explode on being touched. This information, so kindly given, proved of great importance. The party with the flag of truce followed the old man into a deserted fort, and were there shown where the gunpowder was buried. The top surface was scraped away for about an inch, and revealed several small gun-locks, so placed that the weight of the foot would cause them to go off, and, by means of some trains of gunpowder, would have exploded the shells. These missiles, sixteen inches in diameter, were placed in two mines, ten in each, and would have caused a pretty commotion had a company of soldiers marched over the spot.

Very early in the morning, we entered Peh-

tang, and found that our gunboats had taken up the position previously assigned to them. On examination, it was ascertained that there was no site outside the walls suitable for the encampment of our troops. All around was swamp, or covered with water at high tide; and now commenced the miseries of war. We were compelled to lodge the men of both armies in the town, which was densely populated. The unfortunate Chinese women all had the small deformed feet common to the females of their nation, and were scarcely able to move. The Chinese coolies, of whom we had a large number—about 2500[1]—were for the most part atrocious villains, though extremely useful; and in the first instance, when they could be comparatively but little controlled, the robberies and crimes they committed in the town were fearful. In one respectable-looking house which some of our officers entered, were found the corpses of two young women, and their father apparently at the point of death. The latter turned out to be the same kind old man who had received our interpreter and had pointed

[1] A large number of coolies had been temporarily engaged in addition to the regular Coolie corps.

out to us the existence of the loaded shells. They were all taken to the hospital, where it was ascertained that they had swallowed opium. After some difficulty, the father was brought round again, and he told his sad tale. A party of coolies came to his house, and demanded admission. He was obliged to let them in, whereupon they plundered and ransacked his dwelling. They had scarcely taken their departure when fresh coolies came with the same intention, which so terrified the unhappy family that they resolved upon suicide, and took a quantity of opium.

The inhabitants evacuated the town as quickly as possible, the men carrying their helpless, footless wives and their children on their backs, and other poor females hobbling along as best they could, supporting themselves upon sticks to the river-side, and then getting into boats, or toiling along the banks to some other village. Some French soldiers were removing a box out of a house to increase the available space, when on opening it were discovered the bodies of two young girls about fourteen and fifteen years old, who, there was reason to suppose, had been strangled by their relations.

At last the place was cleared of its population; one half of the town was allotted to the French and the other half to ourselves, and we forthwith began disembarking the main body of our troops.

I took up my abode in one of the bastions of the fort, which was cool and airy: perhaps too much so, for I shall never forget one night when a storm of thunder, lightning, wind, and rain broke over us, flooding the place, and converting our beds into the appearance of tubs filled with dirty clothes, and ourselves into half-drowned rats. I had a slight attack of fever during the two following days. The occupation of this town was fraught with the most fearful risks it has ever fallen to my lot to encounter, and had we not been protected by that great Being who rules above, terrible and fearful consequences would have ensued. The town was very small, not much more than 500 yards square, and in it were crowded 11,000 of our men, exclusive of the French force amounting to above 6700 more, and about 4000 of our horses, mules, and ponies, all stowed away in houses and in narrow lanes. The buildings were almost all thatched, fires burning, dinners cooking, men smoking; in fact, all the accessories for the outbreak of a blaze. After the storm, the weather

became very hot, and the thatched roofs as dry as tinder. Had a spark fallen on one of them it is difficult to say what would have been the result. Probably almost all our fine horses and ponies would have been destroyed; and many of the men would have been unable to effect their escape out of the narrow thickly-thronged lanes. At length heavy rain set in, and the danger of fire was much lessened; but the streets became almost impassable from the mud, filth, and dead animals. These latter seemed to cling to us persistently; for when thrown into the river the returning tide cast them back on to the bank where, they decomposed in the sun, creating a horrible stench. Nevertheless, notwithstanding the pestilential nature of the place, our troops, wonderful to say, never enjoyed better health. During the whole period of our occupation we had not above one and a half per cent sick. The French likewise were remarkably healthy.

I had brought four excellent horses with me from India, and my favourite mule. I am sorry to say that the latter on being landed fell upon a post in the river, and staked himself so badly that I was obliged to shoot him. I had likewise my favourite little Arab pony which did

me such good service in India during the Mutiny.[1]

On 3d August, General de Montauban and myself arranged to send out reconnoitring parties of 1000 men each, on the road to the Taku forts, to ascertain the position of the enemy. Brigadier Sutton commanded the British force; and General Collineau,[2] an excellent officer who had commanded a regiment with great gallantry during the attack of the Redan in the Crimea, the French. The party advanced along the narrow road for about four miles, with water and swamp on both sides, and on their way met with a picket of Tartar cavalry which retired on our approach. The ground now sloped upwards and about a mile to the front; an intrenched position became visible, whereupon General Collineau deployed his whole force. The troops had hardly got into line when the enemy opened on them with a heavy fire of gingals, wounding several of their number. This weapon is a species of long heavy duck-gun, carrying a ball weighing

[1] It died at Aldershot, April 1873, after a happy and an honoured old age—a splendid little animal to the last.

[2] General Collineau died at Tien-tsin the following November of small-pox.

about two pounds: its range is at least 1000 yards. Placed upon a tripod, from which tolerable aim can be taken, it is very handy and effective in a country where, owing to innumerable large ditches, water-courses, and marshy ground, field-artillery would be useless. The enemy appeared to be in considerable force; and General Collineau having reconnoitred their position, thought it advisable to retire: my force followed his example. The Tartar cavalry, however, harassed the retreat. On 4th August, we occupied with a strong picket the position abandoned the previous day by the Tartar cavalry.

Probyn's Horse had been landed, and I had posted them within the fort of Peh-tang. On 5th August, heavy rains and violent squalls flooded the horses up to their knees in mud, and, moreover, we were in great straits for drinking-water. There were a few wells in the town yielding a very brackish supply, and in each house were five or six earthen jars large enough to hold a man, in which fresh water had been stored away; but in a short time, with the number of horses to be provided for, these sources became exhausted, and it was a matter for anxious consideration how we could meet this grave impending

difficulty. On the spot where at first landing we had found the dead Tartar pony, a cart-track was perceived; and anxious to discover to where it led, I sent out a reconnoitring party, consisting of two squadrons of Probyn's Horse, and a troop of the King's Dragoon Guards—the whole under Colonel Wolseley, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General, and a most excellent officer. They started on the morning of the 9th August; and on their return the same day, Wolseley reported to me that for the first two miles the track was very muddy and difficult, but that afterwards it became sound, and well adapted for the passage of cavalry and artillery. Above all, he discovered several large pools of excellent rain-water, at which the horses drank greedily. This information was most satisfactory, because, provided the difficulties of the first two miles' mud could be surmounted, I could send a division by the newly-discovered track, and thus attack the enemy in flank as well as in front. I was also much relieved at the discovery of this additional supply of water, though we had now begun to eke out our resources by distilling, which was carried on on board our steamers by Admiral Hope's orders.

Once more the rains came down in constant

heavy showers, and in the intervals the sun shone with an intense heat. Great indeed was my anxiety lest, in consequence of the stench and crowded state of the town, disease should break out; and I resolved at all hazards to march off and attack the enemy the instant the country should become passable after a few days' dry weather.

General de Montauban and myself had come to an agreement that our forces should take precedence of march by turns, and that the British should have the first right to the privilege. The arrangements for the start, therefore, devolved upon me, and I went to tell him of my wish to march off on the morning of the 12th August. The French general objected strongly, and urged that the state of the country would be the destruction of his men. To this I replied that we had had several days of fine weather, which had rendered the ground much sounder, and that every moment we remained in Peh-tang was fraught with danger. Indeed so strongly was I impressed with the latter consideration, that I urged my point with all the force in my power. General de Montauban, I am happy to say, was not in the least offended, and merely replied:

"Very well: if you go I must go with you." The force he detailed for immediate advance, however, amounted only to 1000 men.

On 12th August, therefore, Sir Robert Napier was directed to start with his division an hour before the rest of the troops, to cross the salt-marsh by the cart-track turning to the right, and to attack the enemy's intrenchments on their left. He was reinforced by the cavalry under Brigadier Pattle, one battery of Armstrong guns, three 6-pounders, smooth bore, and a rocket-battery. Sir John Michel was ordered to advance with his division, and to attack the enemy posted behind their earthworks, in front, as soon as Sir Robert Napier should have cleared off the causeway.

I accompanied Sir Robert Napier's division in order that I might assure myself that he had succeeded in crossing the marsh, and here we encountered great difficulty in dragging the artillery along. The horses got bogged, the guns sank up to their axle-trees, and the waggons stuck fast. At last we were compelled to leave the waggon-bodies behind us, and to content ourselves with the gun and waggon limbers.[1] The

[1] The limber and body when hooked up together form a four-

cavalry likewise were much embarrassed in struggling through the mud, and even the infantry found it hard work, and lost many a good pair of boots. At one time I really thought we should be obliged to give up the attempt; but Sir Robert Napier was full of energy: the struggle was continued, and, by means of drag-ropes and perseverance, the artillery was hauled over the two miles of mud, and sound ground reached. I then retraced my steps, and accompanied Sir John Michel's division along the causeway, and on reaching the high ground deployed the whole line, the French force of 1000 men being formed upon our left. From the roof of a house a little to our front I obtained a good view of the whole system of the intrenchments. They appeared to consist of several small redoubts, open at the gorge, and weak in profile, but connected with each other by crenelated walls.

The enemy soon began to open fire upon us, to which we replied with 18 guns at a range of 900 yards, consisting of Desborough's smooth-bore 9-pounders, Barry's Armstrongs, and a battery of French artillery. Govan's rocket-battery also

wheeled carriage. The limber can be moved separately without the body, but not *vice versâ*.

came into action. Every one of our shot pierced right through the slight mud Chinese walls, and in half an hour the forts were all evacuated.

Meanwhile, Sir Robert Napier had been engaged, two miles to our right, with the enemy. A body of about 4000 Tartar cavalry attacked us in the most gallant style, very nearly captured Stirling's [1] three 6-pounders, and surrounded the whole of our column in the manner customary with Eastern horsemen; but the Armstrong guns opened, and our own cavalry was let loose upon them with great effect. The Sikhs understood this style of warfare, and committed great havoc amongst the Tartars—driving them eventually off the field. They took refuge in the village of Tang-ku, on the north bank of the Peiho. We followed up our success to the village of Sin-ho, which was also covered by intrenchments; but the enemy had received such a thrashing that they did not wait to defend it.

General de Montauban now wished to attack another fortified position inclosing the large village of Tang-ku. The distance between this post and Sin-ho was about three miles; the enemy had

[1] Now Lieut.-Colonel William Stirling, commanding B Battery, B Brigade, Royal Horse Artillery.

retreated by a causeway, and the fortifications were large enough to have contained 40,000 men. The ground along each side of this single road appeared to be very marshy, and consequently the whole of our deep columns of infantry would be exposed to an overwhelming fire of artillery from behind the walls, to which we could make no reply, as there was not sufficient breadth of ground for even half a battery in line. I therefore strongly objected to advance any further until, by a reconnaissance, we could mature our plans with greater safety. The French general, however, was resolute, and I at length consented to follow his troops in support. He accordingly moved forward with his columns massed on the highroad, and when within 1700 or 1800 yards of the forts managed to bring a few guns to the front, with which he opened fire. The enemy responded with vigour; but, fortunately for the French, the range was too great to be effective; otherwise their loss would have been heavy indeed. General de Montauban at last recognised the futility of the attempt, and withdrew his force.

On the morning of the 13th August we carefully inspected the position. The river Peiho ran

parallel to the road, and at a perpendicular distance from our right flank of about a mile. A water-course likewise flowed alongside the road. This was bridged, and I then rode up to the river-bank, where the site proved to be at a much higher elevation, and far sounder than in the direction of our original advance. In fact, we found that, by throwing bridges over several little intervening streams, we could march on an extended front up to the very walls of the fort of Tang-ku.

I am sorry to say that, during the fight, two of our men, with several coolies, were taken prisoners as they were conveying a cart with rum to the 2d Division by the track across the salt-marsh. The mishap occurred owing to the carelessness of the Europeans, who had not exerted themselves to keep up with the column, and were captured by some of the Tartar cavalry who had attacked Sir Robert Napier.

[In a journal of the operations kept by an officer on Sir Hope Grant's staff, the following entry occurs, characteristic of the nation with which we were at war: "*August 8th.*—A mandarin brought a letter for Lord Elgin this morn-

ing from the governor-general of the province, saying they wished for peace, but recommended us to keep off, as they were very strong." This same nation, who at a later date violated the laws of nations and of humanity by murdering some of our envoys,[1] captured during our advance on Sin-ho several enlisted coolies, actually assisting an army of foreigners against their own countrymen. The instant execution of the captives could not have been possibly condemned; but the Chinese merely cut off their tails—a mark of degradation —and sent them back to us under a flag of truce. —H. K.]

The 14th of August was a hot dry day; and at an early hour, all our preparations having been completed, the British and French troops filed across the bridges, and were deployed in two lines. The enemy opened on us from the other side of the river with some guns, in two junks, hauled up on the mud near a village called Ta-leang-teze, close to the bank on the other side, and with a battery on some rising ground, about 1200 yards distant from us. Our guns opening upon them soon silenced their fire, and Captain

[1] See page 134.

Willes,[1] Flag-Captain of Admiral Hope, crossed the river with a few men, and spiked the guns in the village.

The two Armstrong and the two 9-pounder batteries then came into action, and with two French batteries, 36 guns in all, opened fire upon the fort. The enemy's intrenchments were traced in the form of a square, one face of which rested on the river, and the other three were strengthened with a crenelated wall, with two wide ditches in front. Our attack was directed against the side of the work at right angles to the river, where the ditches and walls were of weaker profile. The heavy fire from our 36 guns soon knocked the intrenchment to pieces; and by advancing by alternate batteries up to within 350 yards—a movement which was skilfully executed by the officer commanding the Royal Artillery, Brigadier Crofton—the enemy's pieces were dismounted, and their parapets ruined. The flags with which the walls had at first been bedecked were fast vanishing. One brave fellow mounted on the battlements, and proudly waved a red banner in the air, until a shot from one of our guns struck him, and he

[1] Now Admiral Willes, C.B.

disappeared. Meanwhile some companies of the 1st Royals and 60th Rifles crept through some sedges along the banks of the river, reached the foot of the fort, and succeeded in forcing their way in. An entrance once effected, the Chinese abandoned the whole of their works, turned, and fled.

The French met with obstinate resistance at the point they had selected for their attack, a little to our left; but, gallantly led by Colonel Schmitz,[1] the French chief of the staff, they scaled the walls about the same time as ourselves. Ten guns in good condition fell into our hands. One of them which had been troubling us considerably was found dismounted by a shot from an Armstrong gun, and around it were lying thirteen dead Chinamen. Our rocket battery was also used with great effect. The enemy on the other side of the river fired the same sort of missiles at us, with an arrow attached to them. Their range was great, and they were well directed, but they did us no harm. During the engagement Sir John Michel had his horse killed under him. We were

[1] Served as General Schmitz under General Trochu during the early part of the siege of Paris in 1870.

now well sheltered in the large village of Tang-ku, which lay within the enceinte of the works. I directed Sir Robert Napier to occupy it with his division, and from the roof of the house wherein he lived, we could make out the distant outline of the Taku forts. I was convinced that the capture of the small upper northern work would entail the surrender of the three others, and I determined to reconnoitre it carefully, availing myself of the assistance of Sir Robert Napier, whose opinion was, as an engineer officer, particularly valuable. In Tang-ku we found a number of capital boats, which were very useful to us in bridging the river.

The next day I visited our poor wounded fellows, whom I found doing well, and comfortably cared for in the village of Tang-ku.

DESPATCH from LORD ELGIN.

"THE GRANADA, 16*th August* 1860.

"MY DEAR GRANT,—The Chinese authorities are very desirous to put a stop to further military operations. I have received three despatches from them on the subject. As I am of opinion that the forts should be in our hands, and the

Peiho river opened before their terms are accepted I shall do what I can to keep things going till you are ready to effect these objects. But of course it becomes every day more difficult for me to do so. My last despatches from the Governor-General[1] inform me that an Imperial Commissioner is on his way from Pekin.—Yours very sincerely, ELGIN AND KINCARDINE."

[1] Of the province of Pechili.

CHAPTER IV.

DESCRIPTION OF THE SMALL NORTH TAKU FORT—PETITIONS FOR PEACE—GENERAL DE MONTAUBAN'S PLAN OF ATTACK—HIS FORMAL LETTER OF REMONSTRANCE AGAINST SIR HOPE GRANT'S SCHEME, TO WHICH HE FINALLY YIELDS UNDER PROTEST — CANNONADE AGAINST THE FORT—EXPLOSION OF MAGAZINE—THE STORMING AND CAPTURE OF THE TAKU FORT—BRAVERY OF THE CHINESE —CAPTURE OF THE LARGE NORTH FORT—SURRENDER OF THE SOUTHERN FORTS—ADMIRAL HOPE STEAMS WITH HIS GUNBOATS UP TO TIEN-TSIN — SIR HOPE GRANT PROCEEDS THERE LIKEWISE — THE INHABITANTS CONCILIATED — CHINESE REBELS THREATEN SHANGHAI — ARRIVAL OF PLENIPOTENTIARIES AT TIEN-TSIN—COMFORTABLE QUARTERS—REMARKS BY THE EDITOR ON THE PLAN OF ATTACK ON THE TAKU FORTS.

ON the 20th August I made a reconnaissance in company with Sir Robert Napier, and advanced to within 600 yards of the north fort without being molested. I then sent forward Mr Parkes and Captain Graham,[1] Royal Engineers, with a flag of truce, with a view of demanding a sur-

[1] Now Colonel Graham, V.C., C.B.

render; but the Chinese showed no signs of yielding, and my two envoys were compelled to retire. The fort was enclosed with the usual crenelated walls, and with two broad ditches. On the space between the walls and the ditches, corresponding to our berm, the ground was thickly studded with upright bamboo spikes. The adjacent country consisted of a salt-marsh, with innumerable broad deep water-courses intersecting it in all directions. By following a winding course, however, ground could be picked out sufficiently sound to admit of the passage of artillery. I arranged with Sir Robert Napier where the ditches were to be bridged, and where the batteries for our heavy guns were to be placed. A bridge of boats was also nearly completed across the Peiho, when the Chinese, discovering our purpose, established a battery to oppose the passage; whereupon General de Montauban sent a force across which succeeded in driving the enemy away. The whole of the Tartar cavalry, so far as we could ascertain, had crossed over to the right bank, by means of a bridge of boats in their possession, lower down.

Flags of truce now came in to us from the viceroy Hang-foo; and the unfortunate inhabitants

sent deputations begging for the cessation of hostilities. As these overtures in no way emanated from the Emperor, Lord Elgin wrote a letter to the viceroy saying that it was now too late to think of peace. This letter was taken across the river under a flag of truce, by Mr Parkes and Augustus Anson, my aide-de-camp. Hang-foo, to our surprise, sent back two of our men and thirteen coolies who had been captured by the Tartars.[1]

As a proof of the swampy condition of the country at the time of which I am now writing, I may mention that some days before, the river had risen so high that the ground in the vicinity of our camp was flooded, and the headquarter tents of the 1st Division were a foot under water.

The French general now proposed to me that both our armies should cross the river, and attack the town of Taku, which was intrenched, and the large southern fort on the right bank. This plan, upon further consideration, appeared to me very hazardous, as our right flank would thereby be uncovered and exposed to the attacks of cavalry; while even were the main fort, with its numerous and powerful armament, to fall into our hands,

[1] See page 68.

the remaining defences would give us much trouble. I therefore determined to adhere to my original intention, and endeavoured to convince General de Montauban that by gaining possession of the upper northern fort, we should be able to command all the others. In vain; he remained unmoved, but told me that if I was determined to carry out my plan, he of course would give me his assistance—but that he should feel obliged to write a protest against it. Accordingly, in course of time, I received the following letter:—

"Du Bivac de Sin-ho,
Le 20*e* *Aôut* 1860.

"Réponse au Mémorandum.

"1e. L'attaque des forts qui restent sur la rive gauche me semble complètement inutile, ainsi que le Général Grant l'a reconnu lui-même il y a trois jours, lorsque nous étions convenus de ne pas nous occuper de ces forts qui tomberont tout naturellement lorsque ceux de la rive droite dans lesquels sont réunis tous les moyens de défense seront tombés eux-mêmes.[1] C'est donc

[1] In the first instance it had been contemplated to act on both sides of the Peiho, and with this view a bridge of boats had been constructed across the river at Ta-Wang-teze.

contre les forts du sud que tous les efforts d'action doivent être dirigés. Tout ce qui sera tenté contre les forts du nord, n'aura pour résultat que de retarder les opérations de l'armée de mer.

"2e. Le fort extérieur du nord étant à peu près de trois mille mètres[1] du fort intérieur, le feu des cannonières n'atteindra pas le but que l'on se propose.

"Quant à réduire le feu des forts du sud, les cannonières trouveront dans la rivière des obstacles qui ne leur permettront pas de venir assez près pour obtenir ce résultat. La véritable attaque des forts du sud est par terre, et dans ce cas seulement l'on conçoit que la marine puisse y concourir. Laisser les cannonières exposés au feu des forts du sud, sans que ces forts soient inquiétés par terre, me semble une faute capitale contre les règles les plus simples de l'art de la guerre.

"3e. La distance où se trouveront les cannonières du fort intérieur du nord ne me permet pas de comprendre comment elles pourraient ouvrir leur feu sur ce fort.

"4e. Aucune communication par la rivière entre l'armée de terre et l'armée de mer ne me parait

[1] 3280 yards.

possible, même par les cannonières, tant que les forts du sud seront debout; et pour débarrasser la rivière des obstacles du côté de la rive nord, il faudrait que ces obstacles fussent à une telle distance des forts du sud que ceux-ci ne puissent pas atteindre les travailleurs—ce qu'il est impossible d'admettre.

"En resumée, de deux choses l'une: ou les forts du nord seront défendus ou ils seront abandonnés. Dans le premier cas, l'opération de leur attaque ne donnera aucun résultat sérieux pour la solution de la question, ni même aucune satisfaction pour la marine; on y perdra peu de monde peut-être, mais inutilement. Dans le second cas, de quelle utilité sera leur occupation?

"De tout temps les forts du sud ont été considérés comme le véritable siège de la puissance de la défense, et c'est contre l'attaque de ces forts de concert avec l'armée de terre que notre brave marine alliée trouvera l'occasion d'une revanche glorieuse.

"Tout en considérant le plan proposé comme contraire à ce qui avait été convenu d'abord, et comme opposé à mes idées sur la manière de conduire cette opération, je n'en enverrai pas moins une force française de terre pour agir concurre-

ment avec nos alliés, et témoigner par sa présence du désir que j'ai de concourir à toutes les opérations.

"Mes observations ont surtout pour but de dégager ma responsabilité militaire vis-à-vis de mon gouvernement dans le cas où il jugerait la question sous le point de vue où je l'envisage moi-même.

"Le Général de Division,
Commandant-en-Chef,
C. DE MONTAUBAN."

(*Translation.*)

"BIVOUAC AT SIN-HO.
20th August 1860.

"ANSWER TO THE MEMORANDUM.

"1. The attack of the forts situated on the left bank appears to me completely useless, as was admitted by General Grant himself three days ago —when we agreed to pay no heed to these forts, which will fall in the natural course of events, as soon as those which are on the right bank, and in which are combined every means of defence, shall have given way.[1] Consequently, all our active

[1] See note page 77.

measures should be directed against the southern forts. Every attempt against the northern forts will only result in retarding the operations of the sea forces.

"2. The northern exterior fort being about 3000 metres [3280 yards] from the inner fort, the fire of the gunboats will not attain the proposed object.

"As for silencing the southern forts, the gunboats will encounter in the river obstacles which will not allow them to approach sufficiently close to obtain this result. The true attack of the southern forts is by land, and in this case only can it be supposed that the navy will be able to assist. To leave the gunboats exposed to the fire of the southern forts, without distracting their attention on the land side, appears to me a radical error, opposed to the most elementary rules of the art of war.

"3. Considering how great must be the distance of the gunboats from the inner northern fort, I cannot understand how they can open fire against it.

"4. River communication between the land and the sea forces appears to me impossible, even with the aid of gunboats, so long as the southern

forts hold out; and, in order to clear the river of the obstacles on the northern bank, these obstacles must be assumed to be at such a distance from the southern forts that the workmen would be out of range—a fact which I cannot for one moment admit.

"To sum up, there are two alternatives: either the northern forts will be defended or they will be abandoned. In the first case, to carry out an attack against them will not seriously affect the solution of the question—will not even give any satisfactory result to the navy. The loss of life involved will, perhaps, be small, but useless. In the second case, of what use will be their occupation?

"At all times the southern forts have been considered as the true basis of the power of defence, and it is in attacking these forts in concert with the land forces that our brave allied navy will find an opportunity for a glorious revenge.

"Notwithstanding that I consider the proposed plan as contrary to what we had previously agreed on, and opposed to my ideas of the method of conducting this operation of war, I shall nevertheless send a French land force to work conjointly with our allies, and to prove by its presence my desire to co-operate in all the operations.

"The object of my observations is, above all, to free myself from military responsibility with reference to my own Government, in the event of its judging the question from the same point of view as that from which I myself regard it.

"The General of Division
Commanding in chief,
C. DE MONTAUBAN."

I sent the following reply to General de Montauban's memorandum; but I did not alter my opinion, and I arranged that the attack should take place on the 21st August.

"HEADQUARTERS CAMP, SIN-HO,
20th August 1860.

"SIR,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's memorandum of this date, which embraces so many distinct points, that it becomes necessary to reply to it in detail.

"Your Excellency observes that in the forts on the right bank are collected all the means of defence. To this I cannot assent; for, from personal observation, I find that the north forts do not only in themselves possess great means both of offence and defence, but also, from their posi-

tion, their fire can sweep that part of the right bank along which an army must pass to attack the south forts. Nor can I see how their[1] capture would delay the operations of the army; for the bridge is being equally advanced across the Peiho,[2] and is not being delayed by this measure, whilst the bridges which have been constructed over the creeks beyond Tang-ku will be ample for both French and English.

"It has never been proposed by the admirals to bring the fire of the gunboats to bear on the inner forts; on the contrary, it was expressly stipulated that they should fire only on the outer forts.

"I fully agree with your Excellency in thinking that it would be a grave error to expose the gunboats to the fire of the south forts without any co-operation from the land forces; but I have yet to learn that this is proposed to be done. It has not been part of my plan, of which I shall treat more fully below.

"I think it most probable that when the north forts are in our possession, the obstacles in the river can be removed; but, of course, this may be

[1] *I.e.*, of the north forts.

[2] See note, page 77.

doubtful. At all events, we ought to be able to silence any fire they can bring to bear on our working parties. In short, the case resolves itself to this: the bridges over the Peiho will not be completed for three or four days at the soonest. Should we wait for this, and make the great movement down the right bank, the troops would be exposed to such severe fire from the north forts, that the losses would be increased to a very serious extent—losses not only serious, but unnecessary. Nor could the fleets act with any better effect by this plan. I imagine rather the reverse.

"I have already expressed my opinion that the co-operation of the navy is not a military necessity—their object can only be to harass the enemy and divert his attention. No risk should therefore be run by them of losing vessels. It is true that after the capture of Tang-ku I mentioned my opinion that a move to the south bank would be good, but that was before any reconnaissance had been made to the front; and it is still my wish to cross the river as soon as the bridge is completed, and co-operate with your Excellency in the attack of the south forts.

"Much as I regret that my opinion should differ from that of your Excellency, I must still

remind you that I never agreed to any plan to which the present is opposed; and I can only repeat that my object is to cause the forts to fall speedily and with little loss, and to avoid that hazard which every day's delay at this late season of the year must incur, when it is taken into consideration how much yet remains to be done by the allies before the end of the season.—I have the honour, &c.,

"J. HOPE GRANT."

The nature of the ground prevented our drawing up a large force, and our total strength amounted to 2500 men, in addition to which General de Montauban stated he would contribute 1000[1] and two field-batteries. Our heavy guns were placed in position, and consisted of four 8-inch guns, two 8-inch howitzers, two 32-pounders, and three 8-inch mortars. We also had in the field two Armstrong batteries, two 9-pounder batteries, and one rocket battery.

[1] Such is the number stated in Sir Hope Grant's diary. Other sources of information, however, lead to the conclusion that the actual strength of their infantry on this occasion did not exceed 400 of all ranks; and Sir Hope himself, on being appealed to, is inclined to consider the latter estimate correct.—H. K.

At five o'clock on the morning of the 21st August, the enemy opened on us a heavy fire from the two upper forts, one on either side of the river. Our guns quickly responded, and a cannonade from our forty-seven pieces was maintained with great vigour for three hours. Our shot fell thick upon the doomed fort, and at about 6 o'clock A.M., an eight-inch shell falling on their powder magazine blew it up with a terrific explosion. For some time the fort was so shrouded in dense clouds of vapour and smoke, that it appeared to have been entirely destroyed; but by degrees it cleared away; the enemy recommenced fire, and seemed determined not to give up the place without a desperate struggle. Inside the work was a high cavalier from which heavy guns were opened on us, but we soon succeeded in silencing them. The general direction of our attack was against the enemy's rear—a fact on which they had by no means calculated, as they were thus almost entirely exposed to our fire.

Our marines now brought up the pontoons for the purpose of forming a bridge across the broad ditches. They were baffled in their endeavours owing to the heavy matchlock-fire from the walls, and sixteen of them were knocked over. The

French were more successful. By means of scaling-ladders carried by Chinese coolies, they constructed a way across the ditch. The Chinamen jumped into the water up to their necks, and supported the ladders upon their hands and shoulders, to enable the men to get across. These poor fellows behaved gallantly, and though some of them were shot down they never flinched in the least.

The allied forces now pushed forward. Our storming-party consisted of the 44th and 67th Regiments. Some of our men swam across the ditch, and others got over with the French. On reaching the escarp they were sheltered from fire. The French placed their ladders against the parapet and endeavoured to get over; but the defenders offered a vigorous resistance with their swords and pikes, and knocked them off the crest as soon as they showed themselves. At last my aide-de-camp, Anson, gallantly succeeded in clambering across a drawbridge which had been hauled up over the ditch in front of my force, and with his sword cut the supporting ropes. In this operation he was nobly aided by Lieut.-Col. Mann of the Royal Engineers. The bridge fell into its proper position, and afforded to our men a means of crossing. Some of our officers perceived a

small breach which we had effected in the wall close to the gate, and here Lieut. Burslem of the 67th Regiment forced his way in, but was driven back. Lieutenant Rogers[1] was the next to enter, but was wounded.

The French, who behaved as gallantly as possible—worthy of the great nation to which they belonged—entered the breach at the same time as our men, and their great ambition was to plant their standard first upon the walls; but young Chaplin[2] of the 67th Regiment, who carried the colours of his corps, outdid them, and placed the British standard upon the highest part of the works. He was wounded in three places.

Our combined navies had brought up gunboats to within 1800 yards of the two forts at the mouth of the river and commenced firing. Their practice was excellent, and one of their shells exploded a large magazine in the lower fort on the left bank of the river. The damage inflicted we were unable at first to ascertain. The poor Chinese now had a sad time of it; they had fought desperately and with great bravery, few of them apparently having attempted to escape. Indeed they could

[1] Now Major Rogers, V.C., 90th Foot.

[2] Now Captain Chaplin, V.C., 8th Hussars.

hardly have effected their retreat by the other side of the fort—the wall was very high, and the ground below bristled with innumerable sharp bamboo stakes. Then intervened a broad, deep ditch, another row of stakes, and, finally, another large ditch. The only regular exit, the gate, was barred by ourselves. Numbers were killed, and I saw three poor wretches impaled upon the stakes; and yet, notwithstanding all the difficulties which I have pointed out, a considerable number succeeded in getting off.[1] The upper fort on the southern side of the river was completely commanded by the guns on the northern bank, only about 400 yards distant. The enemy was therefore compelled to abandon it. The fort we had captured presented a terrible appearance of devastation. The explosion of the magazine had ruined a large portion of the interior; many of the guns were dismounted, and the parapets battered to pieces. Seventeen of our men were killed, and 184, including twenty-one officers, wounded. Sir Robert Napier, whose conduct was very gallant, was struck by shot in five places,

[1] It was afterwards ascertained that the garrison of this little fort was 500 men, of whom about 100 succeeded in effecting their escape.

but was not actually wounded. Shortly after the fall of the work, Lord Elgin rode down and examined it.[1]

During the early part of the day numerous war-flags had waved defiantly over the other intrenchments, but about this time we suddenly perceived that they had been replaced by white banners. I sent Mr Parkes and Major Sarel, one of my acting aides-de-camp, to summon the defenders of the other northern fort to surrender; but the garrison returned a very insulting answer, to the effect that only one of their works had fallen, and there still remained four more to be captured. I therefore made arrangements with General Collineau, who commanded the French force, at once to proceed to the attack. With this view I moved two 8-inch guns up to within about 900 yards of the work, and caused three heavy guns which had been captured in the cavalier, and which were not more than 1600 yards distant, to be turned in the same direction. The French, however, would not wait for us, hurried forward, reached the fort without a shot being

[1] See also the very brilliant account of the storming of the Taku forts, in Sir Garnet Wolseley's Narrative of the China War, p. 132.

fired at them, marched in by one of the large embrasures, and thus[1] the place was captured without resistance. The fortification was strong towards the sea, but weak on the land side, by which an entrance had been effected, and unenclosed, save by a thin wall, which was not shot-proof. In it were two cavaliers; and it also completely commanded the large fort on the right side of the river about 200 yards distant; and though this latter work was likewise strengthened with two cavaliers, a few shot from our last capture would have silenced all their guns. This showed that I was justified in assuming beforehand that the plan of attack which I had projected would prove successful. About 2000 prisoners fell into our hands, and much to their surprise they were allowed to go away in peace. We likewise captured some enormous brass ordnance, and several of the iron guns lost by our navy during their severe engagement of 1859. We now sent flags of truce across the river to Hang-foo[2] by Mr Parkes and Anson, and demanded the surrender of all the remaining forts with their guns and other military stores. After a long delay this was agreed to, upon condi-

[1] About two hours after the capture of the first fort.

[2] Governor-General of the province.

tion of the inhabitants being protected, and their property spared, to which, of course, we instantly assented.[1]

That afternoon heavy rain commenced to fall, which ere long swamped the whole country, rendering the task of removing our guns a difficult one. Several sank up to their axle-trees, and had to be left for the night.

The next day, 22d August, I sent over Sir Robert Napier to take possession of the forts on the right bank. They were all handed over to him in due form, including 600 guns. The same day Admiral Hope broke away the chains and barriers which had been placed across the river. He was now able to get his gunboats up, and on the 23d he started for Tien-tsin, about sixty miles distant. He met with no opposition, and on approaching the town he found a deputation inviting us to occupy it. I accordingly sent forward the 1st Foot (the Royals), the 67th Regiment, and an Armstrong battery of artillery, under Brigadier Staveley, to take possession of it; and on the 24th August, I myself started up the Peiho river in the Granada for the same destination, which we

[1] For Sir Hope Grant's official despatch relating to the capture of the Taku forts, see Appendix II.

reached in four hours' time. Before setting out I left a small garrison in the large southern fort. Tien-tsin was a much larger town than we had anticipated.

About two and a half miles south of the town, and on the river-banks, were two strong newly-constructed forts, but their guns had been removed, and were afterwards found buried close at hand. On 26th August, we procured some Tartar ponies by the aid of Mr Parkes, and rode out into the adjacent country to select a site for an encampment. Our choice fell on some ground near the temple where Lord Elgin had signed the treaty in 1858. The building was turned into a commissariat "Godown."[1] The Tartar general, Sang-ko-lin-sin, had constructed a crenelated wall round Tien-tsin, which, with a broad ditch, he had expected would keep us at bay. But after our easy conquest of all his other forts, he thought it wiser to retreat forthwith with his army, and the place was denuded of troops. The inhabitants at first were frightened; but finding that so far from molesting them we treated them with kindness, they soon gained courage, and brought us in plentiful supplies, amongst which were fine fat

[1] A "Godown" is a large storehouse.

sheep weighing 70 or 80 lb. each, fat oxen, apples, pears, grapes, peaches, and the great luxury of enormous blocks of ice.

Information reached us from Shanghai that the rebels intended to attack that town; so, on the 24th August, I sent the 44th Regiment from the Taku forts, under Brigadier Jephson, to strengthen the force at Shanghai. Lord Elgin and Baron Gros came to Tien-tsin, and we all three took up our quarters in an excellent clean house, the property of a wealthy and important grain merchant. Around the main building were courtyards, along the sides of which were ranged small rooms with the peculiar circular entrance, showing that they were the ladies' apartments. The couches inside were so constructed as to admit of fires being lit underneath them in winter. As may be supposed, extreme care was necessary in the indulgence of this luxury. The good people of the house seemed quite to approve of our having taken possession of their domicile.

Some additional remarks on the plan of attack on the Taku Forts. By the Editor.

General de Montauban was so strongly opposed

to the projected plan of attack, that he declined to give any countenance to the undertaking beyond assisting with a single battalion of 400 men of all ranks, with a feeble force of artillery[1]—our own force so employed amounting to 2500 men. Moreover, in order to mark still further his disapproval, he did not appear on the scene of conflict —as I am informed by English staff officers who were eyewitnesses—until after the fight for the north fort had been brought to a successful conclusion. He was then unprovided with his sword.

Seldom indeed have commanders been willing to assume the amount of responsibility which Sir Hope Grant so readily took upon himself. Had there been the slightest miscarriage, had the result been even indecisive, the military reputation of the projector would have received a death-blow. The war had never been popular in England; and an outburst of censure would have

[1] After careful investigation and numerous inquiries, I am led to the conclusion that the French furnished one field-battery, of 4 guns only, and not two field-batteries, as promised the previous day by General de Montauban. Moreover Captain (now Colonel) Desborough informs me,—"Assistance from General Collineau was asked to support his storming columns, and two howitzers of my own battery, under Sir John Campbell, were placed so as best to attain this object."—H. K.

arisen, based on the fact that our allies had emphatically condemned the course we had adopted. It must be remembered that in 1860 there was attributed to the French a knowledge of, and aptitude in, the science of war which was supposed to leave every other nation far in the rear, similarly as in 1875 any Prussian military practice is lauded as perfection, for the sole reason that it is a Prussian military practice. On the other hand, in the event of a successful issue, the hazards attendant on the assumption of responsibility would be forgotten in the feeling that "all's well that ends well"—were, in point of fact, forgotten in the anxiety to smooth over the susceptibilities of our allies. I trust, therefore, it will not be unbecoming in me to enlarge upon one or two points connected with the most critical operation in the campaign, which want of time prevented Sir Hope dwelling on in his despatch. The works south of the Peiho were in themselves much stronger; they had numerous guns mounted on cavaliers; they were surrounded by two, and in places by three, wet ditches, together with abattis and pointed stakes; the escarps were 15 feet high, and the parapets were literally bristling with cannon, and enormously thick.

From the river side the only means of approach was across a muddy open expanse; and General de Montauban himself admitted that an attack from this direction was not to be thought of. But supposing that we had split up our army, and had brought the greater part of it across the Peiho in the very face of the enemy—thus repeating on a small scale the operations of the Russians at Friedland—our next step must have been the capture of the works about Suku, after which we must have marched against one of the main southern forts, each of which was far more susceptible of defence from the guns on the opposite side of the river, than were the north forts capable of being aided by the south. Moreover, in our advance over the open country, we should have been especially liable to be surrounded by the numerous Tartar cavalry, which had so nearly performed that feat in front of Sin-ho, and which we knew had crossed the Peiho in a body. This danger would have been a formidable one. We should have been cut off from our base, and from our supplies at Peh-tang; and the Chinese would always have had it in their power to harass us in our rear by forces sallying forth from the northern forts. Lastly, it was made manifest

that the fall of the southern works would not have involved the surrender of those on the other bank.

Let us now review the advantages of the plan of attack which was actually carried out. The works assailed were of a comparatively less formidable construction. By means of our temporary road, we were enabled to make a detour, whereby we avoided to a great extent the fire from the opposite bank. Under any circumstances we could only have been exposed to this fire while crossing the portion of ground between the upper and lower north forts. General de Montauban miscalculated this interval in fixing it at 3280 yards. A reference to the map shows it to have been not more than 1500 yards. With these two forts in our possession, we should command the similar ones on the other side; we should be able to enfilade completely the two long faces of the large southern fort; and, finally, we should take in reverse the sea-defences of the principal northern work, from which direction alone the Chinese expected to be attacked.[1]

[1] I am told by Sir Hope Grant that during the first China war in 1842 there was a current statement—which seems to have been revived for the present occasion—to the effect that, in a subsequently

Every single one of these anticipations were fulfilled to the letter. The capture of the weakest of the four largest works was followed by the almost instant submission of the remainder; and if success be a test of sound reasoning, it can hardly be denied that the step which Sir Hope resolved upon in opposition to the counsels of the French, was based on the soundest military wisdom.—H. KNOLLYS.

captured Chinese despatch, it was mentioned that "the ignorant barbarians, not knowing that guns could not be fired against an object behind them, came upon us in rear, and thus rendered all our cannons useless."

CHAPTER V.

MARCH FROM TIEN-TSIN TO HO-SI-WU—CONCENTRATION OF TROOPS AT LATTER PLACE — CHINESE OPEN NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE—ADVANCE TOWARDS CHAN-CHIA-WAN —SYMPTOMS OF TREACHERY—HAIRBREADTH ESCAPE OF COLONEL WALKER'S PARTY—ALLIES RESOLVE TO ATTACK CHINESE ARMY — ENGAGEMENT OF CHAN-CHIA-WAN — PROBYN'S CHARGE—DEMAND FOR THE RELEASE OF THE ENVOYS—SIR ROBERT NAPIER ORDERED UP FROM HO-SI-WU—ENGAGEMENT AT PA-LE-CHIAO—SIR HOPE GRANT NEARLY CAPTURED BY TARTAR CAVALRY—CHARGE OF ENGLISH CAVALRY—GALLANT FRENCH ATTACK ON CANAL BRIDGE—CHINESE OVERTURES FOR PEACE—ALLIES REFUSE TO TREAT UNTIL THE ENVOYS ARE GIVEN UP—PROBYN'S RECONNAISSANCE—GENERAL IGNATIEFF LENDS A MAP OF PEKIN—DIVERSITY OF OPINION BETWEEN ALLIED COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF AS TO TRUE POINT OF ATTACK OF PEKIN — ARRIVAL OF SIR ROBERT NAPIER'S DIVISION AT TANG-CHOW — SIEGE-TRAIN COMES UP — PROBYN'S SECOND RECONNAISSANCE—THE ALLIED ULTIMATUM — INTERMEDIATE DEPOTS ESTABLISHED — LETTERS FROM PARKES — FURTHER ADVANCE — FRENCH "MISS" OUR TRACK—FRUITLESS SEARCH FOR THEM—THEY ARE DISCOVERED AT THE SUMMER PALACE—SIR HOPE VISITS SUMMER PALACE—LOOTING—CHINESE CONSENT TO RELEASE THE ENVOYS, WHO RETURN TO CAMP —THEIR SAD STORY — HOSPITAL RETURNS — DESCRIPTION OF PEKIN.

ON 31st August, three Commissioners arrived[1] from Pekin with a view to stop our advance. They gave out that they were intrusted with full powers; but this turned out to be false. They were only mandarins of small importance; and therefore, when on the 7th September they brought forward pretended terms of a convention, Lord Elgin and Baron Gros instantly broke off negotiations, stating their resolution not to conclude a treaty before reaching Tang-chow, fifteen miles from Pekin.

[Tien-tsin, on the Pekin road, is thirty-five miles distant from Taku. The French advanced by the left bank of the Peiho, the English by the right; and by the 5th of September the bulk of our troops had been concentrated about the above-mentioned town. Throughout the camp there was a confident anticipation that all the fighting had come to an end—an expectation which was shared by Sir Hope Grant, as is manifest from the following despatches:—

"HEADQUARTERS, TIEN-TSIN,
3d September 1860.

"MY LORD,—I have the honour to request

[1] At Tien-tsin.

that your Excellency will inform me what amount of escort you wish to accompany the special Embassy to Pekin; and also, in about how many days they will be required to be ready to start.—I have, &c.

"J. HOPE GRANT.

"The Right Hon. the EARL of ELGIN
and KINCARDINE."

The strength of the English escort was fixed at 1000 men, and a battery of artillery; but the French, for reasons best known to themselves, objected to our so employing more than 150 men.

"HEADQUARTERS, TIEN-TSIN,
7th September 1860.

"MY LORD,—I have the honour to inform your Excellency that the recent operations in the north of China having terminated successfully, peace is about to be concluded with the Chinese Government. I shall be much obliged, therefore, by your ordering all further supplies of every kind for the army in China, that have not yet left India, to be stopped. Orders have been sent to Singapore to send back everything that has not

yet passed that point, unless they can be disposed of on the spot. . . .

I have . . . &c.

"J. HOPE GRANT,
Lieut.-Gen., Commander-in-Chief in China.

"The Right Hon. EARL CANNING, G.C.B.,
Viceroy and Governor-General of India."

It had come to Mr Parkes's knowledge that the Chinese General, Sang-ko-lin-sin, had organised a kind of commissariat at Tien-tsin, and he immediately offered to employ the chief officers, consisting of merchants and burgesses, for our own purposes. They readily responded, and brought in large supplies of sheep, oxen, vegetables, fruit, and blocks of ice.—H. K.]

On 8th September, we recommenced our march with a small mixed force[1] of 800 infantry, 600 cavalry, and two batteries of artillery. Lord Elgin and I set out, and overtook them on the 9th. During the third night after our start the rain came down in a deluge, whereupon nearly the whole of our drivers, Chinese cartmen, to-

[1] Viz., Stirling's and Barry's Batteries, the King's Dragoon Guards, Fane's Horse, 99th Regiment, and 200 Marines—the whole under the command of Brigadier Reeves.

gether with their mules and ponies, conveying our baggage, absconded. This delayed us for a day, until with great difficulty we obtained water transport. On the 13th September we reached the pretty little town of Ho-si-wu, half-way between Pekin and Tien-tsin, and on the 16th I was joined by Sir John Michel's division, raising our force to 2300 infantry, a company and a half of engineers, three batteries of artillery, and the whole of the cavalry. The French with 1200 men marched into the town the day after ourselves. Sir Robert Napier's division remained behind to hold Tien-tsin, 40 miles to our rear; and as there was good water communication the whole way, I arranged with Admiral Hope to establish a depot at Ho-si-wu, in furtherance of which end he sent us up a flotilla of junks as transport. I also left a regiment, three 6-pounder guns, and 25 sowars to hold the place.

On 11th September despatches arrived for Lord Elgin and Baron Gros from Pekin, and Messrs Parkes and Wade,[1] the latter consul and interpreter, started off on September 13th with an escort

[1] Now T. F. Wade, Esq., C.B., Envoy Extraordinary, Minister Plenipotentiary, and Chief Superintendent of British trade in China.

to meet the Commissioners at Matow, 12 miles from Ho-si-wu, but found the latter had gone back to Tang-chow, to which place our envoys followed them. They proved to be mandarins, one of whom was Tsai, Prince of I, a nephew of the Emperor's, and a conference was held, which lasted until past midnight; but the Chinese had to make their way back to Pekin to obtain the Imperial authority. Parkes and Wade returned to us on the 15th, stating that they had seen about 2000 Tartar cavalry drawn up alongside the road for their inspection, and that they had been treated very civilly. The Commissioners through them prayed us not to advance any further with our army. Lord Elgin sent word in reply that we must march to within five miles of Tang-chow, but would not exceed this limit. To this concession the mandarins agreed with great reluctance. On 17th September we marched for Matow, 12 miles distant, Lord Elgin and Baron Gros remaining behind at Ho-si-wu for a few days. The roads were heavy, and the baggage did not arrive until very late. The entire country appeared to be in a high state of cultivation. The crops of millet and maize were so lofty as to close in the view to within a distance of twenty

yards to a man on horseback. Parkes and Loch,[1] one of Lord Elgin's staff, Mr De Norman,[2] Colonel Walker,[3] Quartermaster-General, and Mr Thompson,[4] a commissariat officer, had gone on ahead to Tang-chow[5] to select a site for encampment and to procure supplies.

On the 18th September we recommenced our march at 5 A.M., the French on this occasion following us. When we had proceeded about three miles, to my surprise we found a strong Tartar picket occupying a farmhouse on the road-side, who retired on our approach. A little further on were seen great bodies of cavalry and infantry, the latter drawn up behind a large nullah or water-course to our right front, displaying innumerable war-banners. We halted for the purpose of forming up our infantry; and seeing that we were likely to meet with resistance, I massed our baggage in rear near the farmhouse, where the

[1] Now Leut.-Col. Henry Brougham Loch, C.B., Lieut.-Governor of the Isle of Man, and commanding 2d Royal Cheshire Militia.

[2] Subsequently treacherously captured by the Chinese. Died whilst a prisoner in consequence of the hardships of captivity.

[3] Now Major-General Walker, C.B., Military Attaché at Berlin.

[4] Since dead.

[5] About 65 miles distant from Tien-tsin.

Tartar picket had been posted. Meanwhile Loch galloped in from Tang-chow with some sowars,[1] and brought letters from Parkes, announcing that the matters with which he had been busied were going on satisfactorily. Lieutenant Anderson, a very fine young fellow, had been sent with Parkes in command of 20 sowars as escort; and Mr Bowlby,[2] the correspondent of the 'Times,' had accompanied the party. Loch further stated that Mr Parkes had started on the return journey with him, but finding that works had been thrown up, guns placed in position, and a large army assembled, had ridden back to ask the meaning of these preparations, and, if necessary, to remonstrate with the mandarins for this active resumption of hostilities after the conference and the proposals for peace. Loch now requested me to allow him to return, under a flag of truce, to look after Parkes; and an artillery officer, Captain Brabazon,[3] asked for leave to ac-

[1] A *sowar* is a native cavalryman from India.

[2] Shared the same fate as Mr De Norman. See preceding page.

[3] Subsequently treacherously captured and murdered by the Chinese. From what Sir Hope Grant states it is evident that Captain Brabazon lost his life in the performance of a duty with which he was intrusted, and not through volunteering for an undertaking merely to satisfy curiosity.—H. K.

company him. At first I refused this latter request; but Brigadier Crofton, commanding the Royal Artillery, pointed out how valuable would be the knowledge of the ground thus obtained, and I regret to say I yielded. Captain Fane, of Fane's Horse, likewise applied for permission to go, but I refused peremptorily—fortunately indeed for him, as will be seen.

A mandarin of high rank, by name Hang-ki, now came to us in his sedan-chair with a flag of truce, and requested to see Lord Elgin. He was told that the ambassadors were not with the armies, and after a short time he went away. A Chinese petty officer and three men also rode up and offered to show us our camping-ground, but they were ordered off.

The name of the place where the enemy had taken up a position, and where we were to have encamped, was Chan-chia-wan. We looked through our telescopes along the line of Chinese troops and made out Colonel Walker and three of the Dragoon Guards on their horses, but to our surprise they did not come out to meet us. The space of ground occupied by the enemy extended over three miles, and as they were moving round both our flanks, I sent a squadron out to our

right and left with directions to keep a good look-out, and advanced a battery of 9-pounders to some high ground on our right flank, with orders to prepare for action. Suddenly we heard a heavy fire of matchlocks and gingals, and a number of horsemen were seen galloping furiously towards us. They turned out to be Colonel Walker and his party. They soon reached us and told us their story. They had been detained by the enemy, but were civilly treated, when a French officer rode up and began to dispute with some Tartars about a mule he was riding. At last he drew a pistol and fired it, when his mule was immediately shot, and he himself murdered. Colonel Walker rode to his assistance, but his sword was struck out of his hand; and though it was restored to him by a Chinese officer, fresh efforts were made to wrest it from him, and in his endeavours to retain it, his fingers were so badly cut that his hand was disabled. Then finding that their only hope of safety was to force their way out, he shouted to his party to ride for their lives. All charged through the enemy and made their escape — viz., Colonel Walker, Mr Thompson of the Commissariat, one sowar and four Dragoon Guards, one of whom

was shot through the leg. Mr Thompson received several spear-wounds in the back, and one horse was shot through the body, but managed to convey its rider back in safety.

Loch and Brabazon had been absent for two hours, and it was evident they had been detained. At all events, after the treacherous conduct of the Chinese, we had no option but to proceed with our attack, and General de Montauban and myself agreed that he should take the right and turn the enemy's position. I placed at his entire disposal a squadron of Fane's Horse, which had already pushed on in that direction. General de Montauban accordingly advanced and soon got on the left flank of the Chinese who were lining the dry water-course. He then brought up his artillery and opened an enfilading fire upon them, from which they must have suffered considerably, as they had not apparently the power of moving their guns and were unable to reply. They therefore attacked him with their cavalry, and for a short time the French guns were in jeopardy. Colonel de Bentzman commanding the French artillery afterwards told me that he drew his revolver as a last resource to aid in endeavouring to save them. Our gallant little force of cavalry with

about half-a-dozen troopers which General de Montauban had with him,[1] the whole led by Colonel Foley, the Commissioner with the French, now charged the Tartars, and, though a handful compared with them, used their sharp swords with such effect that the enemy was compelled to retreat.

I had already ordered the 9-pounder battery to open fire, which diverted the attention of the Chinese from the French flank attack, which was further supported by the 99th Regiment and the Dragoon Guards. Sir John Michel was sent to the left with the 2d Queen's, Stirling's 6-pounder battery,[2] and the native cavalry, to act against the enemy's right; and I proceeded to the point with the Armstrong guns, the Musbee[3] Sikhs, and a squadron of the Dragoon Guards. The enemy opened upon us from all points, but their fire was ineffectual.

Sir John Michel encountered such heavy masses on his left that he had some difficulty in holding

[1] The French expedition was unprovided with cavalry, with the exception of a few mounted orderlies.

[2] The present designation of this battery is B Battery 14th Brigade.

[3] The Musbee is a low caste of Sikh, really the sweeper caste.

his position, and was attacked by a large body of Tartar cavalry. Probyn, who had only 100 of his regiment with him at the time, was ordered to charge to the front, which he did in most gallant style, riding in amongst them with such vigour and determination that they could not withstand his attack for a moment, and fled in utter consternation. The Musbees then advanced in a steady line carrying everything before them, and taking several guns. By-and-by we were joined by the 99th Regiment, the 9-pounder battery and the Dragoon Guards; and Sir John Michel having sent to say that the enemy was still very strong in front of him, I sent the Armstrong battery to his assistance, and shortly after they retired. The whole of their position was now captured, and I sent a message to the French, who had made a long circuit, to say that I intended to advance and take the town of Chan-chia-wan; but General de Montauban replied that his men were so knocked up that he did not propose to advance any further. The squadron of Fane's Horse, commanded by Lieutenant Cattley,[1] crossed over and joined Michel, and I rode on

[1] Since dead.

and found the enemy had evacuated Chan-chia-wan. Advancing through it with the Musbees, about a mile on the other side I came to a large Chinese camp in which we took several guns. The total number which fell into the hands of the allies that day amounted to 80. Our combined forces did not exceed 4000 men. We occupied the town.[1]

During the night a fire broke out and I was in great trepidation lest it should spread; fortunately it was confined to one house. In the evening I sent out a picket on the Tang-chow road; and on the following day, 19th, fresh pickets were pushed still more forward. Wade was sent with a flag of truce into Tang-chow to find out what had become of the prisoners, and to warn the authorities that, if they were not given up, our forces would take Pekin. The Prefect stated that Mr Parkes had left the town on the day of the fight, and, he supposed, had gone back to us. As Wade was returning he saw a large camp to the west of Tang-chow, but on trying to communicate with it was fired at. Lord Elgin and his suite joined our camp this day from Ho-si-wu; and on

[1] The strength of the Chinese was estimated at about 20,000 men.

the 20th September General Collineau's brigade arrived, raising the French force to 3000 men. I also sent an order to Sir Robert Napier to march up from Ho-si-wu with two regiments, one of which was to be the 60th, as soon as possible. The 31st Regiment was to be distributed between Ho-si-wu and Yang-tsun, half-way on the road to Tien-tsin. Our head commissariat officer, Mr Turner,[1] also arrived, and to my great satisfaction reported that he had brought up the flotilla with commissariat stores to Ho-si-wu from Tien-tsin.

On 21st September, at 5 A.M., we resumed our march. The weather had become much cooler, and the country more easy for marching. When two miles outside Chan-chia-wan, I had to wait to enable the French to come up and take their position on our right, according to their turn. Our baggage was collected in two small villages, and 100 infantry left to guard it. We were only a short distance from the enemy; and after we had advanced a mile, their guns opened on the French. Opposite the latter was the canal bridge of Pa-le-chiao,[2] apparently strongly fortified.

[1] Since dead.

[2] Whence General de Montauban subsequently derived his title of Count Palikao.

Our troops were formed up with the infantry on the right, artillery in the centre, and cavalry in echelon on the left, and I then rode up to the French to reconnoitre the position of the enemy. As I was quietly riding back, I saw some cavalry on the left front of our allies, which I at first took for some of their skirmishers, when they suddenly approached me, and I found that they were Tartars. I immediately galloped off to Stirling's guns,[1] and opened fire with case at a range of 200 yards, which quickly made them retire. The King's Dragoon Guards and Fane's Horse, with Probyn's regiment in support, now advanced to the charge; the first-named taking a bank and ditch on their way, and, attacking the Tartars with the utmost vigour, instantly made them give way. Fane's men followed them in pursuit, and on reaching the margin of a road jumped into it over an interposing high bank and ditch. The front rank cleared it well; but the men in rear, unable to see before them owing to the excessive dust, almost all rolled into the ditch. Nevertheless, the Tartars had but a poor chance, and suffered severely. The whole of their cavalry retreated, and we followed them up for some time, occasion-

[1] B Battery, 14th Brigade.

ally firing long shots at them with our Armstrongs with good effect.

We continued our advance until we were stopped by a force firing at us from a strong position in a village and from a tope of trees. We soon, however, brought up some infantry, and dislodged them without difficulty. It must have formed the camping-ground of a Tartar general of some importance, as we there captured two yellow silk banners belonging to the Imperial Guard, one of which I have now in my possession; eighteen brass guns likewise here fell into our possession. The French attacked the bridge of Pa-le-chiao with great gallantry. The *élite* of the Chinese Imperial Guard was drawn up to resist them, but had to give way before European discipline. The French took with the bridge twenty-five guns.

The enemy had apparently disappeared, and I retired towards the bridge, where our camp was being pitched, when suddenly fire was opened on us from the other side, whereupon the Musbees crossed the canal, took the guns, and killed sixty of the enemy. We finally encamped upon some high ground on the right bank of the canal, and the French on the other side, near the Pa-le-chiao

bridge. The next morning, 22d September, a flag of truce was sent in, with letters from the highest mandarin in the empire, Prince Kung, brother to the Emperor. He stated that he had been appointed chief commissioner in room of the last two, whose conduct had not been approved of, and that he was anxious to come to terms with us; but he said nothing with regard to our poor prisoners. Lord Elgin and Baron Gros replied in strong terms, that they declined to open negotiations until the captives were returned. The next day another letter came from the Prince, stating that our people were safe; that Sang-ko-lin-sin had seized them the day of the first fight; and that the only conditions on which they would be sent back were the restitution of the Taku forts and the evacuation by our fleet of the Peiho river. He added that the Emperor had agreed to sign the treaty; but that he could not consent to Lord Elgin delivering to him in person a letter from the Queen of England. Upon this Lord Elgin wrote a most decided letter. He told the high commissioner that if the Chinese Government chose to break through the law of nations with regard to flags of truce, they must abide by the consequences, and that the vengeance

of the British and French would be visited upon their country for such an act of perfidy. As for delivering in person her Majesty's letter to the Emperor, he would waive that point; but that not a ship or any part of the army should leave the country until the provisions of the treaty had been carried out. The Chinese still evaded giving up the prisoners; and Lord Elgin therefore resolved that our advance upon Pekin should not be arrested.

[Prince Kung also threatened that the entry of our forces into the capital would be followed by the instant massacre of the prisoners. The perils which environed these latter placed both the military and the diplomatic chiefs in a position of the most painful perplexity. Mr Parkes and his party having been kidnapped in violation of the laws of nations, when employed upon diplomatic duty, could not be considered lawful prisoners of war; and Lord Elgin always refused, in his correspondence with the Chinese, to admit them to be such. The cruel and treacherous people into whose hands they had fallen, if irritated, were quite capable of wreaking a fearful vengeance on them, as subsequent events proved. And yet to have yielded one iota in our demands to insure

the safety of our fellow-countrymen would have been the most fatal of all precedents—would have been a premium on future bad faith, and might almost have neutralised the successes we had already gained. The plenipotentiaries, therefore, made the surrender of the prisoners a *sine qua non* before hostilities could be suspended.—H. K.]

Sir Robert Napier arrived with his deputy assistant quartermaster-general, Lieut. Lumsden, on the 24th September, but his division was a few days' march in rear. I sent the irregular cavalry to make a reconnaissance up to Pekin; and on their return, Probyn, who was in command, told me that, along the whole distance, he had seen neither troops nor camps, but that report stated that the Chinese army was in position to the north of the town. He had ridden up to within 200 yards of the walls, which he described as being very high and in excellent repair. On the 26th, Lord Elgin and I rode to Chan-chia-wan to pay a visit to General Ignatieff, the Russian ambassador, who had throughout followed us up in our march, and was now on his way to Tang-chow. He received us very cordially, and showed us an excellent map, which he had caused to be made,

of Pekin, wherein was represented every street and house of importance. This plan he kindly lent me to copy, merely stipulating that it should not be published, as it had not yet been sent to St Petersburg.[1] I had it photographed by Signor Beato, whom I had specially allowed to accompany the expedition, and who had previously photographed scenes in India and the Crimea. I also obtained some further very valuable information from the Russians—to the effect that the Tartar town, separated from the Chinese by a wall, occupied the northern portion; that the city was surrounded by large suburbs and numerous trees, and that the ditch was deep and broad on three sides, but on the north side shallow, and in many places almost dry. In this direction, moreover, the ground was much more open. General de Montauban was of opinion that the town ought to be attacked on the south side, but in consequence of the above information, I differed with him. We wished to molest the Chinese as little as possible: on the north, where it was stated that

[1] This acquisition ultimately proved of great value. The streets therein laid down had been "traversed" in a cart from which angles had been taken, while indicators fixed to the wheels marked the distances gone over. See note at end of this chapter.

the Tartar streets were wide and the population scanty, there would be greater facilities for forcing an entrance; and lastly, in this direction the Summer Palace of the Emperor was little more than four miles distant from the city.

On 27th September, the two regiments of Sir Robert Napier's division from Ho-si-wù, together with Pennycuick's and Bedingfield's batteries, marched in, and on the 29th our siege-guns arrived, under the charge of Captain Dew, R.N.[1] He had had great difficulty in bringing them up, owing to the shallowness of the river, and at places had been obliged to have recourse to the company of Madras sappers, which I had sent with the guns in order to cut channels. The day before I had ordered Probyn, with the 1st Irregular Cavalry, to make another reconnaissance, and to ascertain the whereabouts of the Tartar camp—a task which this excellent officer performed with great judgment. He came upon their pickets, drove them in, and discovered their camping-ground to be on the north-east of the town. On 30th September an ultimatum was sent by Lord Elgin and Baron Gros to Pekin, to which the Chinese returned an

[1] Since dead.

answer, that if we would retire to Chan-chia-wan, they were willing to sign a treaty there. Our plenipotentiaries rejoined that this reply was not at all satisfactory, and that the forces should march to Pekin. I left the marines and a couple of guns at Tang-chow[1] to hold that place as a protection to our convoys coming up, and I also established a depot in some roomy old tombs, near the bridge of Pa-le-chiao and the village. These places were built with substantial walls, and were capable of making a good defence. As a temporary measure, I also left there our siege-train, with 200 infantry. Several of our sowars had been fired at conveying letters from Chan-chia-wan down the road, and in compliance with my request, General de Montauban took possession of the town with 100 men, to whom I added 25 irregular cavalry, thus enabling us to keep up our communication with the south.

On the 1st October, Prince Kung again wrote praying us to stay our march, and hinting that Mr Parkes should be employed as a mediator; but on the 2d the allied ambassadors again replied that they would listen to nothing until the

[1] This town had surrendered without opposition.

prisoners had been given up. The same evening Kung sent another letter accompanied by one from Parkes written in Chinese semi-officially, requesting that clothes might be sent for himself and Loch. In the margin were added the words in English "we two are quite well treated," and another sentence in Hindostani by Loch, which conveyed to us a warning that the rest of the letter was written under compulsion. The clothes were forwarded, and a letter was written which would do the prisoners no harm should the Chinese choose to read it, stating what we menaced if they were not given up.[1]

On the 3d October we marched again, crossed the canal, and halted at the depot,[2] which was called Chan Kia-Ying. Here we were obliged to wait pending the arrival of a French convoy. On the 4th the merchants of Pekin sent presents of supplies to Lord Elgin and Baron Gros, entreating at the same time that we would not ad-

[1] Upon some of the clothes thus sent were written in Hindostani the following sentences around the name marked on them: "In three days we shall commence hostilities again;" and "What is the name of the place in which you are confined?" By the next letter received from them, we learned that they were lodged in the Kaon-meaon Temple near the Teh-shun gate.—Wolseley, p. 211.

[2] See preceding page.

vance further. We also heard from Parkes and Loch, saying that they had received the clothes, that they were confined in a temple near the Tey-shun gate, and that only three of the remaining prisoners were with them. Parkes added an official note stating the wishes of Prince Kung and his colleagues. On the morning of the 5th October we marched, the men carrying three days' rations. The country was so intersected with houses and trees, that our progress often became difficult. We only accomplished about five miles, and then encamped round some old brick-kilns about three miles from the north-east angle of Pekin. On the 6th October, after a couple of hours' march we came upon a large grass-covered ruined rampart where the men halted for breakfast, and where General de Montauban and I agreed that, as the army of Sang-ko-lin-sin had apparently retreated, we should make for the Summer Palace, where we should probably find the Emperor or principal Government officials. It was the turn of the English to march first, and as the country was much enclosed, rendering our advance in a regulated line impracticable, I pushed on in front with a strong advanced-guard and with flankers. At the same

time our cavalry moved off to the right, and were directed to take a wide circuit on that flank. When we had gone a couple of miles, it was reported to me that a strong force of Tartar cavalry was moving ahead of us. They retreated, however, so quickly, that we soon lost sight of them amongst the trees and houses; but I was determined to follow them up, and moved my force along a road which led up to a rampart, forming a part of the same ruined fortifications before mentioned. Our troops were now much fatigued; and I gave orders for them to encamp near some fine temples situated on a large open plain within the line of works, while I myself went in search of the French General, whom we supposed to be on our left, for the purpose of holding a conference with him. But he was nowhere to be found, and the cavalry which I had sent out as flankers had also disappeared. He and his force must have lost us in the enclosed country. I rode all along the line of ramparts to try and find them, but in vain. It had no doubt been arranged between us that we should ultimately march to the Summer Palace, but I expected that in the first instance the French would follow us.

Lord Elgin and I took up our quarters in a handsome old temple dedicated to Confucius. As soon as it became dark, I ordered large fires to be lighted to indicate to the French and to our cavalry the position of our camp, in the event of their having lost their way; and the following morning, the 7th October, I caused a salute of 21 guns to be fired from some rising ground outside the rampart with the same object. Even this was of no avail, and so I sent a squadron of the King's Dragoon Guards to find out the exact position of the Summer Palace, and to ascertain if the French and our cavalry were there. Wolseley, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General, went with this party, and at 9 A.M. returned with the information that he had found them at Yuan-min-yuan—the Chinese name of the Palace. The French during their march had missed our track, and had therefore proceeded to the Palace. After breakfast Lord Elgin and I rode over to see General de Montauban. In the distance we at last perceived the Palace beautifully situated amidst gardens and woods, and a range of large suburbs in front. We passed the park walls by a fine old stately gateway, and proceeding up an avenue, came to a range of

handsome dwellings roofed over with yellow tiles, turned up at the ends, Chinese fashion. In different parts of the grounds were 40 separate small palaces, in beautiful situations. The park was carefully kept—the footpaths and roads clean and in excellent order, and there were various pretty pieces of ornamental water. We found that the French had encamped near the entrance of the Great Audience Hall, and it was pitiful to see the way in which everything was being robbed.

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The principal Palace was filled with beautiful jade-stone of great value and carved in a most elaborate manner—splendid old China jars, enamels, bronzes, and numerous handsome clocks and watches, many of which were presents given by Lord Macartney[1] and ambassadors from other countries. In a building close to the main Palace were two mountain-howitzers[2] which had been made at Woolwich and likewise presented

[1] Probably in the year 1793.

[2] They bore the date "1782," and were complete with carriages, limbers, and ammunition.

by Lord Macartney to the Emperor. They had apparently been kept as curiosities and never used. They were afterwards sent back to Woolwich. One room only in the palace was untouched. General de Montauban informed me he had reserved any valuables it might contain for equal division between the English and French. The walls of it were covered with jade-stones, and with ornaments of various descriptions.

General de Montauban told me that the only opposition the French had met with was from a small guard at the palace gates, where two of his officers had been wounded in forcing an entrance. The Emperor and all his grandees had taken flight only a short time previously, and had carried little or nothing away with them.

General de Montauban and I agreed that all that remained of prize property should be divided between both armies. A quantity of articles was set aside for us, and I determined to sell them for the benefit of our officers and men. The French general told me that he had found two "joës," or staves of office, made of gold and green jade-stone, one of which he would give me as a present to Queen Victoria, the other he intended for the Emperor Napoleon. In a stable

we found eleven of Fane's horses, two of Probyn's, and one belonging to the King's Dragoon Guards, all of which had been taken from the escort sent with Parkes. On returning to camp we found a letter from Prince Kung, evidently written in great fear, saying that the prisoners would be sent to us to-morrow, and that a high commissioner would meet any delegate we might be disposed to send at a house outside the main gate of the city. The letter was signed by Parkes. A verbal message was returned that Mr Wade would meet the commissioner at the appointed place. Thither Wade repaired, and was informed by Hang-ki, the head mandarin appointed for this duty, that the total number of European prisoners in Pekin was eight—viz., Parkes, Loch, a sowar, and five Frenchmen, one of whom was an officer. He promised that they should be delivered up to-morrow. The Emperor, he added, had fled with the army, and he believed that the remainder of the prisoners were with him.

The next day, the 8th October, a quantity of gold and silver was discovered in one of the temples of the Summer Palace, and a room full of the richest silks and furs. This treasure was divided in two equal portions between the French and ourselves.

At about 3 P.M., to our inexpressible satisfaction, Parkes, Loch and the five Frenchmen came into camp to the temple in which Lord Elgin and I resided. Parkes told me their sad story. On the 18th September, Loch and Brabazon, having ridden into Tang-chow, collected all the party, consisting of De Norman, Mr Bowlby ('Times' correspondent), Lieutenant Anderson, nineteen sowars, one man of the King's Dragoon Guards — Phipps by name — and Parkes himself, and started on the way back. Ere long, however, they were fired at from the Chinese lines, and on riding round a field of high maize they came across a body of infantry, who, levelling their matchlocks at them, desired them to halt. Parkes spoke a few words of remonstrance, but was told that no one could be allowed to pass without an order from Sang-ko-lin-sin, who was not far distant, and to whom he was referred. Loch and a sowar accompanied him, and thus they became separated from the rest of their party. That general, however, turned round upon him, abused him, said that all the evil of the war had been brought upon the Chinese owing to his misconduct, and ordered both him and Loch to be made prisoners. They were then made to dismount and forced to kiss the ground.

Their arms were tied tightly behind their backs, and they were taken to the rear, where their custodians began to ill-treat them, and they expected every moment to be killed. They were, however, put into a cart and driven to Pekin, thrown into a common prison in company with seventy-five common malefactors, murderers and robbers, and loaded with chains, one round their necks, one round their bodies, two round their arms, and two round their legs. These were connected by a main chain to a ring in the roof so tightly, that they could not sit down. It was afterwards lengthened, which relieved them considerably. Parkes told me that they were treated with the greatest kindness by the wretched people who were in the same prison with them, who gave them a part of their miserable food. A jailer kept close to each of them day and night. In this state they were kept badly fed for nine days, when they were released from their chains and put into a prison by themselves, where they were interrogated by inquisitors as to the strength of our force, and other matters connected with us; but the two Englishmen refused to answer. At length they were taken away and placed in a very excellent joss-house, where, up to the time they

were brought back to us, they were fed like turkeys preparatory to a Christmas feast. The poor sowar was kept chained in a separate dark dungeon. For three days no one came near him, and he had nothing to eat. At last coarse grain and some water were given him to keep up life. The endurance of these poor natives of India was wonderful, and they stand hardships which would break down a European. Three only of our prisoners had been saved, and the fate of the others was not known until the 13th October, when eight Sikhs and one Frenchman, the sole survivors, were given up to us. They were in a sad state, and their hands and wrists were ulcerated from the manner in which they had been tied up. They then gave us a shocking account of the way in which they had been treated.

When Parkes and Loch left to remonstrate with the Chinese general, a crowd of soldiers set on them, and tied their feet and hands together behind their backs as lightly as possible, afterwards pouring water on the cords to increase the tension, and they were kept in this terrible position until the condition of their hands and wrists became too horrible for description. Poor Anderson was

affected by delirium, and died after nine days of captivity. De Norman suffered still more, and lived for seventeen days. Anderson was a noble fellow, clever, amiable, and much looked up to by his brother officers. De Norman and Mr Bowlby were also great favourites. In course of time all the others died, or were put to a violent death, with the exception of those whom I have already mentioned. Private Phipps, of the King's Dragoon Guards, was especially distinguished by the fortitude with which he endured his sufferings, and with which, up to the day of his death, he strove to keep up the courage of his fellow-captives.

The following report shows the sanitary condition of the British troops serving in the north of China on 25th August 1860:—

Remained,	482
Admitted,	155
Total,	637
Discharged,	133
Died,	3
Remaining,	503

Diseases remaining.

Fevers, ...	91
Diseases of stomach, wounds, and injuries,	135
Other diseases, ...	125
Total, . . .	503

Strength 9115. Percentage 5.[1]

W. M. MUIR, D.T.G.,
Principal Medical Officer.

Extracts from information concerning the city of Pekin, obtained from his Excellency GENERAL IGNATIEFF, the Russian ambassador.

"HEADQUARTERS, PA-LE,
September 25, 1860.

"A road runs along the parapet on the summit of the thickness of the wall. This communication, however, is broken at intervals by large towers, some of which are armed; but many of them have only guns painted on wood. It is possible to breach this wall, but it would entail the expenditure of time and ammunition. The simpler form would perhaps be to mine and blow it down.

[1] I take this opportunity of mentioning that, for the returns and the greater number of the statistics contained in this volume, I am indebted to the kindness of Major-General F. C. A. Stephenson, who, as Colonel Stephenson, served as Deputy Adjutant-General to the British troops during the campaign of 1860.—H. KNOLLYS.

"Outside the north-east angle of the imperial city, which is in the centre of the mandarin quarter, are living 60,000 men of the royal Tartar Guard, with all their families. It is probable that considerable street-fighting may take place here, should the allied forces assault the city.

"All the preparations for defence have been made along the east face of the two cities; and it is deemed very probable that an attack directed at almost any other point of the city would be unopposed. The Chinese city is the Paris of Pekin. There are all the theatres, parks, merchants' houses, wealthy shops, &c. It is much cleaner than the Manching city, and the streets are broader and better paved.

"General Ignatieff considers the north side of the city the weakest point. He says that the ground at this part outside the walls is very high. Here is the imperial parade-ground. A force in position could entirely cut off the retreat of the Emperor from the capital by the main roads running from north-east-by-east, north-north-west, and north-west-by-west gates. The Emperor is reported to have arrived in Pekin two days ago.

"H. HOPE CREALOCK,
Lieutenant-Colonel, Military Secretary to H.B.M.'s Special Embassy in China."

CHAPTER VI.

LETTERS FROM LORD HERBERT—CHINESE OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO THE WAR.

THE following correspondence has been selected from amongst the numerous letters placed in my hands, addressed by Lord Herbert to Sir Hope Grant. Irrespectively of the fact that they deal with the main points connected with the China campaign, they may perhaps possess an interest of their own, as illustrating the disposition of one who was probably the best War Minister England ever possessed.—H. KNOLLYS.

From Right Hon. SIDNEY HERBERT, Secretary of State for War, to Lieut.-General Sir HOPE GRANT.

"WAR OFFICE, *Nov.* 26, 1859.

"DEAR SIR J. HOPE GRANT,—I trust that an early mail will bring your acceptance of the appointment to the command of the expedition to

China. In that case, our relations will henceforth be of such an intimate character that I feel I may without scruple address you as I have done in this letter.

"The force under your command will consist of . . . [Here follows the detail of troops, the total of which is estimated at 10,000 men.]

"The French send 5800 infantry, four batteries of field-artillery (with a double set of guns), and some 'compagnies de débarquement,' consisting of seamen trained to land manœuvres—in all, about 8000 men. Your formal instructions will go out by the next mail; but it is necessary to have an understanding with the French Government upon them, before they are finally despatched to you.

"The command which has been offered to you is one requiring, from the peculiar circumstances which surround it, both temper and judgment; and I do not think the Queen could have chosen an officer more likely than yourself to discharge its duties successfully.

"There are two difficulties which beset our course—one as regards our enemy, the other as regards our ally.

"As regards the Chinese, the deplorable mishap

at the mouth of the Peiho[1] makes retaliation unavoidable, unless we could in the interim receive—which I fear is very unlikely—a disavowal of the act and some offer of reparation.

"But our quarrel is not with the people, but with the Government. At the ports where we trade our peaceful relations have remained unimpaired. Our object in going to China is to trade; and they trade with us uninterruptedly, though the central Government fires on our ships, and arrests the progress of our ambassador. It is important to maintain, if possible, this good understanding with the Chinese people at the trading ports.

"The pressure, therefore, whatever it be, should be as far as possible confined to the central Government. They can be approached by the Gulf of Pechili and the Peiho. I trust that the reduction of the forts at the mouth of the river, or if that operation, though successful, should fail to bring them to terms, an advance up the Peiho to Tien-tsin would probably enable us to dictate a peace to the Chinese emperor.

"Our object is to get our peace ratified without being obliged to have recourse to an advance on Pekin itself. With the numbers which the Chinese

[1] In 1859.

Government have at their command, the advance of what, after all, is but a handful of men, into an enormous capital, is hazardous; and the operation, if successful, might possibly in the present disorganised state of the Chinese empire, end in upsetting the existing dynasty, and throwing the whole country into a state of anarchy, fatal to the interests of commerce, because destructive of all production.

"Again, the Chinese capital is so situated that it is, first, from ice, and, secondly, from the north-east monsoon, almost unattackable till the beginning of May; and the great heats of June and July are almost as powerful for its defence. Add to this, that the Government are most anxious, whether from China or from India, to effect a greater concentration of our troops in England as soon as possible.

"An early termination of our Chinese difficulty is therefore most desirable. Our allies probably have different views. They have no great commercial interests at stake. The goodwill of the Chinese or the stability of the Chinese empire is not important to them; but the prestige of a bulletin dated from Pekin would give great satisfaction to the French people.

"Our plenipotentiary, Mr Bruce, may therefore have difficult cards to play. I need scarcely impress upon you the necessity of a most open, cordial, and conciliatory bearing towards the commanders of the French forces. Although the two Governments are on perfectly friendly terms, it is impossible to deny that there exists between the two nations a jealous and uneasy feeling.[1] A perfectly frank and unreserved course of conduct is, as in all such cases, the best and safest.

"I enclose two memoranda which will form part of the letter of instructions, which you will receive by a later mail.

"The first was one which was issued as a guide for the conduct of the general and admiral when General Ashburnham was sent to China,[2] and which is a copy of the memorandum drawn up by the Duke of Wellington for the guidance of Lord Gough and Sir William Parker in the previous China war. The second . . . [Here follow general instructions and information relative to rendezvous, transport of troops, tonnage, &c.]

"I will now only further add, that at this dis-

[1] This was written shortly after the attempt of Orsini to asassinate the Emperor Napoleon. The consequent excitement against England gave rise to the first formation of Volunteer corps.

[2] Previous to the outbreak of the Indian Mutiny in 1857.

tance it is impossible to give directions as to the operations to be undertaken. It is left to the discretion and judgment of yourself and colleagues, naval and military, French and English, all acting—which is most important—in concert with the two plenipotentiaries, upon whom the ultimate question of peace or war must rest.

"All I can undertake is that you shall be honestly and heartily supported at home.

"As regards the troops, you will have full authority to make any alterations or additions as to clothing, rations, &c., &c., which, after consultation with your medical and sanitary officer, you may deem right. The list of reinforcements to the existing garrison of Hong-Kong, and of all stores, munitions of war, &c., sent out there, have already been forwarded to you. I will write again by the next mail, which I hope will carry out your formal instructions, a duplicate of which will be sent to Singapore and Hong-Kong.

"With every wish for your success, and a firm belief that you will do all that can be done to attain it, I remain sincerely yours,

"SIDNEY HERBERT.

"*P.S.*—In addition to the force I have enumer-

ated, a siege-train of thirty guns, with proportionate amount of ammunition, will be despatched from this country forthwith."

"WAR OFFICE, *December* 10*th*, 1859.

"DEAR SIR J. HOPE GRANT,— . . . The battalions going to China are weaker than we had assumed they would be. I see by Lord Canning's letter that they numbered no more than 780 men, and those now going out will not be above 850 men. . . . The whole force will be larger than was first contemplated. Under these circumstances the Government have considered the necessity of sending out a second general officer, and have selected Sir William Mansfield to serve under you in command of the infantry division.[1] I have no doubt that you will find him in every way most useful to the public service.

"We expect by the next mail to hear from Lord Elphinstone that he has arranged for a steamer to meet the two batteries of Royal Artillery going out from here *viâ* Suez, with the Armstrong guns. These guns are all ready, and the batteries are to be inspected by the Duke of Cambridge on Friday. I am very anxious that

[1] See page 3.

they should be thoroughly tested on service. I have the greatest confidence in their merits; but for fear of accidents, we have sent duplicate batteries of the ordinary brass field-pieces by long sea.—Pray believe me, &c.,

"SIDNEY HERBERT.

"*P.S.*—I am not sure whether I mentioned in my last letter that, as a matter of course, you would have the local rank of Lieutenant-General in China."

"WAR OFFICE, *April 9th*, 1860.

"DEAR SIR HOPE,— . . . As regards the question which you put to me, whether my statement of the risks of an advance on Pekin[1] is to be taken as an order not to go there, I thought it best to consult Lord Palmerston upon it. He says, 'I should be for leaving to the military commanders (who should, of course, consult with the diplomatists as to the diplomatic bearing of the question) full latitude of discretion as to advancing on Pekin.'

"Lord Palmerston thinks that the belief that an occupation of Pekin might lead to the over-

[1] Probably referring to letter of November 26, 1859.

throw of the dynasty, and by plunging everything into confusion, destroy our trade, is unfounded.[1]

"It is clear, however, that we could not winter there, and we should have to leave almost immediately after our arrival.

"You, however, on the spot, will be able to judge far better than we can here of the prudence of the advance. I doubt now whether the French are much bent upon it. They have, apparently, some other designs in the way of settlement in some part of the China seas. I still cherish the hope that the Chinese Government will see the wisdom of an early concession to our demands, which certainly are not immoderate after so great an outrage as that perpetrated at the Taku Forts.[2]

"Lord Elgin leaves England this month for China.—Pray believe me, &c.,

"SIDNEY HERBERT."

"LONDON, *May 10th*, 1860.

"DEAR SIR HOPE,—I am very glad to hear by your letter of the 14th March that you have

[1] Lord Palmerston's opinion was verified by subsequent events.
[2] In 1859.

formed good expectations of your French colleagues. Admiral Hope seems to have well studied the coast on which he has to operate, and to have a clear perception of what may be done.

"We have been surprised here at the large amount of native force despatched from India to China, making the whole forces 18,000 or 19,000 men. Our agreement with France included no more than 10,000 altogether, exclusive of the then garrison at Canton and Hong-Kong. We were of opinion that, in a country in which the climate will not permit military operations by Europeans for much more than three months, and that period intersected by a spell of intolerable hot weather, a small force, compact, but well appointed, would have been more effective. Almost the whole operation will be on the coast or up rivers. We therefore spoke of a small proportion of cavalry, and a reduced number of followers. In fact, I fear that you will find that you have not steamers enough to move rapidly so large a force. I trust you will not find difficulties as to feeding them; but we know very little of the country, or of the possibility of drawing supplies from Japan or the neighbouring localities.

"Lord Elgin will be with you before this. He is, I think, too sanguine as to the probability of the Chinese yielding to mere demonstrations. But his arrival—not having been mixed up with the Peiho affair,[1] and having successfully negotiated before—may have a good effect on the policy of the Chinese.

"We have been advised here, first, that it is difficult to send furs or skins by the long sea route without great risk of injury; secondly, that they are very difficult to get good here, where such things are little worn, and the mode of preparing them therefore not understood. But excellent sheep-skin clothing can be obtained at Bombay in great quantities at low rates, with a comparatively short voyage. But I should think that the intense cold in China itself would cause the use of garments fitted to resist it, and that a supply of some description of warm clothing could be found there.

"Sir Edward Lugard mentions that the Military Train made excellent cavalry in India[2] when not wanted for train purposes. You will have been aware of this, and may possibly find them again useful in the former capacity.

[1] In 1859. [2] During the Indian Mutiny in 1857-58.

"We shall soon be looking for the first indications of the effect of your preparations on the Chinese Government. Though the war is not popular here, every one sympathises with the men who compose and the officer who commands the expedition.—Pray believe me, &c.,

"SIDNEY HEBERT."

"LONDON, *June 10th*, 1860.

"DEAR SIR HOPE,—The Chinese are certainly the most extraordinary people on the face of the earth; and your excellent arrangement with regard to the peninsula of Kowloon[1] certainly would prove it had we no other evidence on the subject.

"The commissariat speak of readiness to provide supplies; but I fear that, as you get farther north, you will meet with a more patriotic but less convenient spirit on the part of the Chinese population.

"I have read with the greatest interest your account of the meeting and discussion with the French officers; and the Government entirely approves of the arrangement you have made.

[1] See p. 4.

By it you seem to have secured what is best for both. Each will act on the plan they themselves advocate.[1] There will be complete co-operation; but each army will act under the sole direction of its own general in the particular operation. There will be a common object separately attained, and no collision or jealousies on the road to it. Last, but not least, you seem to have the best plan and the least hazard.

"We have, I hope, removed the difficulty as to pay and allowance which you have very properly brought to notice. You will get by this mail what, I hope, will prove a satisfactory answer as to the rates to be paid on Indian allowances throughout. . . . You will have received a letter from the War Office, disallowing the full increase of the coolie corps proposed. You may, however, have reason for exceeding the number fixed by the War Office, in which case I send you an authority so to do, now that you have so large a force under you, and may not have received from India the number of camp-followers, &c., you expected, as I see an account

[1] Referring to General de Montauban's intention, subsequently abandoned, of landing independently on a point south of the Peiho.—See p. 34.

of difficulties experienced in inducing them to embark. But I shall be glad to have reports of the number raised, as it is of course difficult to estimate for the forces to be employed which are not included in the combatant corps.

"We shall, I apprehend, have to raise at least an additional three millions sterling; but at this distance it is mere guess-work. I trust you will prove right in the hopes you entertain of a bloodless termination to all our preparations, and that the Chinese, who have rejected rather contumeliously the ultimatum of a distant enemy,[1] will yield to a visible force appearing off Taku; but I fear that their success last year, and their numbers this year, may encourage them to hold out. I should be very glad to have some of your battalions home in the winter; but it is too good to hope for.—Pray believe me, &c.,

"SIDNEY HERBERT."

"WAR OFFICE, *July 21st*, 1860.

"DEAR SIR HOPE,—I am very glad you have retained the additional force which Lord Canning proposed to stop. Once the expense has been incurred of their transport to your seas, it is well to

[1] See p. 9.

get all the good out of them which is possible, and you have exercised a sound discretion in keeping them and turning them to the best account. Clearly, by your account of the French, we shall have to do the work, and the more we have to do it with the better.

"I regret very much the loss of the Indian commissariat. I fear that our people will make blunders as to native caste prejudices, and so on, which would be serious. It is another instance of the great inconvenience of having two separate civil jealous services, in lieu of one with a common interest and object.

"We got our China vote not without the display of a good deal of dissatisfaction from all parties in the House of Commons. We have now taken on the ordinary estimates, about £1,200,000, by a vote of credit, at the commencement £850,000, and £3,300,000 now. The war was, in my opinion, after the Peiho affair, inevitable; but though the country was keen for war on the miserable lorcha affair,[1] in which we were in the wrong, it is now weary of the expense and unsatisfactory results, and ready for any

[1] Alluding to the boarding of the lorcha Arrow by Sir John Bowring in 1858.

means of escape from the difficulty. There is no fear, however, but that the good conduct of the forces engaged will meet with all the approbation and reward they deserve.—Believe me, &c., SIDNEY HERBERT."

"WAR OFFICE, *August 10th*, 1860.

"DEAR SIR HOPE,—I write a very hurried line before I go to the House of Commons. . . . I hope you will find the Armstrong guns better than you expected. We have now tried a great many of them, and we have found all, in point of accuracy, as near perfection as possible. They have other faults, but in this respect I should think the fault lay in the laying of the gun rather than in the gun itself. . . . —Believe me, &c.,

"SIDNEY HERBERT."

"WILTON, *October 24th*, 1860.

"DEAR SIR HOPE,—Your last mail was very tantalising; and we are in a state of anxious suspense, only knowing that your attack on the Taku Forts was about to be made. God grant the next may bring us good news. . . . One thing has made me rather anxious—namely, the

postponement of sending for warm winter clothing. . . . I trust you may winter south; but if not, you will have a fearful climate to contend with. At Bombay a great supply of sheep-skin clothing can, I understand, be obtained. No doubt in China the same skins or furs can be got but can they be got by an enemy? However, I have no doubt you will have thought of all this.

"I earnestly trust that your operations may have a good and speedy result. Every one speaks in the highest terms of the admirable discipline of your army, of its perfect efficiency, and admirable arrangements as regards supplies. You deserve success; but your difficulties are great, and will require all your skill and tact to surmount.—Pray believe me, &c., S. HERBERT."

"WAR OFFICE, *November 10th*, 1860.

"MY DEAR SIR HOPE,—I must add to the public despatches which go out to you by this mail my own congratulations on the brilliant success which you have achieved.[1] There is really not a drawback to it. All the departments seem to have been well up to their work—good com-

[1] The capture of the Taku Forts.

missariat—good medical staff—good health, and good discipline—things not to be attained without vigour and vigilance on the part of the commander. You have every reason to be proud of the force under you, and never was Grand Cross better won. . . .

"I trust no rancour is left in the minds of our allies. At any rate, the joint success *should* remove any if it existed.

"We are looking eagerly for your next despatches, which will give us the complement of your last one's, by specifying the names of those who most distinguished themselves, and bring us, I have no doubt, the account of important events as regards the prospects of peace.—Pray believe me, my dear Sir Hope, &c. &c.

"SIDNEY HERBERT."

"WAR OFFICE, *November 10th*, 1860.

"MY DEAR SIR HOPE,—

. . . . . .

"I am inclined to think that the Military Train has been made too military in its organisation, and too much like a combatant corps. They will not consider themselves as acting under the various departments whose transport they are to

carry on. They ought to be like a postmaster, who supplies with post-horses any one who wants them. The commissariat at Aldershot have been applying for a transport of their own, separate from the Military Train, and entirely under their own control. —— is strongly for it; —— against it. The latter says, justly enough, why maintain a Military Train if you are to have other people to do their work? But then the Military Train should do it themselves, and without making difficulties. I should be very much obliged if you, who have now seen the practical working of the present system in war, would tell me what your conclusions are, what the defects of the system may be, and what remedies you would apply,—whether it should continue to be a purchase corps; whether the officers should more frequently come from among the non-commissioned officers of the army, &c. &c. . . . —Pray believe me, &c.,

"S. HERBERT."

"WAR OFFICE, *November 27th*, 1860.

"MY DEAR SIR HOPE,—I have again to congratulate you on two successful engagements.[1]

[1] On 18th and 21st September.—See p. 112-116.

. . . You have not much margin in the way of time; and as the Chinese, if they knew how to play their game, could put you into an awkward fix, we here cannot but be anxious as to the future. I am glad to hear that you do not intend wintering in Pekin or near it; so long as you have open and clear communications with the sea, you can do well. . . . So much depends on the conditions of the treaty that it is difficult to give any positive directions at this distance.

"I expect the Duke of Cambridge in town to-morrow, when we will go over your list of officers recommended. I hear from Lord Cowley that Colonel Foley[1] has been promoted in the Legion of Honour, no communication between the Governments being necessary for the promotion of an officer who has already the lower grade of the Order; but that they (the French Government) will communicate with us when the operations shall be over as to the decoration to be bestowed on the Commandant Reboul.[2] The red-tapists here were, I find, much shocked at your specially recommending him for the Bath. I did not see who else could if you did not; but they say that

[1] English military attaché with the French force.

[2] French military attaché with the English force.

you should have spoken to his merits, but not specified the reward.

"Your accounts of the Armstrong guns are very satisfactory. The defects noticed in the reports of your officers had, I think, nearly all been discovered in practice here, and have been more or less remedied. The injury to the fuses, as you know, was owing to an unpardonable neglect in storing on board ship, by which they got damaged. The only defect which I think serious is the flying out of the breech-piece, because it can only be prevented by tight screwing up, and you cannot depend upon this being done in great hurry and excitement. Those we now are fitting have a better carriage, and single block trail.[1]

"I won't take your judgment on the Enfield as final. At Inkerman, at close quarters, it saved the day; for its penetration was such that it killed not only the front man fired at, but two, three,

[1] It must be remembered that although a few converted rifled guns were used by the French in the Italian campaign of 1859, the breech-loading cannon on the Armstrong principle was in 1860 an entirely new and untried weapon, and was regarded with suspicion and dislike by many of our military judges. The defect in the breech-piece, which Lord Herbert points out, was remedied shortly after; the time-fuses have still much to be desired; but even in the present day the weapon is considered a most admirable one.—H. K.

and even four behind. But if at short distances men fire high, the better the weapon, the less harm they will do. The badness of Brown Bess made the ball drop so soon that a bad aim if too high was corrected. But it proves, I think, that our men want more training still to make the marksman equal to his weapon, . . .—Believe me, &c. SIDNEY HERBERT."

"WAR OFFICE, *December 10th*, 1860.

"MY DEAR SIR HOPE,— . . . On Saturday we had a telegram from Alexandria [announcing the surrender of the gates of Pekin, &c. . . . .] Militarily everything seems to have been a great success; but the flight of the Emperor, and the possession even partially of Pekin, constitute a great difficulty. The danger most apprehended has come to pass; but I must say that I do not see how under the circumstances you could have avoided the advance. We have, however, now the prospect of a winter in the north, and very little prospect of a treaty at any time. A protraction of the war, with its enormous expenditure, will, I fear, meet with a doubtful reception in Parliament. Now, however, the first thing to be done is to re-establish the amount

of supplies, which I had checked in some instances and stopped in others. I have therefore brought together again a committee we had formed to discuss and decide these questions.

"We will take every precaution in packing the Armstrong fuses so as to secure them from damage. Medical comforts, of which half supplies only have been sent lately, will be sent out in full. Warm winter clothing I hope you will have got either from Bombay or in China itself. I fear the winter is rigid; but with the stores of Pekin under your hand, I hope there is no danger of your being short.

"Of course you will keep a good force. In case you want more, Lord Canning has a regiment or two ready for you as a reserve. I don't send you out reinforcements, because you had probably rather be without them till the season for operations returns. You will, I assume, keep the Armstrong batteries, guns and men. . . . I write all this on the first blush of the telegram; the despatches may modify it.

"I can only wish you God-speed with all my heart. I have perfect confidence in your judgment, and will do my utmost for your assistance, so far as at this distance can be done. The per-

formances of the force under your command are fully appreciated here.—Believe me, &c.

"SIDNEY HERBERT."

"WILTON, *December 25th*, 1860.

"DEAR SIR HOPE,—We heard last week . . . of the termination of the war in China. . . . The announcement has given immense satisfaction here. The prospect of a winter passed in China by the whole force, and the necessity of a renewal of the campaign next spring, was a subject of serious anxiety; and your position seemed very uncertain and precarious. But the peace seems to have been made with the same skill on the side of the diplomatists as the military operations were conducted by the commanders. I most heartily congratulate you on all you have achieved. . . . The fate of the poor prisoners has created a most painful impression here.[1] Of both Mr De Norman and Captain Brabazon I have heard a high character. The whole proceeding, from beginning to end, seems to have been of the most rascally character; and its wantonness and short-sightedness are even more astounding than its cruelty. I see by the tele-

[1] See p. 131.

gram that the Summer Palace was burnt to the ground. I suppose this had a good deal to do with the fate of the prisoners.[1]

"This is Christmas-day: I wish you a happy enjoyment of it, and many still to come. I hope before long to have the pleasure of converting our paper acquaintance into a personal friendship.—Pray believe me, &c.,

"SIDNEY HERBERT."

"WAR OFFICE, *January 10th*, 1861.

"MY DEAR SIR HOPE,—I hope by the next mail to send you the list of promotions and honours for the China campaign. We were very much puzzled how to select from the large list you sent us, the more so as the limits of the Bath have been more than reached, and there is great unwillingness to exceed or add to the numbers. As soon as the Queen's sanction is obtained they shall be despatched to China.

"The public here are, I think, very much pleased at the way in which everything has been done in China—firmness, temper, skill, success. But they are puzzled as to the future. They

[1] The prisoners had been murdered before the Summer Palace was destroyed.

doubt the stability of any treaty, and have a growing objection to wars which succeed in obtaining indemnities, but which cost far more than the indemnities recovered. I trust, however, that the severity of the lesson, the appearance of a hostile force in Pekin, and the rapidity and completeness of the campaign, may produce a lasting effect. In the meanwhile, the whole thing has been so well done that, provided it does not recur, every one seems satisfied. A first-rate general, a capital staff, an excellent commissariat, and a good medical department, are four things which the English public are especially pleased to see, and the more so when all are got together.

"I hope when you are at Hong-Kong you will look carefully over Kowloon. There is a strong feeling among the Hong-Kong civilians that all the advantages of the acquisition must be reserved for them. I have urged on the Colonial Office that merchants go out to Hong-Kong or elsewhere at their own risk for their own good; but the soldier is sent out to protect the merchant, without any option on his part, probably against his will, and certainly not for his good, and that the duty of the Government is to give them the best chance of health and comfort. . . .

Judging . . . by the tone of your letters, you are looking forward anxiously to a return home as permanent relief from tropical service. If I should be in office, of which my tenure is precarious, the earliest opportunity of employing you at home, if you wished it, would be taken advantage of.

"I see that your occupying force amounts to something about 10,000 men. Whenever a reduction takes place, the Indian troops should, if possible, be sent home first, as their employment under us is an exceptional proceeding, and is objected to by some on constitutional grounds, as not being included in our estimates, nor under our Mutiny Act,—not that the objection is worth much if put in the scale against practical convenience.

"I am about to change my appellation under circumstances which are far from agreeable. I had a very hard session last year, and got through it apparently well enough; but I have suffered from it since so much that I am forbidden to try another in the House of Commons, and I am forced therefore to take refuge in the Upper House, by the title of Lord Herbert. It has been a great blow to me; for I was fond of the

House of Commons, and had many and old friends in it, beside whom I have been fighting through various fortunes for a quarter of a century.—Pray believe me, &c.,

"SIDNEY HERBERT."

EXTRACTS from CHINESE OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS found in Sin-ho by Mr PARKES on 12th August 1860.

MEMORIAL from HO-KWEI-TSING, Imperial Commissioner, commenting on the ultimata of England and France.

. . . . . .

"Your servant would observe that, while there is no proof that statements made in the newspapers are true, it is by no means certain that they are utterly without foundation, and that it would not be right, when an increase of the English and French force is spoken of, not to be prepared against them. The report that the object of the English is Tien-tsin, and that the French desire to take possession of Chusan, tallies with what has been observed before. . . . Bruce

and Bourboulon are inseparable in wickedness, and their character is indeed sanguinary and treacherous. Still, utterly objectionable as the eight propositions of the Barbarians may be, your servant, feeling that it would not be so easy at a moment's time to dissolve the hardness of these chiefs, . . . and that, if he were to keep them quite at arm's-length, he would lose all chance of gaining the day, had resolved on receiving the commands your Majesty deigned to issue, authorising their admission into Pekin to exchange treaties in the same manner as the American Barbarians to Tien-tsin, then to proceed in person to Shanghai, to confer with them and make the necessary arrangements."

[Ho then speaks of the sudden arrival of the allied ultimatum, "the language of which he found to be detestably extravagant and insubordinate;" and, after discussing the various concessions demanded, thus proceeds:—]

"Wei-hu and his colleague further confidently report that the war-ships of these Barbarians have indeed been despatched from their country one after another, but that they are much afraid of our military prowess at Tien-tsin; that the presentation of the despatch beforehand is merely

for the purpose of making it appear that the commencement of hostilities does not lie with them, the English, but with us; and that this is another empty stratagem of Bruce's, who thereby takes such ground, that if, as he apprehended, another defeat be sustained by him, the whole of his nation will be obliged to send troops to the rescue; at the same time, that by this means he constrains the Barbarian merchants not to do what will serve us.

"The French Barbarian, not being in fact the person who began the quarrel, is merely mixing himself up in it at the instance of the other. . . . As they [the Barbarians] have named thirty days as the time they ought to wait for the Secretary of State's reply, no smash[1] will probably take place within the thirty days. It becomes the duty of your servant, on the one hand, to request instructions from your Majesty; and, on the other, in obedience to your commands, to direct Sien Kwan to repair before the time expires to Shanghai, and, in company with his subordinates, confidentially to instruct the Chinese merchants to get round the Barbarian merchants, with a view to devising means of holding them in a pair of

[1] *I.e.*, Nothing serious.

pincers.[1] . . . As regards the war-ships of the English Barbarians at Shanghai, up to the 3d of the 2d moon [24th February], there were in all six still in port; and since that date there have come in six more, and five have left the port. Of the latter, it has been ascertained that two have sailed northward.

"The Heart of the troops[2] of the French Barbarians, it is ascertained, has reached Hong-Kong, and, it is reported, will arrive at Shanghai immediately. . . . This he has the honour to submit to your Majesty for perusal, and, prostrate, he implores your Majesty's sacred glance thereon.

"A Respectful Memorial."

The following are the translations made from the newspaper dated the 10th of the English first moon, or the 18th of the Chinese 12th moon, which he has the honour to submit to your Majesty:—

"The reinforcements being sent out from England to China will amount to 10,000 troops, white

[1] A simile, meaning preventing any movement.

[2] *I.e.*, the general.

and black. The French, in addition to the 8000 men already despatched, are sending 2000, which will make a total of 10,000 men. The English and French will land 30,000 fighting men. . . . It is the purpose of England in this expedition to put forth all her strength. A great brass mortar will go to China. It has reached Sha-tun-tun,[1] and has been shipped on board the Hai-mi-lei-ya.[2] Thence it will go A-la-shan,[3] and from A-la-shan to So-ho-sy,[4] as at So-ho-sy there will certainly be a ship to carry this mortar to Hong-Kong.

"The French force has already all started for China.

"There is also an augmentation of the British navy; *apropos* of which there has been a discussion in England, lasting several days, upon the plan of campaign. One party says that the expedition ought not to attack China in the Tien-tsin country, as the Tien-tsin river is hard to enter, and the mud-banks extend several *li*. Pekin, even when a landing has been effected, is difficult of access, as the roads are full of impediments, and the

[1] Southampton.
[2] Himalaya.
[3] Alexandria.
[4] Suez.

water-ways numerous. There are bridges, but these will be sure to be broken up—added to which, great danger is probably to be apprehended from the Mongol cavalry making charges in difficult ground. It were best, therefore, to take the line followed in Tang Kwang's reign, and reoccupy Nankin. No apprehension need be entertained that peace will not be made. . . . On the other hand, it is urged that this plan is not a good one—that [here follow counter-arguments]. . . . Admitting all these difficulties—the impracticability of the mud-flats, the embarrassments of the road, the destruction of the bridges, and the impetuosity of the cavalry—the foreign[1] troops are on this occasion well provided with floating batteries, wooden causeways for the mud-flats, scaling-ladders, and flying-bridges. If the cavalry charge, the foreign soldiers have also cavalry to receive them. Need any anxiety be felt that with 30,000 troops Pekin shall not be reached? The foreign troops have, moreover, been looking for water in the neighbourhood of Peh-tang deep enough to enable them to land without difficulty; and, once landed, they will

[1] *I.e.*, the Allies.

take the forts in rear, destroy these, and attack Tien-tsin, after which they will advance on Pekin, and the business will be over.

"It is said that the newly-appointed French chief, Man-tau-pan,[1] has reached Hong-Kong, and will arrive at Shanghai shortly."

The following documents, so characteristic of the Chinese Government and nation, fell into the hands of the allies at the capture of the Summer Palace on the 9th of October, two days after the sack of the palace by the French army. They were translated from the original by Thomas Wade, Esq., Chinese Secretary, whose name has so frequently appeared in this volume. Some complimentary and formal phrases occurring in the originals are omitted in the translations.

MEMORIAL by SANG-KO-LIN-SIN.

"*7th month, 10th day* (*August 26th*).

"Your slave Sang-ko-lin-sin, kneeling, presents a memorial. Judging that the changeable disposition of the Barbarians will make it impossible to carry into effect the pacific policy, he, in

[1] Montauban.

the name of the princes and dukes of the six leagues, prays your Majesty to proceed on a hunting-tour, in order that measures for attacking and destroying the Barbarians may be facilitated. Your slave lately lost the position at Taku, where he commanded, in consequence of the unforeseen explosion of the powder-magazines at two of the north forts simultaneously, and not from any slackness in the defence or insufficiency of means. Therefore he apprehends that now it will be difficult to make the Barbarians submit; and yet that their demands can hardly be granted. Your slave has made the necessary dispositions along the road between Tien-tsin and Tung-chow. If fighting should take place near Tung-chow, it is to be feared that the minds of the inhabitants of Pekin would be greatly agitated. Victory or defeat may depend on the circumstances of a moment. Should a reverse possibly occur, the trading people who congregate in the capital would desert in multitudes; and if perchance the heart of the soldiers should fail, the consequences might be momentous.[1]

"Your slave has received the greatest favours

[1] Note by the interpreter, Mr Wade—"This means that the Emperor might be made prisoner."

from your Majesty, and has shown no return for them. After the most anxious reflection on the present critical state of affairs, the best course which has suggested itself to him, and which he has adopted, appeared to be to write to the princes and others of the six leagues, desiring them to repair to the capital with the *élite* of their troops, so that they might receive your Majesty on your route with the proper honours, and then join the rest of the forces. He humbly begs your Majesty to follow the precedent of making a hunting-tour in the autumn, and accordingly to leave the capital for a time; and further, that the princes and state officers left at the head of affairs may be commanded to see that the army keep the city in the most perfect state of defence until they be joined by the troops of the six leagues, when all together may attack and exterminate the enemy. If at that time your Majesty should be in the capital, not only might the execution of needful plans be impeded, but also alarm might unfortunately be excited in your own mind. Your slave does not shrink from thus, in the name of the princes and others of the leagues, expressing his and their obscure views, and which he yet urgently so-

licits your Majesty to permit to be carried into effect."

"He would then be at liberty to choose his own time and mode of attack, and might advance or retire as events should make necessary. Without any doubt he would sweep the vile blood from off the earth, and redeem his previous shortcomings. He addresses this secret memorial to your Majesty for your decision thereupon, &c. &c.

"He does not venture to forward this by the regular express, but, reverently sealing it, he intrusts it to Kwo-shung, to deliver it in person," &c. &c.

Extracts from a semi-destroyed fragment of a Decree in Vermilion,[1] dated 10 P.M., 7th September, found in one of the Emperor's private apartments in the Summer Palace on the 8th October 1860, drawn up by the Emperor of China.

. . . . . .

"As the Ministers have conceded trade [at the port of Tien-tsin], the only course will be to assent to the proposition under consideration, and so to

[1] Decrees emanating from the direct authority of the Emperor are written in vermilion-coloured pencil.

keep the Barbarians in hand for the time, and when negotiation breaks down altogether, to recall Kweiliang and his colleagues or degrade them. . . . As to their exaction of (war) expenses, . . . such a thing is utterly out of the question. From of old it has been held a disgrace to make a treaty under your city wall; and if one is again[1] to tender gifts while one's face is ashamed, will China be still thought to have a man?

"If Kweiliang and his colleagues have so madly lost themselves as to presume on their own authority to concede these last two points,[2] they have not only disobeyed our written commands, and shown fear of the Barbarian,[3] but they have simply taken up the empire and put it into his hands; and we will at once vindicate the law by the execution of these ministers, and then fight it out with the Barbarians.

"As to the admission of the chief Fa[4] into the capital, peace once negotiated between the two countries, orders will of course have to be given

[1] "Again."—viz., as in 1842 and 1858.

[2] Viz., the payment by the Chinese of a war indemnity, and the entry of the allied troops into Pekin.

[3] Mr Parkes.

[4] Mr Parkes.

to the proper departments to make satisfactory arrangements for the supply of all requisites. What need will there then be for Fa's personal inspection? Besides, this rebellious chief, idly yelping, frantically barking, is certain to bring forward other restrictive conditions, and once he is come will not go away. . . . Is it reasonable (of the Barbarians) to exact compensation by holding a knife to the throat? . . . Lastly, as to war to the knife, it is essential that this should begin soon—that it should not be postponed. We should avail ourselves of the autumn and winter, using therein our advantage, and pressing them on their weak side. If we wait until the spring and summer of next year, these Barbarians will of course raise large bodies of black Barbarians, and will bring the force of all the world to try conclusions with us. And they will league with the long-haired rebels; and then between war with those from afar and those close at hand, we shall have trouble enough to hold our own.

"The remarks above, which exhaust our opinions, we have written with our own hand. . . .

"A special decree."

MEMORIAL by KIA-CHING, and signed by 25 others.

"*7th month, 24th day* (*9th September*).

"Your Ministers, Kia-ching and others, kneeling, present a memorial, plainly expressing, in obedience to the imperial command, their opinions on the present critical conjuncture.

"On this 24th day of the month (9th September), they have received a vermilion decree, together with a secret memorial by Sang-ko-lin-sin. . . . They reverently read that their Emperor proposed to command in person the battalions of the empire, and to proceed to Tung-chow to exterminate the vile brood of Barbarians; and in this they observe the firm resolution of the sacred son of Heaven. But they remember that . . . (here follows a lengthy allusion to some historical circumstance which occurred about the year A.D. 1000). The mist of the sea would be dissipated before the celestial wrath; but still they consider that the course proposed is not that which would best conduce to the interest of the State; and they deem that it ought not on any account to be lightly adopted.

And Sang-ko-lin-sin's proposition regarding a hunting-tour your Ministers hold to be even more objectionable. If the capital, which is encircled by an uninterrupted line of strong fortifications, is not secure, what shelter is to be looked for in open and unfenced hunting-grounds? But further, your Majesty's departure would excite the wildest agitation in the people's minds. . . . Since the Barbarians have been able to reach the port of Tien-tsin, what is to prevent them from likewise penetrating to the Loan River [at Gehol]? Your Ministers cannot endure to dwell on the ideas which these reflections awaken in their minds. . . . They propose that your Majesty should issue an edict to reassure the people, and invite them to courageous action, that high rewards should be promised to all who distinguish themselves, and that special attention should be given to placing the army in a state of perfect efficiency. . . ."

. . . . . .

[Note by the translator, Mr Wade.—"I believe that Kia-ching, whose name heads this paper, became Prime Minister soon after the Emperor's flight, his predecessor having escaped."]

MEMORIAL by AI-FIN, a Censor, and 74 others.

"*7th month, 27th day* (*September 12th*).

"Your Minister Ai-fin, and others, respectfully submit their opinion that the capital and Court ought not to be forsaken on light grounds.

"On the 24th day of the present month, the Princes and Ministers of the Inner Council received a vermilion decree, stating that your Majesty intended proceeding for a time on a hunting-tour. Your Ministers heard of this with extreme astonishment and alarm. They would humbly remark that, although the Barbarians' vessels may have reached Tien-tsin, the circumstance has not excited much fear in the capital. The throne is that in which all things centre, and to which the eyes of all men turn. One step of the Emperor's foot shakes the earth. The project in question, then, must have arisen without due thought of the dangers which would ensue therefrom. It is impossible that your Majesty's household, and the princes and grandees who will form your escort, and whose families lie in Pekin, can be well disposed to leave a place of security, even in attendance on the imperial person. Commencing their journey in haste and confusion, the

crowd of followers would be alive to everything which might excite their fears; and if they should disperse in mid-journey, no means might be found of going back or forward. Since 1820, the year in which his late Majesty discontinued the hunting-tour [the 25th year of Kia-king, and the year in which Tao-kwang succeeded] it is said that the country has become very desolate, and that the travelling palaces have fallen into disrepair, and are unfit to live in. Nor do your Ministers know what the character of the inhabitants may now be, but they may safely say that it cannot be as loyal as that of the inhabitants of the capital city, which has been established for 200 years. Again, Gehol is at no great distance from the Shan-hai-kwan [pass near the terminus of the Great Wall] and New-chwang, and other places which are quite accessible to the Barbarians. It is also near the Russian Barbarians; and such being the case, who can deem it secure? Our troops now are several times more numerous than those of the Barbarians; but if your Majesty were to leave the Court, every one would be disheartened; a panic might break out; the Barbarians would use the opportunity to take the city; and we should become victims to their wiles. . . .

"From the first establishment of our dynasty, there has been a great intermingling of natives and foreigners, and they have flourished in mutual prosperity. Of this we have had no previous example. The Barbarians of the present day are nothing comparable in ferocity to those of the time of Yung-kia [A.D. 309] or Tsung-kang [A.D. 1127]. If then, giving ear to loose gossip, and on the impulse of a moment, the empire of the world is thrown away like a weed, the duty to the spirits of the saints in the other world will have been left undone. . . .

"A puff of breath is now sufficient to decide the balance in which hangs the loss or preservation of the succession of your ancestors and the repose of the tutelary gods. . . .

"Your Ministers ask one more act of grace. As your Majesty's intention to travel was publicly announced, and men's minds have been so much disturbed that it would be difficult to reassure them, they beg that you will promulgate your intention to return to your palace, that false rumours may be at once extinguished, and tranquillity be restored. The national decline may be arrested, and the Government may recommence a course of success.

"Your Ministers, and the others, being by their office obliged to call attention to national points, have accordingly thus expressed their imperfect views with all humility, and they await your Majesty's commands."

The following are EXTRACTS from a MEMORIAL dated September 13th, in continuation of the preceding.

. . . . . .

"For the Emperor to command the army in person is a thing which may not lightly be undertaken. In 1853, when the Cantonese rebels overran the country, advancing impetuously towards the north, the alarm occasioned in the capital was many times more serious than that manifested. Happily your Majesty appointed generals able to cope with the enemy, and the rampant outbreak was quelled. Why should not now the Barbarians, hardly 10,000 in number, be easily vanquished and expelled from the country by the many times larger army under our generals? Would not the assumption of command be a derogation from the imperial dignity, and likely to astonish all who should hear of it? . . . Again, the tranquillity of people's minds depend upon your

Majesty's presence at the seat of government. . . . Again, your Majesty's proceeding to the northward, while the enemy was at the south, would be another circumstance producing much doubt and disturbance. . . . This troublous season is not at all to be compared with peaceful times. It would be most difficult to find men to whom the superintendence of government could be safely intrusted. The gravest evils might arise, . . . and it is fearful to think of them."

MEMORIAL by ISINEN KING, and 40 others, dated 12th September.

[This State paper from the Emperor's Ministers reiterates with wearisome prolixity the reasons, set forth in the other documents, against his Majesty's quitting Pekin for the ostensible purpose of proceeding on a hunting-tour to Gehol. The conclusion, however, illustrates very strikingly the light in which the Chinese Government regarded their invaders.]

"Granting that the whole force of the Barbarians hardly exceeds 10,000 men, and that Sang-ko-lin-sin commands more than 30,000, they [the Ministers] make no question that the many might

not defeat the few. But they desire to notice the fact, that the Barbarians, who have come far from across the ocean, have hitherto shown that their object was merely to trade. Their creeping into Kwang-tung, Fo-kien, Shanghai, and other places, was only to besiege the ports, and not to take possession of the country. Nor have they attempted any conquest of China. Even the point of entry into Pekin is one which might be satisfactorily disposed of. . . .

"Such are your Ministers' obscure views."

EXTRACTS from a MEMORIAL by ISINEN KING, a President of the Board of Civil Office, and signed by 26 others. Date, 13th September.

The Ministers, after attempting to dissuade the Emperor from his proposed visit to Gehol, prior to his taking the field in person, proceed: "They admire the awe-inspiring demeanour and the well-devised strategy thus displayed. But the common people are extremely slow of comprehension—they easily suspect, and with difficulty appreciate. . . . If defence and holding out in words are to mean flight and dispersion in fact, your Ministers, without urging on your Majesty

that thus the temples of your ancestors and the altars of your tutelary gods will be abandoned, only ask, Where else could your Majesty's personal safety be better assured than at the capital? Beyond the Hoo-pe-kow pass [in the Great Wall] is the haunt of numbers of Russian Barbarians, some of whom have been for a long time pretending to deliver communications at Pekin for the furtherance of some treacherous designs. . . . If commotions were to arise within [the capital], the authors of our calamities would be not the Barbarians but ourselves. . . . Your Majesty is well familiar with the maxim, that the prince is bound to sacrifice himself for his country. But far be it from your Ministers, at such a time as this, to desire to wound your Majesty's feelings by adverting to such thoughts; and, indeed, the crisis is in no degree so serious as to make it necessary. The great danger now to be avoided is that of disturbances arising from within. . . ."

EXTRACTS from a MEMORIAL by TSAI-TANG-YUNG, ex-Censor of the Hoo-kwang Provinces, dated 13th September.

This document is chiefly remarkable for the manly outspoken terms in which the writer ad-

dresses the Emperor, who in China is generally treated as a kind of divinity. After alluding to the rumours of disasters which were causing so much terror, Tsai writes: "The confusion and alarm are indescribable. But there has been nothing so strange as the report now heard, that your Majesty intended making a tour to Gehol. This has caused the utmost consternation; but your Minister does not believe in it. . . . If, indeed, the report is true, the effect produced will be like a convulsion of nature, and the mischief must be irreparable. In what light does your Majesty regard your people? in what light the shrines of your ancestors, or the altars of the tutelary gods? Will you cast away the inheritance of your ancestors like a damaged shoe? What would history say of your Majesty for a thousand generations henceforward? It has never been known that a sovereign should choose a time of danger and distress to make a hunting-tour, supposing that thereby he would prevent trouble. If the capital should be disturbed, what would there be to save Gehol alone from being disturbed? Your Majesty is besought to return without delay to your palace, in order that the people's minds may be reassured against the enemy. Let the Hwey-

tsin-wung [the Emperor's uncle] give orders for the proper distribution of the garrison of Pekin. If the enemy is met between Tung-chow and Matow we shall proceed, as originally intended, to the northward of the capital, and take up a position with a strong force. The spirit of our army leaves us no reason to fear that the handful of Barbarians, not amounting to 10,000, shall not be completely destroyed. Let this decree be read by the princes, and the other officers of state.

"From the above, it appears that your Majesty's northern tour is positively decided on. Does our Emperor, then, think nothing of his people? of the temples of his ancestors? and of the altars of the tutelary gods? . . . The grand army under Sang-ko-lin-sin is quite sufficient to conclude the war with success; and why, therefore, should your Majesty expose yourself to the fatigues and dangers of a campaign? The gravity of the crisis does not allow of much speech. Your Minister only entreats that you will consent to the advice and desires of all, and return to your Court to superintend the defensive preparations, and rejecting doubtful counsels, &c. &c. . . .

"The capital is most strictly guarded; the spirit of all the inhabitants is roused to the highest pitch, and even women and children are determined to fight to the last. Above all, Sang-ko-lin-sin is now at the head of several tens of thousands of Mongol troops. . . . Your Majesty might make a public confession of your own error, and thus fortify the national resolution. . . . The enrolment of volunteers in the Tien-tsin district is a step to be recommended. . . . The Barbarians do not exceed a few thousands in number, and a considerable portion of their force consists of hired traitorous Chinese. . . . If money were judiciously employed, and an appeal were made to the patriotism of the mercenaries, the whole of this body might be dispersed without recourse to arms. Your Minister cannot imagine why this has not been attempted. . . . *Postscript.*—While your Minister's memorandum was being written, he reverently read the vermilion edict of this day, as follows:—

"'Considering that the approach of the Barbarians, and the various circumstances of the present crisis, demand from us a course of action calculated to fortify the resolution of our people, we have directed that the arrangements for our pro-

posed hunting-tour shall serve as preparation for our taking the field in person.'"

The following is either the actual draft, or the memorandum from which the draft was to be prepared, of a decree alluded to in more than one of the captured memorials. It was in the vermilion pencil, and bears no date.

"We have perused the memorial of Kweiliang and his colleagues, detailing the breaking down [1] of the Barbarian question, and our indignation is greater than we can bear. To save the people of this the territory of our capital from the pernicious effects of the poison (of war), we had in our extremity obliged ourselves to assent to a scheme of conciliation. These Barbarians have, notwithstanding, again and again, with wanton violence, insisted on various concessions, right or wrong, until there is nothing left for it but to fight them to the death. Besides, it is impossible but that our Ministers and servants, Manchu and Chinese, who have for generations received of the bounty of (our family), should feel the enmity we feel, and share our hatred—should unite to do justice to their long accumulating wrath.

[1] Or in original, "Grand smash."

"We shall now move straight to Tung-chow at the head of our army, there to take the vengeance heaven requires—to do an act of punishment and subjugation, the effect of which shall be widely felt.

"We command the princes who have the *entrée*, the high officers of the guard, the members of the Great Council, and high officers of the household, to enter upon the consideration (of this question) with all speed.

"We have also perused the confidential memorial of Sang-ko-lin-sin, for the discussion of which as well, let the Ministers *not* having the *entrée*, who have this day memorialised us on the same question, meet in conference.

"A special command."

CHAPTER VII.

BRITISH TROOPS DIRECTED TO GIVE UP "LOOT" FROM SUMMER PALACE—THEIR READY COMPLIANCE—AUCTION TO INSURE AN EQUAL DIVISION—SUBSEQUENT CONFIRMATION OF THE STEP BY THE HOME GOVERNMENT—HAN-KI'S SEARCH FOR THE GOVERNOR OF THE SUMMER PALACE—ESTABLISHMENT OF BATTERIES TO BREACH PEKIN WALLS—INHABITANTS WARNED OF APPROACHING CONFLICT—PRINCE KUNG'S COMPLAINT OF THE LOOTING OF THE PALACE—HE PROMISES THAT OUR TERMS SHALL BE AGREED TO—THE PRISONERS GIVEN UP—DETAIL OF THE BATTERIES—EXTRAORDINARY STRENGTH OF THE WALLS—FUNERALS OF THE MURDERED PRISONERS—BURNING OF THE SUMMER PALACE—RUMOURS OF TREACHERY, AND PROBYN'S CONSEQUENT RECONNAISSANCE—ENTRY OF SIR HOPE GRANT, LORD ELGIN, AND BRITISH TROOPS INTO PEKIN—THE SIGNING OF THE TREATY—PRINCE KUNG'S TERROR OF THE PHOTOGRAPHIC APPARATUS—PREPARATIONS FOR DEPARTURE—THE TOWN OF PEKIN—THE TROOPS BEGIN THEIR RETURN MARCH TO TIEN-TSIN AND TAKU—REMARKS BY THE EDITOR ON THE MARCH TO, AND DESTRUCTION OF, THE SUMMER PALACE—RESULTS ATTAINED BY THE WAR.

A GREAT change of temperature now took place, and on the 9th October the rain fell, and a cold north-east wind set in like the blasts of Edinburgh

in March. I went to Sir Robert Napier's quarters, and in the course of conversation he told me that his aide-de-camp had brought away from the Summer Palace a large piece of gold, which he had found lying on the ground, and which at first had been taken for brass. Sir Robert asked whether I had any objection to his giving it to the men of his division. I did not, however, think that, in justice to the other division, I could accede to this request; and I therefore decided to issue an order directing the officers to give up any valuables they might have obtained from the Summer Palace for the purpose of putting them into a general stock, which would afterwards be divided equally. These directions were accordingly promulgated; and I was greatly pleased to find that a quantity of articles of value were given up by a number of gentlemen who, when they found the French making such havoc among the treasures, had thought there could be no harm in appropriating a few things to themselves. I felt very proud of their liberal and honourable behaviour; and I therefore resolved to take a great responsibility upon myself, and at once to divide the spoil amongst the officers and men of the British force at that moment at Pekin. It was sold by auction,

and, together with what had been handed over to us by the French, realised a good round sum. Colonel Walker, Major Wilmot,[1] and Captain Anson were appointed prize agents. Their task was a difficult and an arduous one, but they performed it with great ability. Wilmot took sole charge of the accounts, and kept them with admirable regularity. I declined to take my own share of the proceeds of the sale; and the two generals of division, Sir John Michel and Sir Robert Napier, in the handsomest way waived their claims. Strictly speaking, I had of course no right to take this step; but considering the lenient laws of France on the subject, and the strict way in which I had as much as possible prevented the men from plundering, I thought I was justified in thus acting. I wrote to Mr Sidney Herbert,[2] Secretary of State for War, informing him of my intention, which I hoped, I said, would be approved of. In course of time I received an answer from Lord John Russell, saying that "I had taken a grave responsibility upon myself;" but her Majesty had, under the circum-

[1] Now Major Sir Henry Wilmot, V.C., member for South Derbyshire.

[2] See despatch at end of chapter.

stances stated by me, approved of what I had done. [The sum realised by the sale amounted to about £8000, which with £18,000 in specie, handed over to us by the French, was divided into three shares. One share was reserved for distribution among the officers at a more convenient date, and the other two were on the spot divided among the men, so that by the 16th October every private soldier with the army before Pekin received about £4; and thus for the first time, perhaps, British troops rejoiced in the speedy apportionment of the spoils of war. Probably the general considerations by which Sir Hope Grant was actuated, are best made apparent by the following extract from a despatch written by him at the commencement of the campaign, in defence of a subordinate who was supposed to have exceeded his powers: ". . . must be aware that officers of her Majesty's army and navy are called upon to take on themselves certain responsibilities, and that an illegal act done to avert a great public evil is not only justifiable, but praiseworthy."—H. K.]

Numbers of beautiful ornaments were now put up for sale; and the officers, knowing they were to get their prize-money, at once bid freely, and the

articles sold for great prices. A small, yellow, Chinese tea-cup realised £22. I bought several beautiful jade-stones, and also a necklace of the finest green jade, with rubies, which, by a label attached to it, we ascertained had been presented to the Emperor by a famous Tartar chief. Nobody seemed to take a fancy to the ornament, and I paid for it only fifty dollars. I also bought a fine carving of lapis lazuli. The prize committee secured a beautiful gold jug, from which the Emperor of China used to pour rose-water upon his delicate hands, and this they presented to me in a very handsome manner. There were two beautiful large enamel vases which had been given up by Major Probyn, and they were so handsome that I requested him and the prize committee to allow me to send them to the Queen, to which they readily agreed.

On the 10th October, the Commissioner Hang-ki begged to be allowed to visit the Summer Palace in company with Parkes. I consented, and gave him an escort. Parkes told me it was most distressing to see the poor man. He seated himself upon the edge of one of the litle lakes, put his head between his hands, and burst into tears, saying that everything was lost, and that he should

destroy himself. His principal object in coming, however, was to discover the body of the governor of the palace, who was a great friend of his, and who was supposed to have drowned himself. The body was afterwards found in one of the lakes, and Hang-ki returned to Pekin.

This day, 10th October, General de Montauban and I, with the approval of Lord Elgin and Baron Gros, sent a letter to Prince Kung, informing him that unless he chose to give us up one of the gates of the Tartar town, we should batter down an entrance for ourselves. We gave him until twelve o'clock mid-day on the 13th to consider our proposal, and if it were not then agreed to our guns would open fire. The French general and I then started off to the An-ting Gate to reconnoitre. White flags were hoisted in every direction, and Tartar soldiers lined the parapets; but they took no notice of us, and I rode so close up to the walls that I was able to let my horse drink out of the ditch. Within 200 yards of the town was the "Temple of the Earth," a set of handsome buildings surrounded with high massive walls; and opposite this point the water in the ditch was scarcely a foot deep. I fixed on this spot for my breaching batteries, and I ordered

the heavy guns which had been brought up from the depot to be taken within the temple, and covering earthworks to be thrown up. The French established their batteries a little higher up, and within 60 yards of the wall. They had only field-artillery, brass rifled guns, throwing a 24-pounder shot; and their commanding officer of artillery, Colonel de Bentzman, told me he much doubted their power to effect a breach, but that they would serve to distract the attention of the enemy. On 12th October, a proclamation was published for the benefit of the inhabitants of Pekin, warning them that if peace were not made by mid-day on the morrow, the attack against the place would begin, in which case they were recommended to quit the town, as we could not answer for the consequences. The merchants realised the peril of their situation, and went in a body to Prince Kung, whom they urged to give up the gate. Poor Kung, in an agony of distress, replied that it might cost him his life to comply with their request; but that, nevertheless, if they would support him, and declare their earnest desire that our demands should be agreed to, he would yield. Parkes accordingly went to meet Hang-ki by appointment, and was informed by him that the

Chinese agreed to our terms, and that the Anting Gate would be given up on the following day, on the understanding that if the treaty were signed and the prisoners returned to us, the town should be uninjured, and our soldiers should not enter it in greater numbers than might be required as an escort for the ambassadors. To all this we agreed, and then Hang-ki delivered up nine of the still missing prisoners—viz., eight Sikhs and one Frenchman.[1] Late in the evening of the 12th, a letter arrived from Prince Kung for Lord Elgin, wherein he bitterly complained of the state to which the Summer Palace had been reduced—the more unjustifiable, he said, because peace had been concluded. This was false, because it was as yet by no means even certain that the terms would be agreed to.

The 13th October was the great day on which the question of peace or a continuation of the war was to be decided, and all was made ready to recommence hostilities should the gate not be given up. At 10 A.M., Parkes set off for another interview with Hang-ki. The guns were placed in

[1] In all probability the current report of the rebel army being only 100 miles north of Pekin, and about to march on the capital, powerfully influenced Hang-ki in coming to terms with us at any price.

position ready for breaching the wall—viz., four 8-inch guns for battering, two Armstrong guns to play also upon the breach, two to fire down the road, and two in reserve. The 9-pounder battery, about 400 yards to the right of the heavy guns, was destined to keep down the fire from the walls. The mortars, in the south-west angle of the Temple of the Earth, would supplement the fire on the breach; and a ledge in the temple wall served as a banquette for our infantry.

However, by noon[1] on the 13th October, the An-ting Gate was given up, and Sir Robert Napier marched in with 300 of the 67th Regiment, and with 100 of the 8th Punjaub Infantry. Our force took possession of a portion of the wall, extending from the right of the gate; and the French occupied that to the left. We, both of us, posted a battery so as to command the approaches. The gate itself was a fine massive structure, with a three-storied guard-house on the top of it. The wall round the town, which, as far as I could ascertain, extended over a circumference of sixteen miles, was indeed a wonderful sight. Ancient history tells us the walls of Babylon were so broad that several chariots could be

[1] At a few minutes only before twelve o'clock.

driven abreast on the top of them; but I really think those of Pekin must have exceeded them. They were upwards of 50 feet in breadth, very nearly the same in height, in excellent repair, and paved on the top, where, I am sure, five coaches-and-four could with a little management have been driven abreast. Lieut.-Colonel Thomas,[1] 67th Regiment, was placed in command of our troops at this gate; and the position was further strengthened by Sir R. Napier, by a traverse, with a couple of guns.

On the 14th October, two more sowars, the only remaining survivors of our prisoners, were sent in. They reported the deaths of Mr Bowlby, Private Phipps of the King's Dragoon Guards, and two sowars. The bodies of eight of the victims—six English and two French—were brought in in coffins, which contained little but mere bones. By the clothes, however, we were able to identify the remains as those of Lieutenant Anderson, Messrs De Norman and Bowlby, and two sowars. General Ignatieff very kindly expressed his hope that the bodies of our countrymen might be buried in the Russian cemetery at

[1] Now Colonel Thomas, C.B., commanding a Brigade Depot, Winchester.

Pekin, and asked to be allowed to attend the ceremony. We were, of course, very grateful for the offer; and on the 17th October the funeral took place. General de Montauban and his staff were present. The Russian ambassador was, owing to indisposition, unable to attend, but was represented by his suite. Lord Elgin and I were the chief mourners; and a procession, consisting of a troop of the King's Dragoon Guards, a troop of Fane's Horse, and one officer with 25 men from each English regiment, followed in the *cortège*. The band was furnished by the 60th Rifles.

I shall never forget the bitter cold of that day —the hills were white with snow, and a north-east wind blew with the cold piercing blast of winter. We marched down to the cemetery, which was situated just outside the walls of Pekin; the coffins were laid in one large grave; the burial-service was read without any pomp or display; and we then left the bodies of our poor countrymen in their last sad resting-place.

General de Montauban was not prepared for such a simple ceremony, and expressed his surprise when it was concluded. It was certainly a contrast to the funeral of the French soldiers, which took place on the 28th October. Of course

I attended with many of my officers; and I also sent a squadron of the King's Dragoon Guards. General Ignatieff, his staff, and that of the British embassy, accompanied the procession; but Lord Elgin, owing to a severe attack of influenza, was confined to his house. We passed under the walls of the city—which by this time was in our possession—and through the suburbs, to the old French Jesuit cemetery, a handsome enclosure, wherein was dug one large deep grave, with a ramp down which the coffins were conveyed, thus sparing the awkwardness and annoyance of lowering by ropes, and laid side by side. Then the ceremony was begun by an old French abbé,[1] who had been so long at Pekin that he had almost forgotten his own language. Sundry other priests, attended by Chinese boys, assisted —all in full canonicals. One of them came forward and made an oration on the merits of the deceased; this was followed by reading the service, accompanied by continual tinklings of bells. Then General de Montauban put an instrument into my hands, which contained the holy water, and with which I was requested to sprinkle the coffins. This went rather against the grain; but

[1] The Abbé de Luc.

as I perceived Sir Robert Napier—an excellent man—occupied with the same business, I no longer hesitated. Next Colonel de Bentzman read a funeral oration; and General de Montauban made an excellent speech, winding up by saying, "Adieu, mes amis, adieu!" Now came the most singular part of the whole ceremony. Every French soldier present marched past the tomb singly, firing his rifle against the coffins, which in a short time were covered with exploded cartridge-papers. This concluded the funeral.

In consequence of the murder of the greater number of our captured countrymen, and the barbarities committed on all, Lord Elgin and I thought it was necessary that the Tartar Emperor should be visited with some severe punishment and signal mark of retribution, and we therefore decided to burn his splendid Summer Palace to the ground. General de Montauban objected to this destruction, and would not co-operate with us.

By this time the prisoners had been delivered up into our hands, or had been otherwise accounted for, and therefore their fate could not be affected by any retaliatory measures I might adopt.

[Sir Hope Grant's reasons for thus acting are explained in detail in the following despatch:—

"HEADQUARTERS, PEKIN,
18th October 1860.

"SIR,—With reference to your Excellency's letter of yesterday's date, No. 123, I have the honour to state that my reasons for wishing to destroy the palace of Yuan-min-yuan are—first, because it was in that place that the prisoners were treated with such barbarity, being bound hand and foot together for three days, with nothing to eat or drink; and, secondly, because the English nation will not be satisfied unless more lasting marks of our sense of the barbarous manner in which they have violated the laws of nations be inflicted on the Chinese Government.

"If we were to now make peace, sign the treaty and retire, the Chinese Government would see that our countrymen can be seized and murdered with impunity. It is necessary to undeceive them on this point.

"The Summer Palace of the Emperor has certainly been plundered, but the damage inflicted upon it could be repaired in a month. The very day the French army left Yuan-min-yuan, the palace was again taken possession of by the Chinese authorities, and five Chinamen caught plundering there were executed by them. My

patrols have since found the place locked up, and the houses not destroyed.

"It has been well ascertained that the palace of Yuan-min-yuan is considered as a most important place. The destruction of it is a blow aimed entirely at the Chinese Government, by whom, and not by the people, have these atrocities been committed; and it is a blow that will be felt most severely by the Chinese Government, whilst on the score of humanity there can be no objection urged against it.

"I beg further to add that Lord Elgin holds the same opinions as I do on this subject.—I have, &c.

(Signed) "J. HOPE GRANT, Lt.-Gen.
Commander of the Forces.

"To His Excellency Lieut.-Gen. de Montauban,
Commanding H.I.M.'s Forces, China."

A despatch to the same effect was written by Sir Hope Grant to the Secretary of State for War, London.—H. K.]

On 18th October, Sir John Michel's division, with the greater part of the cavalry brigade, were marched to the place, and set the whole pile of buildings on fire. It was a magnificent sight.

I could not but grieve at the destruction of so much ancient grandeur, and felt that it was an uncivilised proceeding; but I believed it to be necessary as a future warning to the Chinese against the murder of European envoys, and the violation of the laws of nations.

We had written to Prince Kung stating our intention to burn the palace, and demanding an indemnity of 300,000 taels,[1] which would be given to the families of the murdered prisoners. The French demanded 200,000[2] taels for a similar purpose. The money was at once paid, and the signature of the treaty fixed for the 23d October.[3]

[The following is the letter written by Prince Kung in reply to Sir Hope Grant :—

"The Prince of Kung, Imperial Commissioner, makes a communication in reply.

"The Prince is in receipt of H.E. the British Commander-in-Chief's communication of the 4th

[1] £100,000. [2] £66,666.

[3] On 22d October. This was in addition to the sum demanded for the expenses of the war, amounting to 8,000,000 taels = £2,666,666. It was further guaranteed on the part of the English that out of this sum, 2,000,000 (£666,666) should be given to the British Canton merchants for losses sustained by them. The whole of this money was paid in.—H. K.

day of the 9th moon (19th October), stating that 21 British officers had been sent back, but that five other persons taken at the same time were still unaccounted for; and requesting an explicit reply from the Prince upon this point.

"The Prince, as soon as he took charge of affairs, behaved to the eight British officers in the capital with all proper attention, and sent them back. He had not, when he took charge, any knowledge of the others, nor was it until after some days of continued inquiry that he ascertained by degrees that they had all been sent to such and such places. On this he gave orders that they should all be handsomely treated, and he has now sent back from one place or another, living and dead, 29 persons, which number, it appears to him, corresponds with that given in the despatch he has received from H.E. the British Minister, Elgin. He has also promised the British Minister, Elgin, that the sum of 300,000 taels H.E. has applied for as compensation money shall be paid.

"A necessary reply addressed to H.E. General Grant, commanding H.B.M. land forces.

"KIEN-TUNG, 10th year, 9th moon, 6th day.
(*19th October* 1860.")]

On the 22d October, a report was brought to me through the French Roman Catholic missionary, Monsieur Mahé, that treachery was intended on our entering the town. He stated he had heard from many Chinese converts on whom he could rely, that infernal machines were placed in different houses by which we should have to pass, and that the guns on the walls were turned against the building in which the treaty was to be signed. He added that a large force of the enemy was encamped on the west side of the city. As I thought there might be some truth in all these rumours, I sent Major Probyn, with the two Irregular Cavalry regiments, to reconnoitre in the direction alluded to. The force suddenly came upon an intrenched camp, where further progress was stopped by infantry lining a bank, and who with levelled matchlocks threatened to open fire. As Probyn had obtained all the information that was necessary, and as nothing was to be gained by bringing on a collision, he very wisely retired. This decided me to make every preparation for emergencies, and on the morning of the 24th October, to which date the signature of the English treaty had been unavoidably postponed, I directed Sir Robert Napier to march in, and with

the 2d division to occupy the main street leading to the "Hall of Ceremonies," a task which he performed with great accuracy and judgment. I also posted a field-battery at the An-ting Gate, ready for action at a moment's notice. Lord Elgin started in the afternoon, accompanied by myself and staff, 400 infantry, 100 cavalry, and two bands playing at the head of the procession. I rode alongside our ambassador, who was conveyed in a richly-ornamented sedan-chair, to the hall, a distance of three miles. The main street was broad and handsome, but the roadway was atrocious. The centre was raised high and much broken, and was flanked by two minor tracks, almost impassable from holes and pools of water. There was a vast concourse of spectators, men, women, and children, but none of them showed the slightest animosity against us. It took us about an hour to reach the Hall of Ceremonies, where the treaty was to be signed, and which was quite separate from the Tartar portion of the town. We entered the gates of the hall, marched through gardens, up the paved way, and on approaching the grand entrance were met by Prince Kung and about 500 mandarins, some of whom were princely looking fellows, dressed in silk robes of state. The

Prince came up and closed his hands in front of his face, according to the Chinese salute; but Lord Elgin returned him a proud contemptuous look, and merely bowed slightly, which must have made the blood run cold in poor Kung's veins. He was a delicate gentlemanlike-looking man, evidently overpowered with fear. We were placed in chairs of state, in the most honourable position, the left-hand side, and the convention was laid before the Imperial Commissioner, who on this occasion was invested with full powers. After talking over several points, he signed it and ratified the former treaty. Hang-ki, the other commissioner, was evidently a clever and clear-headed person, old in appearance, pale, delicate, and very thorough-bred-looking.

In the midst of the ceremony, the indefatigable Signor Beato, who was very anxious to take a good photograph of "the Signing of the Treaty," brought forward his apparatus, placed it at the entrance door, and directed the large lens of the camera full against the breast of the unhappy Prince Kung. The royal brother looked up in a state of terror, pale as death, and with his eyes turned first to Lord Elgin and then to me, expecting every moment to have his head blown off by the infernal machine

opposite him—which really looked like a sort of mortar, ready to disgorge its terrible contents into his devoted body. It was explained to him that no such evil design was intended, and his anxious pale face brightened up when he was told that his portrait was being taken. The treaty was signed, and the whole business went off satisfactorily, except as regards Signor Beato's picture, which was an utter failure, owing to want of proper light. Refreshments were offered to us, which Lord Elgin declined, and, after a proper amount of bowing, we took our departure. The following day the French treaty was also signed. The war was now at an end, and the good tidings were conveyed home by my aide-de-camp, Anson.

The weather became bitterly cold, some of the hills being covered with snow; and as—according to the information which General Ignatieff, with his usual extreme kindness, furnished me—the Peiho would soon become frozen up, and as it would be unsafe to linger at Pekin, I was anxious to return as soon as possible to Tien-tsin, there to make preparations for embarking our troops. In the first instance, therefore, I settled to start on our return journey on the 1st November; but Lord Elgin was very desirous that we should

remain eight or ten days longer—by which time, it was hoped, an edict would have arrived from the Emperor at Gehol, on the north side of the great wall of Tartary, and 130 miles from Pekin, to which he had retreated. Without this edict the proclamation of peace could not be published; and Lord Elgin was very anxious that the terms should be made known to the Chinese at Pekin before his departure. I therefore agreed to postpone our march until the 7th and 8th November. The French General, however, would not wait, and started on the 1st November, leaving a battalion of 450 men as a guard for Baron Gros, who had taken up his residence in the town.

As a general rule, our soldiers were not allowed to enter Pekin, but commanding officers were empowered to give passes to non-commissioned officers and very steady men. Thus order was maintained, and the inhabitants soon gained confidence. In this, as in all Chinese cities, there was a street occupied by curiosity-shops, and it was amusing to see the way these houses were beset with English and French purchasers; and the sums they paid away must have been very great. There were quaint articles of antiquity in

carved rock, jade-stones, enamels, porcelain, and bronzes.

On the 2d November, the edict arrived from the Emperor, giving full powers to publish the treaty. The printing of it was a tedious and troublesome affair; but Parkes and Wade set to work Chinese carvers, who cut it out on wooden blocks, and it was ready for circulation on the 7th. Sir Robert Napier's division had already started; and on that day, Bruce, Lord Elgin's successor, arrived at Pekin, and on the 8th he was formally installed as ambassador. On the 9th, I marched away from the place with the remaining (Sir John Michel's) division—as did likewise Baron Gros with his escort. Both forces moved off without any attempt to annoy us on the part of the people, who indeed seemed rather sorry than otherwise at our departure. At the end of the third day's march, I hastened on to Tien-tsin, the place of embarkation, and on the arrival of the infantry, I instantly sent them off.[1] It was fortunate that I thus acted, as, shortly after their departure, the frost set in with such intensity, that in three days the river was frozen over, and navi-

[1] To England, India, and some few regiments to the garrisons in China.

gation rendered impossible. The cavalry waited to the last, as I intended to march them down from Tien-tsin to Taku, 34 miles distant, in two days, where they were to embark. A severe snowstorm, accompanied with frost, came on, with symptoms of the water communication being closed, and I became very anxious to hurry them down as soon as possible. I therefore gave orders that the whole distance should be accomplished in one day's march—somewhat to Brigadier Pattle's dismay, who was apprehensive for the wellbeing of his horses. I was confident the journey would not hurt them; and on the 23d November, the two regiments—King's Dragoon Guards and Probyn's Horse[1]—marched independently, each commanding officer taking his own time and making his own arrangements. Every man and horse reached their destination the same evening, although the roads were certainly in a fearful state; and in two days after they were all safely on board ship.[2] The Taku Forts, Tien-tsin, Shanghai, Hong-Kong, and Canton, were, for the present, occupied by strong

[1] Fane's Horse, with some other troops, remained at Tien-tsin for the winter.

[2] A similar feat was performed by Stirling's Battery (B 14) *minus* their guns.

English garrisons; but the greater part of our army was now embarked, and on the way either to India or England.

Remarks on the French march to Yuan-min-yuan, and on the pillage and destruction of the Palace. Results attained by the war. By the Editor.

So far, perhaps, as English officers are concerned, they would have been willing that the subject of the march to, and the looting and the destruction of, the Summer Palace, should be allowed to sink into oblivion. From time to time, however, it has been persistently brought before the public, our silence has been misinterpreted, and a mistaken colouring has been given to facts. In March 1874, especially, the discussion was revived, when the claims put forward on behalf of the estate of the late Emperor Napoleon, including that of the Empress Eugénie, to the Chinese collection, were referred to the committee appointed at Paris for an investigation. It would now be almost an affectation of silence to write any narrative, however incomplete, of the China war without bringing forward the topic.

Sir Hope has in his Journal treated it with the utmost tenderness; but I trust that, in my capacity of Editor, and with a view of refuting unjust aspersions, it may be allowable for me to enter at greater length on the points at issue. There surely cannot be the smallest doubt that the march of the French on the Summer Palace took us completely by surprise. It is certain that, about 9 A.M. on the 6th October, Sir Hope Grant and General de Montauban agreed that their joint forces should make Yuan-min-yuan their objective point, whither Sang-ko-lin-sin's army had, it was reported, retreated; it is certain that, at the same time, the British cavalry was pushed well forward to the right front, with instructions to endeavour to cut off the enemy's retreat on the palace road: but it is equally certain that, when this plan of operations was concerted, the English General did not for an instant anticipate that his coadjutor would accomplish alone that which they had settled should be carried out hand in hand. When the armies, after a halt for breakfast, resumed their march at 10.30, the French, according to the arrangements for precedence for that day, were on our left, next to Pekin. Between them and the road leading to the Summer

Palace was the entire British force, and Sir Hope assumed, as a matter of course, that this relative position would be maintained. During the march the French dropped a little behind, crossed our rear, and then made straight for Yuan-min-Yuan.[1] No intimation had been given by them that they contemplated any such change of direction; and the English, utterly unacquainted with this movement, continued their march in search of the enemy, and halted late in the afternoon, not far from the north-west gate of the city of Pekin. There they expected to find the French in position on their left, and we fully anticipated an attack from the Tartars. But their allies had disappeared.[2]

The presence of our cavalry with the French might at first sight lead to the inference that the latter assumed Sir Hope Grant to be aware of the fresh route taken, and to have tacitly agreed to the change of programme. Such a chain of reasoning is rendered entirely untenable by the following statement.[3]

[1] Letter to 'Times,' March 13, 1874, from "One who was there."

[2] Letter to 'Times,' March 18, 1874, from "An Eyewitness." See also Sir Hope Grant's Journal, p. 126, and compare with plan.

[3] Letter to 'Times,' dated March 14, 1874, signed "Robert K. Douglas."

Brigadier Pattle was ordered to march to some convenient place on the broad northern road leading to the Teh-shun, or second gate, on the north face of Pekin, as it was thought that in all probability the Tartars would retreat along this road whenever the design should be put into execution of attacking their encampment outside the city with British and French infantry from the east. The cavalry brigade, on reaching their destination, found, to their surprise, that the French had arrived before them. General de Montauban expressed his determination to march on to the Summer Palace; and as Brigadier Pattle had been ordered to endeavour to keep up a communication with the French on his left, it is to be presumed he thought that, under the altered circumstances, he could not do wrong by now feeling into them on his right; and he therefore followed them in their march. "On arriving at the Summer Palace, the French Commander-in-Chief persuaded the Brigadier to move on with the English cavalry to more open ground, while the French encamped just outside the palace, and French guards were put over the entrances to the palace instead of joint French and

English guards, as might easily have been done."[1]

It is only fair to say that Major-General, then Colonel, St George Foley, Commissioner at the French headquarters during the Anglo-French war with China, asserts that General de Montauban merely acted up to the arrangement agreed upon before marching to the Summer Palace;[2] but the evidence to the contrary seems to be conclusive, which, if necessary, may be still further confirmed by the following extract from Lord Elgin's 'Letters and Journals,' p. 361: "Strange to say, our cavalry, which went off far to the right in the morning, has not been heard of yet, and we cannot discover what has become of the French. . . . *Sunday, October 7th.*—We hear this morning that the French and our cavalry have captured the Summer Palace of the Emperor."

Let us now turn to Count Palikao's evidence before the committe.[3] The bulk of the army, he says, including the whole of the English, was at Pekin protecting the baggage and keeping in awe the three cities—the Tartar, the Imperial, and

[1] "One who was there," 'Times,' March 13, 1874. See also Narrative of the China War, p. 220.

[2] 'Times,' March 14, 1874. [3] 'Times,' March 10, 1874.

the Chinese—when he set out with a detachment for the Summer Palace. He surely cannot dispute the fact that even the enceinte of the fortifications was not crossed until seven days later. Again, he declares that the palace itself was never sacked. "When we had driven away the Tartars[1] who took refuge at the extremity of the enclosure, I had sentries posted, and directed two officers, with two companies of marine infantry, to protect the palace from depredation, and to allow nothing to be removed until the arrival of the English commanders, to whom I immediately sent. Thus there could be no pillage." "Nothing," the General distinctly asserted, "had been touched in the palace when the English arrived." Evidence to the contrary, however, exists in overwhelming abundance. Major-General Foley says:[2] "I cannot agree that the palace was not sacked. It is true that General de Montauban gave orders that nothing should be touched until the arrival of Sir Hope Grant; but I saw a woful difference in the appearance

[1] About twenty badly-armed slaves made some pretence at resistance, but were quickly disposed of.—See Narrative of the China War, p. 224.

[2] 'Times,' March 14, 1874.

of the wondrously magnificent collections which met the eye upon the first entrance into the palace, at 6 A.M. on the 7th October, of General de Montauban, his staff, and myself, and that which presented itself upon our return to the palace after breakfast about 11.30 A.M. Sir Hope Grant arrived about 1 P.M. . . . On the afternoon of the 8th, an orderly officer informed General de Montauban, with whom I was riding, that the Imperial treasury had been discovered. Upon arriving at the spot we found the French had been in possession some time, and had secured the most precious articles. General de Montauban immediately acceded to my request that the place might be cleared of people, and a guard put over the entrance, until I had communicated with Sir Hope Grant. Sir Hope Grant, with as little delay as possible, sent Major (now Colonel) Anson and 40 sowars to assist me in securing our share in what remained; and I do not think that either Anson or myself will ever forget the rough night we had of it."

All the above is fully confirmed by "An Eye-Witness" and "One who was there." The former writes: "Those who were present when the English Ambassador and the French General met,

will long remember . . . the impressive assertion that nothing in the palace had been removed or injured. But they will remember also the evidence of their own senses. They saw that tents occupied by French officers of all ranks were full of plunder," &c. "One who was there" states: "At the palace I found looting going on everywhere. Officers of the French army of all ranks, French non-commissioned officers and men, were looting systematically." Lastly, the following is an extract from the note-book of an officer on the English Headquarter Staff: "October 7th.—The General and Lord Elgin rode over to the palace. The French were looting it from end to end. . . . October 8th.—The looting in the palace [is being carried on] to a frightful extent to-day. Many of the things put aside for the Queen had been looted by the French."

As regards the burning of the palace, we have never at any time hesitated to assume the responsibility of the deed, but not from the motives attributed by General de Montauban, who now justifies an act in which at the time he refused to participate. The General states: "We hoped, therefore, that this vigorous demonstration would have a good result. Unfortunately, our hopes

were not realised soon enough to save some unfortunate European envoys from frightful tortures; still more, the correspondent of the 'Times' was put to death; and it was when the bloody fragments of his body were found that the English resolved to burn the palace in revenge for the murder of their countryman. I perfectly remember that I then made some observations to Lord Elgin, who replied in a form of discreet confidence, 'What would the "Times" say of me if I did not avenge its correspondent?'" It is indeed difficult to believe that our high-minded diplomatist was prompted to so severe an act of retribution, merely through an apprehension that otherwise he might lack the support of one of the organs, however influential, of public opinion. General de Montauban's argument that the measure was a preventive one, is demolished by the fact that the outrage on our envoys had been perpetrated, and their bodies delivered into our hands on the 16th October, two days before the palace was destroyed.

It has been stated that, on the 17th October, the plenipotentiaries threatened that if our demands were not accepted by the 20th, the allies would burn the Imperial Palace inside Pekin to

the ground. I have the best authority for stating that, though the expediency of the measure was discussed, such a threat was never actually held out to the Chinese.

Sir Garnet Wolseley well sums up all that is to be said on the subject as follows:[1] "The destruction of the palaces appears to have struck the Pekin authorities with awe. It was the stamp which gave an unmistakable reality to our work of vengeance, proving that Lord Elgin's last letter was no idle threat, and warning them of what they might expect in the capital itself unless they accepted our proffered terms. The Imperial Palace within the city still remained untouched; and if they wished to save that last remaining place for their master, it behoved them to lose no time. I feel convinced that the burning of Yuan-min-yuan considerably hastened the final settlement of affairs and strengthened our ambassador's position. Our allies, who had looted all, and destroyed some of the buildings of that place, objected to our putting the *coup de grace* to their work. It was averred that the complete destruction of the palaces would be a Goth-like act of barbarism. It seems strange that this

[1] Narrative of the China War, p. 729.

idea did not occur to the generally quick perceptions of our Gallic allies before they had shorn the place of all its beauty and ornament, by the removal or reckless destruction of everything that was valuable within its precincts, leaving us, indeed, little more than the bare shell of the buildings on which to wreak our vengeance for the cruelties practised therein upon our ill-fated countrymen."

It is scarcely too much to say that the China War of 1860 may be considered the most successful and the best carried out of England's "little wars," if, indeed, the latter term be not a misnomer. No mistake occurred to mar the outline of the whole, and in the short space of three months the Chinese received three defeats in the open—their strong forts of Taku, on which they based their powers of resistance, were captured —and their capital itself was forced to succumb under the guns of the invaders. The expense involved was great; but, unlike the majority of wars, the consequent return was adequate. We obtained freedom of action for our merchants throughout the whole of the empire; we procured for the civilised world protection from the oppression and barbarous outrages which the

nation had been previously wont to inflict upon strangers; we struck a salutary blow at the pride of China, which, as experience shows, has been successful in convincing her that she is no match for the peoples of Europe; and, above all, we exacted from them the Treaty of Pekin,[1] which has proved far more lasting than any former engagements with that nation.

Had we, on the other hand, refrained from war, we could not have maintained our position at the several ports where we traded; neither property nor life would have been worth a moment's purchase; the laws of nations would have been habitually set at defiance; and the time would have arrived when we should have been compelled to quit the country altogether—conciliatory measures and efforts to obtain our just demands by negotiation having been interpreted by the Chinese as signs of weakness. When at last, in alliance with the French, we had recourse to arms, the advantages obtained for the civilised world were scarcely less important than those insured for our own individual interests.—H. KNOLLYS.

[1] See Appendix V., p. 260.

Despatch explaining the immediate sale of English treasure captured in the Summer Palace.

"HEADQUARTERS, PEKIN,
October 21, 1860.

"SIR,—This palace[1] was full of valuable works of art, chiefly of Chinese manufacture; and although an attempt was made to effect a division of the property between the two nations, yet it became virtually a state of indiscriminate plunder. Being unwilling to expose the English army to the demoralising influence of such a state of affairs, I kept them confined to their bivouac in front of Pekin, and appointed officers to collect as far as possible what belonged to the English. The whole of the property thus collected by officers was sold at public auction by my orders, realising about £8000. In addition to this, specie to the amount of about £18,000 was discovered in the palace, and the whole amount being comparatively small, I considered it would only be a just and proper thing to divide this money on the spot amongst the army. My principal reason for this was because our men saw all the French soldiers laden with dollars

[1] The Summer Palace.

and sycee silver, and knowing that the palace had been given up to plunder, might naturally feel dissatisfied at not being allowed to participate; whereas, if they saw everything fairly divided, they would have no reason to complain. Moreover, without the prospect of such a division, it would have been difficult to have prevented any but the best men from going to the palace without leave, to plunder for themselves. I have therefore caused the money to be divided in the following manner—viz., one-third between the officers, and two-thirds between the non-commissioned officers and men; the major-generals and myself resigning all claims to share in the prize. The distribution has been restricted to those actually present with the force before Pekin. —I have the honour, &c.

"J. HOPE GRANT, Lt.-Gen.,
Commander of the Forces.

"The Right Hon. the SECRETARY of STATE for WAR."

CHAPTER VIII.

JOURNAL OF A VISIT TO JAPAN.

SIR HOPE GRANT SAILS FOR JAPAN—ARRIVES AT YOKOHAMA —PROCEEDS TO YEDO—ARREST OF THE JEW—DESCRIPTION OF MR ALCOCK'S RESIDENCE—THE FEUDAL POWER —THE DAIMIOS AND THE GOVERNMENT—MURDER OF THE TYCOON—THE ROYAL CONJUROR—PROSPERITY OF JAPAN—VISIT TO THE JAPANESE MINISTERS—DWELLINGS OF THE DAIMIOS—SYSTEM OF UNIVERSAL ESPIONAGE—JAPANESE DEFENCES—THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF WAR—RETURN VOYAGE TO HONG-KONG—THE GRANADA NEARLY FOUNDERS—SHIPWRECKED MALAYS—LEAVE TO RETURN TO ENGLAND—INTERVIEW WITH NAPOLEON—FUNERAL OF THE EMPEROR.

ON the 29th November I started for Shanghai, where I arrived on the 4th December, and where I and my staff were most hospitably received by Mr Webb, of Dent's House. I then sailed on a pleasure trip to Japan, where, owing to Mr Webb's kind arrangements, I spent three weeks very pleasantly, pending the arrival of orders from England relative to my own destination.

On 12th December 1860, my staff I and embarked on board the Granada for Japan. On the 17th, we entered the harbour of Kanagava, where the view was surpassingly beautiful, with the adjacent undulating ground covered with rich crops, and with a lovely background of the snow-topped peaks of Fusi-yama. The next day we landed at Yokohama, three miles distant from Kanagava, and the only place in Japan where foreign merchants are allowed to reside. The little town was neat, clean, and well built, with numerous shops containing the beautiful lacquer-ware for which the country is so celebrated. We forthwith forwarded a letter of introduction, with which we had been provided, to Mr Alcock,[1] Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Yedo, the principal city in Japan, who received us with the greatest cordiality and kindness. He obtained permission for us to visit the town, and kindly offered to put us up at his house. Our journey extended over a distance of about sixteen miles, and we accomplished it with great comfort by means of some excellent ponies lent to us by Captain Vyse, and

[1] Now Sir Rutherford Alcock, K.C.B. Resigned his position in Japan, July 1871.

by a "noriman," a species of silk-cushioned palanquin, carried by eight bearers, divided into two reliefs of four. The whole road from Kanagava was intensely interesting and beautiful; the villages and detached houses were neat and clean; and there was a general appearance of prosperity and comfort very unusual in these Eastern lands. The route, which was excellent, led us along the sea-shore; different sorts of wild fowl flocked around us in every direction like barn-door fowls, sometimes lighting so close that it would have been easy to have killed them with a stone. Cyruses, storks, and snipe were equally numerous. The latter, indeed, were perfectly tame, for no one in the neighbourhood of Yedo is allowed to molest them. We were met on our journey by the Dutch [1] Vice-Consul, who took us to a roadside tea-garden, where we were supplied with tea by some really pretty and pleasing-looking girls. As we approached the town, Mr Alcock, accompanied by some of the Legation, rode out to receive us.

While we were at Yedo, a melancholy occur-

[1] Until a short time previous to 1854, the Chinese and the Dutch were the only foreigners admitted, for trading purposes, within Japanese territory. The exports by the Dutch were limited to two ships' cargoes annually.

rence took place. An English Jew went out shooting, and killed a wild goose, whereupon some policemen came up, demanded his name, and secured the coolie who was carrying the bird. This was resented by the Jew, who cocked his gun, and, presenting it at one of the party, threatened to fire if they advanced any further. The gun unhappily went off, either by accident or with intention, shattered the man's arm, and otherwise wounded him severely. The offender was taken off to prison, but was eventually handed over to the Consul; and after he had paid a fine of 1000 dollars, was deported. Had the victim died, the consequent troubles would have been serious and complicated, for the Japanese are a revengeful race, and act on the principle of blood for blood.

Mr Alcock's house had been converted from a handsome temple into a very comfortable dwelling. It was beautifully situated, with a well-mown lawn behind, about which were dotted shrubs and dwarf trees, leading down to a pretty little piece of water with fantastic bridges. Still further to the rear was a bold hill covered with fine evergreen oaks; and on the side of the acclivity was an old cemetery, laid out with much

taste, and ornamented with handsomely-carved ancient tombstones, and some splendid old trees. I must confess that the cold of the house was biting, for we were in the middle of winter, and the windows as well as the partitions of the rooms were formed of thin paper.

The dress of the Japanese and the Chinese is very similar. Both perpetually carry about with them umbrellas, and both are hard-working and intelligent; but in other respects they totally differ from one another. The Chinese are stolid and sedate; the Japanese, who are a race of Malays, are cheerful and lively. They are, moreover, of a curious, prying disposition; and the system of espionage carried on throughout all orders of society renders intercourse with them extremely troublesome and dangerous. Their head ruler goes by the name of the Tycoon, and all temporal authority is vested in him, with a Ministry under him. He resides in Yedo. Their Emperor, who is called the Micado, is their spiritual governor. He lives at Miako, and, as I understood, is kept secluded from human sight.[1] A strong feudal power exists among the Princes

[1] This government is now altogether changed. The Daimios have voluntarily relinquished their feudal rights, the office of

and the Daimios, or Barons, which in many instances is so great that the Government frequently have hard work to maintain their own authority. Several of these chiefs possess as many as 30,000 armed retainers, ready to do their bidding at a moment's notice. The Daimios entertain a great hatred towards all foreigners, and especially towards the English—and with good reason. They are aware that we have taken possession of the whole of India ; and they have seen China, one of the largest empires in the world, completely broken up by us.[1] The Japanese Government rather encouraged the admission of foreigners into the country, as a counterpoise to the much-feared influence of the Daimios. It was, however, dangerous even for ambassadors to reside in Yedo, where Europeans were constantly murdered. A short time before our arrival, three Russians and a Frenchman had been assassinated, and the crime was imputed to the Daimios.

About the year 1853, when the English first

Tycoon has been abolished, and the Emperor of Japan is now virtually as well as nominally head of both "Church and State." —H. K.

[1] It must be remembered that this was written immediately after we had imposed a humiliating peace on the Chinese.

began to make their appearance in the island, the Tycoon was poisoned by Prince Mito, a powerful noble. The criminal was first banished to his own territory by order of the Government, then sentenced to perpetual exile from the capital, and finally deposed from his principality, his son being allowed to succeed him; all this rankled in the Prince's mind, and he determined to murder the Regent, whose name was Ikomonono-Kami, and whose office he had hoped to obtain, the new Tycoon being a minor. The Regent's residence, a princely mansion, was situated within the outer wall of the fortress, and about 500 yards from the palace. One stormy day, when the snow and sleet were being drifted about in every direction, he was attacked by a party of about eighteen armed men as he was proceeding in his noriman from his house to the palace. When Daimios go out of doors, however short may be the distance they intend to perform, they always proceed in state, with two standard-bearers, several umbrella-bearers, and numerous retainers, some of whom, according to their singular ideas of dignity, carry a quantity of boxes, supposed to be filled with wearing apparel. In the present instance, the retainers were all armed, many of them with two

swords each; but in consequence of the cold they were wrapped up in large waterproof cloaks, made of a kind of oiled brown paper, which, with their enormous clumsy hats, rendered the wearers sufficiently helpless. The assassins suddenly attacked the *cortège*, cut down some of the bearers and retainers, and were proceeding to drag the unfortunate Regent out of his norimon, when his guard drew their swords, and a general *mêlée* ensued. Several were disabled on both sides; and it is stated that the wounded murderers instantly performed the Hara-kiri, or Happy Despatch, which consists in committing suicide by disembowelling themselves, and with which, by the laws of the country, no one is allowed to interfere even to further the ends of justice. During the scuffle a man was seen running away, holding up a decapitated human head by the hair. The retainers supposed it to be that of the Regent, and in order to gain possession of it pursued the fugitive. Meanwhile the assassins availed themselves of the opportunity to behead the real Regent, and to effect their escape. The feudal retainers, eight of whom were still alive, were discovered, and put to the torture. They confessed that Prince Mito had ordered them to commit the crime. After

which they were executed, or allowed to perform the Hara-kiri; and Mito was, by directions of the Government, poisoned. Such were the results of a feudal power, and the absence of an untrammelled Government. Each Daimio's retainers consider it to be their duty to carry out their chief's behest, even though death or torture is certain to be the consequence.

Shortly after our arrival the royal conjuror gave a performance before us. He was a dignified-looking old gentleman, with a deep sonorous voice, extremely refined in his manners, and dressed like a high-bred Japanese. His tricks, which were sleight of hand, were nothing remarkable, with two exceptions. Having rolled up a small piece of paper, he shook it gently upon a fan, and gradually it assumed the shape of a small beautifully-formed egg. It was then put into an empty box, and transformed into a live barn-door fowl. Again, he formed a scrap of paper into the shape of a butterfly, which he set in motion by waving a fan; at a short distance it appeared to fly about exactly like a live insect. After a while he treated a second piece of paper in the same way, and by means of two fans kept both butterflies flying about together, one of them

occasionally lighting upon some convenient resting-place. I never in any country saw a more graceful or charming trick.

The next day Mr Alcock took us to see the pretty tea-gardens at Oh-gee, ten miles distant. The villagers appeared civil and respectful; and here, again, there were evidences of prosperity and comfort universally apparent which I never expected to meet with in an Eastern land. The gardens were really very pretty, with a picturesque rivulet, neat walks, flowers, and a carefully-kept lawn. We were provided with an excellent breakfast, though one elaborate dish consisted of a large raw fish, and we were waited on by some very pretty modest-looking damsels, whose attractions consisted in dark eyes, a profusion of jet black hair, beautiful complexions, and the freshness of youth. The poor married ladies, however, excited our sincere pity. When subjected to the misfortune of marriage, they are obliged to shave their eyebrows and stain their fine teeth with some horrible ugly black composition, which takes away charms they might otherwise possess. Mr Alcock kindly wrote to inform the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs that I wished to pay my respects to the Ministers, and they fixed the

15th December for my visit. Ladies were not allowed to be present. On that day, therefore, I set out with Mr Alcock and his staff on Japanese ponies, and proceeded through the gate of the outer wall, within which were built all the Daimios' houses, each in turn surrounded by a second large wall, with handsome gateways, and the family arms emblazoned over them. The pathways were beautifully kept with streams of pure water flowing along the sides. Within were two other substantial enclosures, one of which contained the Tycoon's palace, and the other that of the Ministers. Each enclosure was encircled with a large moat of transparent water, literally covered with wild ducks, and with stone battlements and banks of beautiful turf. Splendid cedars threw out their wide-spreading branches from the edge of the water to the foot of the wall. We were ushered into a well-built, scrupulously clean palace, carpeted with the finest mats, but otherwise unfurnished. The Japanese nobility pride themselves on being without luxuries, and on dressing themselves in the plainest silks. The males of all classes sit upon their heels, considering chairs and tables effeminate and derogatory to the dignity of a man. In an inner room, however,

these conveniences had been provided for us; and on this occasion the two chief Japanese Ministers also occupied seats opposite to us, either out of respect, or because they thought that to stand while we were seated would be inconsistent with their rank. The other dignitaries sat on their heels. The appearance of a Japanese is not unlike that of a bantam-cock: small, compact, strutting little fellows, they shave the tops of their heads, leaving a tuft of stiff hair sticking out in the centre of the forehead, which strongly resembles the top-knot of a cock. The nobility are dressed in quiet-coloured silk jackets, with tight pantaloons. On this occasion they were without slippers, and each man wore two swords projecting at right angles behind, just like a cock's tail. Altogether they were the most quaint laughable little fellows imaginable. The Japanese, I understand, have now taken to wear European clothes. We were placed opposite them on the other side of the room, and all our conversation was carried on by means of an interpreter seated on his heels between us. Whenever he translated a sentence to the Ministers, he first bowed to the ground and kissed the dust at their feet. A small table was placed before each of us, on which were

arranged preserved fruits, cakes, pipes and tobacco. After a short stay, and sundry little complimentary speeches, we got up, bowed, and took our departure. I have seen no country, apart from our own, where the inhabitants appear so comfortable and well cared for, and no town so clean and in such good order as Yedo. They seem to delight in cleanliness, and the public baths are numerous and much frequented. The city is twenty-five miles in circumference, and is supposed to contain about two million inhabitants. The houses are built of wood, except the foundations of those belonging to the Daimios, and are seldom even one story high. Very destructive typhoons and earthquakes are of constant occurrence; and a short time ago nearly the whole of Yedo was in consequence shaken to the ground.

As I have before mentioned, the official houses of the Daimios are situated inside the large outer moat which surrounded the palace, and here a certain number of them are obliged to reside for six months in the year. The Government make it a rule that no Daimio shall call upon another that by so doing he lowers his dignity and pronounces himself of an inferior rank. By these means their power becomes limited, combinations

are prevented, and every one is jealous of his neighbour. The system of official espionage also checks their mixing with one another, as each fears his neighbour may be a spy, who will report against him he knows not what. During our stay at Yedo a constant watch was kept upon our conduct, and we were never allowed to go out without being attended by two or three Jakomins — mounted officials, each wearing two swords. Nominally they acted as our guards, but their real object was to watch our doings. One day, however, Biddulph and I slipped out quietly, unobserved, and took a walk along the sea-side. Suddenly the retainer of some Daimio, armed with two swords, galloped up furiously behind us and would have ridden us down had we not slipped aside. After casting at us looks of undisguised defiance, he rode on, and our Jakomins, who by this time had discovered that we had eluded them, came up and resumed guard over us.

On the 27th December we left Yedo for Kanagava, and on the 28th again put to sea. The harbours of both towns are indifferent, and without sufficient water for vessels of large size. Opposite Yedo are four forts, which extend across

the bay, and are apparently heavily armed; but we were not allowed to enter any of them. There are numerous other similar forts along the sea-coast. When I was on shore I examined one of their works as closely as could be managed, and I found that though strong in front, it could not resist an attack in rear. The nation seems to have made considerable progress in the art of war, though a portion of their army is still armed with bows and arrows. On the occasion of our visit to the Ministers, I inspected the arms of the guard at one of the gates of the fortress. They were armed with Japanese-made percussion light muskets; but on trying the locks many of them would scarcely go off. The guard were seated in a line on their heels in front of the guard-room, and some distance from their muskets. They appeared perfectly immovable, otherwise than that they paid the strictest attention to our movements.

We made our return voyage through the inland sea, and on our way passed the towns of Oyaca and Miako, the chief city in the country. The adjacent country was mountainous, thickly wooded, and inhabited. The numerous fishing-junks, with their large, singularly-shaped, dark-

brown sails, had a very picturesque effect. On the 4th January we arrived at Nagasaki, the third largest town in Japan, situated at the head of a long narrow bay. At the entrance is the small sugar-loaf-shaped island of Pappenberg, from the top of which, 200 years ago, Christians were cast down a perpendicular height of about 100 feet.

On each side of the bay are numerous batteries, the total armament of which amounts to 800 guns. Nagasaki cannot be compared with Yedo in appearance or in cleanliness, and is not nearly so large—not above one-tenth the size. There is a pretty cemetery on a hillside behind the town, not unlike the Paris Père la Chaise. The dead are buried in a sitting position, with the knees tied together. Our next destination was the mouth of the Woosung river, where we had a narrow escape. We were here enveloped in a thick fog, and cast anchor in five fathoms of water; but after a time it began to blow very heavily, and when the tide had fallen we suddenly bumped with great violence against the bottom. We immediately began to weigh anchor, but this operation required some time, and meanwhile we were subjected to five distinct and violent shocks.

We were in imminent danger of foundering, and were only safe when we got up our anchor and steamed into deep water. In this unpleasant vicinity we remained for three days, when the fog lifted, and we made our way to Shanghai. The Granada's time was now up, and we were obliged to leave her. We had been most kindly taken care of by her commander, Captain Hazlewood, an excellent sailor, and a good honest Englishman. We embarked on board the Formosa for Hong-Kong, where we arrived on the 29th January. On our way we picked up the long-boat and crew of a ship called the Elizabeth, which had foundered ten days ago when 300 miles from Hong-Kong. The boat was in tow of a junk which had come across them the same day as ourselves. There was on board a Scotchman, twelve Malays, and some Chinamen. One of the latter died, and the rest of the crew were at death's-door owing to hunger and thirst.

Towards the end of January 1861, I went to inspect our newly-acquired promontory of Kowloon—which, by the new treaty, had been handed formally over to us—and to settle on the measures for putting it in a state of defence. The Hong-Kong merchants wanted to obtain possession of

all the best ground for their own purposes; but of course I insisted on the most advantageous positions being reserved as sites for the projected new barracks.

I received a letter from the Duke of Cambridge desiring me to send back to India as many of the native regiments as could be spared; but, under the circumstances, I could only dispense with the Loodianah Regiment and the 21st Madras Native Infantry—which were despatched to their respective Presidencies. The 60th Rifles were also ordered to England, and Fane's Regiment to the Punjaub.

I was offered the appointment of Commander-in-Chief at Madras, which I gratefully accepted; and His Royal Highness very kindly allowed me to take a run home for six months, which was a great boon. I remember that, some time afterwards, on my return to England, I was introduced to Sir Charles Wood, the Secretary of State for India, at a dinner given by the Duke. His speech to me was: "I am happy to make your acquaintance, but sorry to find you here." I opened my eyes, and thought I had not heard him properly; but he added, "Did you not receive my letter in China?" I replied that I had not.

Dinner was at this moment announced; but he afterwards took me aside and explained that he had written, desiring me to take up my command at once at Madras, where my presence was much needed to assist in carrying out the scheme for amalgamating the Queen's and East India Company's armies. By some fortunate "mischance" I had never received the letter. What an untimely bit of paper it would have been! I had been for three hot seasons in succession under canvas on active service during the Indian Mutiny, followed by a campaign in China, and I absolutely required a little setting up in my own country before encountering the sultry atmosphere of Madras.[1] I was now made a G.C.B., which is the highest military order in Great Britain, and the Emperor of the French nominated me a "Grand Officer of the Legion of Honour."

It gave me great delight to hear that Admiral Hope had been made a K.C.B., as a finer, more honourable man, or a greater ornament to his profession, does not exist.

Sir John Michel now arrived at Hong-Kong:

[1] The illness of which Sir Hope Grant died—March 7, 1875—originated from his long and trying service in India and China.—H. K., March 15th.

I handed over to him the command of the troops; and on the 16th March I embarked on board the Pekin for dear old England. On the 24th April I arrived in Paris; and there I had the honour of being presented by our ambassador, Lord Cowley,[1] to the Emperor Napoleon. We were ushered into a room, where the great autocrat of the world was sitting at a large table covered with papers, in which he seemed profoundly immersed. He rose at our entrance, and with a manner totally unlike that of a Frenchman, came up to me, and shook hands very cordially. After addressing to me some complimentary remarks, he began speaking about the China campaign, and said he thought it would have been desirable for the allies to have put down the rebellion which was devastating the empire ere they left the country. We had a long conversation on this and similar subjects, and he then rose, and we took our departure. There was a stolid sober look about his countenance, and he appeared to weigh every sentence before he spoke.

[In some subsequent pages of Sir Hope Grant's Journal, I find the following account of the next

[1] Now Earl Cowley, K.G.; G.C.B.

occasion when he was brought into personal communication with members of the Bonaparte family.—H. K.]

The Emperor Napoleon died at Chiselhurst on the 9th January 1873; and considering that I had taken part with his troops during the China war, and that he had given me the Star and Order of the Legion of Honour, I felt that it would be a proper mark of respect which I owed to him to attend his funeral. It took place on the 15th January; and at 9.30 A.M. on that day, accompanied by my aide-de-camp, Barton,[1] I showed my card at Camden House, where the Imperial family resided, and was at once admitted. I was presented by Lord Sydney, the representative of her Majesty, to the Duc de Cambacérès, the late Emperor's chamberlain. At eleven o'clock the coffin was brought out, and placed in a hearse drawn by eight horses, and on the top of the carriage were laid several beautiful wreaths of camellias and violets. The young Prince Imperial, as chief mourner, followed in rear, together with some of the ladies of the Imperial Court, general officers, and other gentlemen. Amongst them was my old ally, De Montauban, now Count Palikao, and Marshal

[1] Captain, Coldstream Guards.

Canrobert, with his left arm in a sling. Marshal MacMahon was not present. I was standing speaking to Sir Linton Simmons,[1] the Governor of the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich, who had brought with him a number of Woolwich cadets, friends of the Prince Imperial, who was studying at the institution, when a well-dressed man came up and asked for the names of the young gentlemen who were to take part in the procession. He then inquired of me in what capacity I was present, and when I told him my name, he took off his hat and said, "I am proud to have the honour of seeing you. I was formerly your brother's, Mr Grant's,[2] whipper-in when he kept the hounds in Perthshire:" for the last seventeen years he had been stud-groom to the late Emperor Napoleon. I then recognised him as Mr Gamble, a person of great importance at Chalons when I there attended the French manœuvres professionally. I inquired whether I could obtain admission into the chapel; and he replied that probably this would be very difficult, as there were a large number of followers who would have the first right of entry; at the same

[1] Lieut.-General Sir Linton Simmons, K.C.B.

[2] Died 1873.

time he begged me to accept his card of admission, of which I gladly availed myself. We followed in the procession to the Roman Catholic chapel, about half a mile distant, and the number of people who had assembled to witness the ceremony was marvellous. The greatest respect and solemnity were manifested throughout. On arriving at the chapel the coffin was taken out of the hearse and covered with a purple-velvet pall, on which were embroidered the imperial crown and numerous bees; it was then carried into the chapel and surrounded by priests. Next began the ceremonies of the Roman Catholic Church, the reading of prayers in Latin, the continual putting the mitre on the head of Monsignor Goddart, the principal priest, and taking it off again, the procession of priests round the coffin, sprinkling it with what is called holy water, and enveloping it in a mist of incense, as though to waft the spirit of the dead into Paradise. After these ceremonies the coffin was borne into a small adjacent vault with grated doors. Every Roman Catholic present then sprinkled holy water upon it. On leaving the chapel, the Duc de Cambacérès requested me to be present at a levee which the Prince Imperial was about to hold at Camden House. There I

was presented by De Montauban to the young Prince and to his cousin Prince Napoleon. The former was much liked by the Woolwich cadets. He afterwards went out to receive a deputation of French peasants and artisans, who had come over to attend the funeral. They appeared carrying the tricolor on the branch of a tree; and one of them made an oration, which was followed by vociferous cries of "Vive Napoleon IV.!" "Vive l'Empereur!" "Vive l'Angleterre!" Shortly afterwards the crowd dispersed.

APPENDIX.

I.

SHANGHAI, *22d March* 1860.

SIR,—I have the honour to inform you, that with the view of guarding against any delay which might take place in the negotiations with the Chinese Government, in the event of my being compelled from any cause to quit China, the Queen has been graciously pleased to grant to you (or the commander of her Majesty's land forces in China for the time being), and to Rear-Admiral James Hope (or the senior officer in command of her Majesty's squadron for the time being), a full power, authorising you to negotiate, either jointly or separately, with the Ministers of the Emperor of China.

This full power has been transmitted to me, and I have caused it to be placed in the archives of her Majesty's Legation, where it will remain until the contingency in which it is intended to be exercised shall have arisen.—I have the honour, &c.

FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Lieutenant-General Sir J. HOPE GRANT, K.C.B.

II.

Extracts from a Despatch from Sir HOPE GRANT to the SECRETARY of STATE for WAR, reporting the Capture of the Peiho Forts. (See Chap. IV.)

HEADQUARTERS, TANG-KU,
24th August 1860.

SIR,—I have the honour to report, that after the capture of Tang-ku on the 14th inst., I commenced bringing up siege-guns and ammunition from Peh-tang, with a view to the reduction of the uppermost fort on the left bank of the Peiho, distant about two miles from Tang-ku. The ground upon which it was necessary to advance was mostly of a very difficult nature, and intersected with broad and deep canals, used in the manufacture of salt.

I placed Major-General Sir R. Napier in charge of the advance, his division being quartered in Tang-ku. Under his superintendence, bridges were thrown over the ditches by Lieutenant-Colonel Mann, commanding Royal Engineers; and heavy guns,[1] with a good supply of ammunition, having been brought into Tang-ku, the 67th Regiment and one Armstrong battery were pushed forward on the evening of the 19th to within 2000 yards, to cover the working parties making roads, bridges, &c.

[1] Two 32-pounders, two 8-inch howitzers, three 8-inch mortars.

On the 20th, the road was made practicable to within 800 yards of the fort, batteries were traced, and the heavy guns were brought out, ready to place in position by daybreak on the following day.

The Chinese opened fire during the day, and were replied to by Captain Milward's Armstrong guns at 2000 yards range with good effect, and the firing gradually ceased. During the night batteries were constructed for the heavy guns and mortars, and for one field-battery; also for two 8-inch guns, which were brought up with great exertions from Peh-tang during the night; and the whole were placed in position by daybreak on the 21st August.

It had been arranged with the Admiral that the gun-boats should cross the bar that morning, and should engage the outer north fort and the flank of the outer south fort at the same time that the attack on the inner north fort was commenced by the land forces.

At 5 A.M., however, the Chinese opened fire upon the troops from all their forts within range, and we were thus forced to reply an hour earlier than had been intended. The artillery was disposed as follows:—

. . . . . .

. . . . . .

The storming party of infantry consisted of a wing of the 44th, under Lieutenant-Colonel M'Mahon, and a wing of the 67th, under Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas, supported by the other wings of those two regiments and the Royal Marines, under Lieutenant-Colonel Gascoyne. A detachment of Royal Marines, under

Lieutenant-Colonel Travers, carried a pontoon-bridge for crossing the wet ditches; and Major Graham, R.E., conducted the attack. The whole were commanded by Brigadier Reeves.

The fire of the artillery was most effective; the guns of the fort (of which many were of very large calibre) were speedily silenced; and at about 7 A.M. the magazine blew up with a terrific explosion. A few minutes later the magazine in the outer north fort was also exploded by a shell from the gunboats. The field-guns were all advanced to within 500 yards of the fort, and redoubled their efforts, and a breach was commenced near the gate. The fire of the fort having almost entirely ceased, a portion of the storming party was advanced to within 30 yards, to open a musketry-fire, the French infantry being on the right, the English on the left. The fire of our artillery being thus partially compelled to slacken, the enemy emerged from their cover, and opened a heavy fire of musketry on our troops. The French immediately pushed on to the salient next the river, crossed the wet ditch in the most gallant manner, and established themselves on the berm, from whence they endeavoured to escalade the walls. This, however, they were unable to effect, from the vigorous resistance of the Chinese. The efforts of the sappers to lay down the pontoon-bridge were unavailing, no less than 15 of the men carrying it being knocked over in one instant, and one of the pontoons destroyed.

At this juncture Sir R. Napier caused the two howitzers of Captain Govan's battery to be brought up

to within 50 yards of the gate, in order more speedily to create a breach; and a space sufficient to admit one man had just been made, when our storming party, now joined by the wing of the 67th, under Colonel Knox, which had partly crossed by the French bridge and partly swam over, forced their way in by single file in the most gallant manner, Lieutenant Rogers, 44th, and Lieutenant Burslem, 67th, being the first to enter, when they assisted the regimental colours of the 67th Regiment, carried by Ensign Chaplin, who first planted them on the breach, assisted by Private Lane, 67th Regiment, and then carried them to the cavalier, which he was the first to mount. At the same moment the French effected their entrance, and the garrison was driven back, step by step, and hurled, pell-mell, through the embrasures on the opposite side.

Here the same obstacles which had impeded our advance obstructed their retreat; in addition to two wet ditches and two belts of pointed bamboo stakes, there was swampy ground, and a third ditch and bank.

The storming parties opened a destructive fire on them from the cavalier, and this was enhanced by the canister of Captain Govan's guns, which had been moved to the left of the fort for this purpose. The ground outside the fort was literally strewn with the enemy's dead and wounded. Three of the Chinese were impaled on the stakes. A few fugitives reached the outer north fort, which opened fire to cover their retreat, and was answered by the Armstrong guns with good effect. About an hour after this, the whole of the

forts hauled down their war-banners, and hoisted flags of truce. . . . . .

. . . . . .

. . . . . .

. . . . . .

I have, &c.,

J. HOPE GRANT, Lieut.-General,
Commander of the Forces.

III.

From Hon. F. BRUCE, British Minister, China, to Sir HOPE GRANT.

SHANGHAI, *May* 10, 1860.

MY DEAR GRANT,— . . . .

. . . . . .

Montauban has deferred his departure [for Shantung] till he hears from you. With the immediate arrival of the ambassadors, I am not sorry at this. He is not prepared to attack the forts, therefore no time is lost; and if the expedition advances on Shantung after the ambassadors reach China, the Emperor will be disabused of the idea that any change has taken place in the policy of the two Governments.

You will hear from Chusan of the alarm produced by inquiries into the taxation of the island. As the place and inhabitants are poor, it would, in my opinion,

be advisable to treat the island now as we did on our former occupation,[1] and not raise taxes. Considering the extent of China, and the importance of not being driven elsewhere for supplies, we ought not to sacrifice lightly the goodwill of the inhabitants, where they are disposed to receive us in a friendly spirit. I hear that Meritens has recommended the removal of the civil mandarin, because he declines furnishing information as to taxes. I should regret any such measure, as his absence would render the task of administering the island much more difficult.

Perhaps the Earl[2] has left you for the north. If not, pray show him this letter. I don't write to him, because I expect that he will have started for Shanghai.

I may mention that it is reported the Imperialists have been beaten and compelled to raise the siege of Nankin, and that fresh proposals for accommodation are contemplated by the Chinese. I expect some such move when the ambassadors arrive.

I like what I have seen of Janin.[3] . . .

Yours very truly,

FREDERICK BRUCE.

[1] In 1843.

[2] His brother, Lord Elgin.

[3] The French envoy.

IV.

(*See page* 90.)

Recapitulation of the Return of Killed and Wounded in the English Force during the attack on the Peiho Forts, 21st August 1860.

	Killed or mortally wounded.	Wounded.	Missing.	Total.
Officers, . . .	0	21	0	21
Men, . . .	22	158	0	180
	22	179	0	201

W. M. MUIR, D.I.G.,
P.M.O.

FREDK. STEPHENSON,
D.A.G.

V.

(*See page* 225.)

Heads of Convention between the English and the Chinese, signed at Pekin, October 24, 1860.

1. The Emperor of China expresses his deep regret at the misunderstanding occasioned by the act of the Taku garrison, 1859.

2. The English ambassador to be allowed to reside at Pekin.

3. The Emperor of China to pay 8,000,000 taels indemnity to the British Government.

4. Tien-tsin to be open to British traders.

5. Permission to be granted to Chinese subjects to take service with the British in their colonies or other parts beyond sea.

6. Kowloon permanently ceded to the British.

7. Provisions of the treaty of 1858 to be carried into effect.

8. The 1858 and the 1860 treaty to be made public throughout China.

9. Upon the exchange of ratifications of the 1858 treaty and the signature of the 1860 convention, Chusan to be evacuated, and British force before Pekin to commence its march towards Tien-tsin, Taku, Shan-tung, and Canton; but at the option of the Queen a force may be maintained at any of the above stations pending the payment of the indemnity.

VI.

(*See Chapter IV.*)

Extract from a Despatch from LORD HERBERT, Secretary of State for War, to Sir HOPE GRANT, dated War Office, 10th November 1860.

"SIR,—. . . . I immediately laid before the Queen those despatches in which you have ably described the rapid and brilliant operations which followed the landing of the allied forces at Peh-tang, and which terminated in the capture of the forts both on the north and south banks of the Peiho.

"I have now received her Majesty's gracious orders to express to you her sense of the great service you have rendered to the country, and her admiration of the gallantry and discipline which have been signally displayed by the troops under your command. . . .

. . . . . .

"The Queen deeply deplores the inevitable loss incidental to the achievement of this great success. . . .

. . . . . .

"To yourself as commander-in-chief, to the generals of divisions, to the brigadiers, and to all the officers and men engaged, her Majesty tenders her warm and heartfelt thanks."

VII.

Extract of a Despatch from Sir HOPE GRANT to LORD CANNING relating to the services of the two Sikh Irregular Cavalry Regiments.

HEADQUARTERS, TIEN-TSIN, *Nov.* 21, 1860.

MY LORD,—The 1st Sikh Irregular Cavalry, under Major Probyn, and Fane's Horse under Captain Fane, have performed their work most admirably. On more than one occasion these regiments have been opposed to, and have successfully charged, a vastly superior force of the enemy's cavalry; and their conduct in the field excited the admiration of the French as well as of the English troops.

It is not only on the field of battle that their services have been so important during the recent campaign, but in performing the numerous other duties required of them of an infinitely more harassing nature—patrols, escorts, reconnaissances, as well as the task of carrying letters almost daily between Tien-tsin and Pekin (a distance of 75 miles) for upwards of a month, during which they were frequently fired upon—their services have been of the utmost value to the expedition. I beg to recommend Major Probyn and Captain Fane to your Excellency's most favourable notice.

. . . . . .

I have, &c.

J. HOPE GRANT, *Lieut.-General,*
Commander of the Forces.

VIII.

Proposed Distribution of British Troops when the army marched from Pekin, November 1860.

To remain at Tien-tsin under Brigadier Staveley,	2½ Batteries Royal Artillery. 1 Company Royal Engineers. Fane's Horse. Military Train. 3 Line Regiments.
To Remain at Shanghai,	½ Battery Royal Artillery. 2 Native Infantry Regiments.
Canton,	1 Battery Royal Artillery. 99th Regiment. 3d Bombay N.I.
Hong-Kong,	1 Battery Royal Artillery. 1 Company Royal Engineers. 44th Regiment. 21st Madras N.I.
Return to India,	Madras Artillery. Madras Sappers. King's Dragoon Guards. Probyn's Horse. 3 Punjaub Infantry Regiments.
To return to England,	3 Batteries Royal Artillery. 1 Company Royal Engineers. 4 Line Regiments.

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

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